Comments on Ann Capling “The end of Doha as we have known it: what next for Australian trade policy?” 3/05/2011, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/05/03/the-end-of-doha-as-we-have-known-it-what-next-for-australian-trade-policy/
I have to say that I am very unfamiliar to WTO Doha round negotiations, not to mention the causes of current difficulties.
I would like to ask a question however. Why could WTO adopt a rather different approach to member negotiations by having a forward opt in strategy?
Such a strategy would be to advance a version of forward and make it an agreement among them first if there are at least a set minimum number of countries or with a set minimum share of world trade agree to a clause, with it open for other members to opt in at a later stage. Once opting in, a country should only move forward.
This strategy would settle on agreements and leave disagreements aside.
With proper provisions or revision to existing rules, it could avoid the current cumbersome negotiations and make gradual and steady advancement and could potentially replace the needs for regional trade agreement for many countries.
In fact, such a strategy could be applied to some other international organisations, such as different UN bodies.
More specifically, UN climate change negotiations.
Showing posts with label WTO rules. Show all posts
Showing posts with label WTO rules. Show all posts
2009-09-15
Does WTO have any tooth?
Comments on Alan Kohler “Obama's perilous protectionism”, 15/09/2009, http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/China-America-marraige-hits-the-rocks-pd20090915-VVSFV?OpenDocument&src=sph
It would be interesting to see what the WTO should say on the US new tariff on Chinese Tyers.
Does the WTO have any tooth to enforce its own rules, especially when it deals with world most powerful economies like the US?
It would be interesting to see what the WTO should say on the US new tariff on Chinese Tyers.
Does the WTO have any tooth to enforce its own rules, especially when it deals with world most powerful economies like the US?
2009-09-08
WTO needs enforcement
Comments on Rajiv Kumar “India: Pumping new life into the Doha Round”, 8/09/2009, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/09/08/india-pumping-new-life-into-the-doha-round/
If existing WTO rules cannot prevent governments from taking protectionist measures in trade, what is the use for the conclusion of another round of trade negotiations that is simply likely to be no secure in safeguard measures?
The fact is that the collapse in trade has been much serious than the decline in economic growth.
WTO needs to enforce existing rules as opposed to let them bended by some governments.
Does it have the courage to do it?
If existing WTO rules cannot prevent governments from taking protectionist measures in trade, what is the use for the conclusion of another round of trade negotiations that is simply likely to be no secure in safeguard measures?
The fact is that the collapse in trade has been much serious than the decline in economic growth.
WTO needs to enforce existing rules as opposed to let them bended by some governments.
Does it have the courage to do it?
2009-06-10
Rio board and shareholders and the failed deal with Chinalco
Comments on Ross Daniel’s comments on “Australia needs to get its act together on China, and fast”, 9/06/2009, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/06/07/australia-needs-to-get-its-act-together-on-china-and-fast/
I have some sympathy to Ross Daniel's point, although I don't think the deal was uncommercial even when it was first promulgated and the Rio board then acted against the shareholders' interest. Although the value of a company is hard to measure because ever changing environment and internal situations, one could get a clue from its share prices. At the time the deal was conceived, what was the total market capitalisation of Rio and what value was the deal value Rio at? I did not calculate that but that should be an easy matter to do. I suspect that that deal valued Rio much higher than the market capitalisation.
One got to remember is the fact that Rio was having very high debt to equity ratio and the market situation during late last year and early this year was so dangerous that some companies were fighting for their own survival. The deal and the Rio board had to take that into account. Yes, it turned out that the world banking and finance crisis almost subsided now, but back then, the whole system was in danger of collapse and many companies, especially those with high debt would have gone under if the banking crisis was not averted by the unprecedented and concerted efforts by the governments of major large countries/economies.
Individual shareholders may or may not have got the whole and true picture as the board in most of time, unless the board is acting strangely but that is relatively rare. On the other hand, shareholders have every right to be concerned and often get emotional.
Even now it is unclear whether the deal with BHP will bring benefit to Rio or not, given that many major countries are voicing their concerns about the monopolistic nature of the deal. They may devise some scheme to counter any savings and pricing monopoly behaviour that would potentially benefit Rio. Don’t worry about WTO rule, if there are many countries that think it is unfair, they will act and design new rules. The matter of fact is that WTO rules are made by its member countries. They can make them and they can change them.
I have some sympathy to Ross Daniel's point, although I don't think the deal was uncommercial even when it was first promulgated and the Rio board then acted against the shareholders' interest. Although the value of a company is hard to measure because ever changing environment and internal situations, one could get a clue from its share prices. At the time the deal was conceived, what was the total market capitalisation of Rio and what value was the deal value Rio at? I did not calculate that but that should be an easy matter to do. I suspect that that deal valued Rio much higher than the market capitalisation.
One got to remember is the fact that Rio was having very high debt to equity ratio and the market situation during late last year and early this year was so dangerous that some companies were fighting for their own survival. The deal and the Rio board had to take that into account. Yes, it turned out that the world banking and finance crisis almost subsided now, but back then, the whole system was in danger of collapse and many companies, especially those with high debt would have gone under if the banking crisis was not averted by the unprecedented and concerted efforts by the governments of major large countries/economies.
Individual shareholders may or may not have got the whole and true picture as the board in most of time, unless the board is acting strangely but that is relatively rare. On the other hand, shareholders have every right to be concerned and often get emotional.
Even now it is unclear whether the deal with BHP will bring benefit to Rio or not, given that many major countries are voicing their concerns about the monopolistic nature of the deal. They may devise some scheme to counter any savings and pricing monopoly behaviour that would potentially benefit Rio. Don’t worry about WTO rule, if there are many countries that think it is unfair, they will act and design new rules. The matter of fact is that WTO rules are made by its member countries. They can make them and they can change them.
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