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Showing posts with label macroeconomics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label macroeconomics. Show all posts

2013-05-08

Know what they say - economists may have positive and normative analyses

Comments and rejoinders on Phil Lewis "Howard’s End: how the coalition’s last budget created the ground for the current deficit", 8/05/2013, https://theconversation.com/howards-end-how-the-coalitions-last-budget-created-the-ground-for-the-current-deficits-13848

I probably don't need to read the article to point out the central argument is wrong and totally unconvincing to politically independent and competent analysts, economists and policy makers who are not mechanical and dogmatic in their thinking.
It has been nearly 6 years since the Howard and Costello government was voted out and the current ALP government came to power. SIX YEARS!
Budget policy can change every year and the current government has had FIVE YEARS and FIVE budgets to change the course.
What has happened?
We've got huge debts and every years there were budget deficits.
Yes, the government can use various excuses, but it is not right for economists to accept any of those.

In answer to Felix's question: "Lincoln, for a self-proclaimed 'economist' to speak of 'huge debts' is a bit unimpressive - tends to make me wonder about the objectivity of your entire post."

Felix, to answer your question, firstly, I am not a self-proclaimed 'economist', but with a PhD degree in economics from the ANU. So what is your definition of economists?
Secondly, my objective is to inject some sanity into the debate. If you understand basis macroeconomics you would know that government expenditure is a policy tool to get the economy to the most desirable state and can be changed to achieve that objective. The underlying assumption is to get the budget balanced over a economic cycle.
Now it has been 5 and a half years since the current government in being control, that is how many days that the course of G could have been changed to bring the budget into balance?
Neither Rudd or Gillard have been bound by Howard/Costello policies, have they? Then why blame Howard/Costello for the current deficits 5 and a half years later?
In terms of debts, they are huge, if you looked the rate of change and the magnitudes of yearly average, aren't they?
So let not be arguing according to whether one has benefited from either side of political side and be objective and independent. AND apply a little economics, if one can.

In answer to Ted's questions "Lincoln, can you elaborate on why debts denominated in the currency over which the government has sovereignty are ever an issue?
"And could you also please elaborate on why deficits are bad for an open economy with a current account deficit and a positive savings ratio?
"

Ted, firstly, government debts, like private debts, incur interest costs at least, irrespective which currency it is denominated in, not to mention situations may change in the future that even the principal of the government debts may be forced to pay or may need to pay. Currently due to very low interest rates due to the state of the international economies, the costs of interest payments for governments are relatively low compared to otherwise. Just think about the case where interest rates were as high as nearly 20% a year occurred before.
Secondly, there is an inter-generation fairness issue, not too different from leaving your children with debts or wealth. Current government debts if not paid, represent a liability for future generations, that is, our children and grand children.
Thirdly, there is a moral hazard issue here too. If everyone thinks and acts as if government debts don't matter, then what governments and politicians would do? And what are the limits to the levels of debts in that situation? And also, the current political arrangement, not only in Australia but in many countries, mean either one side of the main political streams or both have an incentive to spend beyond its means, because they don't face hard budget constraints and public debts are not their individual debts and often it is the case that a political party may get more votes if it spends more. That is not a good governing system, though there is little that we can do about it.
For the second question, it involves obviously more factors. However, the key situation in that case s the domestic savings are seems not to be enough for domestic investment needs in aggregate. Alternatively, there maybe international competitiveness issue involved, either shorter term or longer term.
In the former case, government deficits is a contributor to the imbalance between domestic savings and investment needs and competing with private investments for funds. While it is not always, but is generally the case that private investments are more efficient. Of course, there are some investments that are more suited for government to make their the private sector due to various equity considerations and administrative costs involved.



In answer to Peter's argument "Depends largely on what the debt is for surely, Lincoln.
"If we do what some European countries have done - like Greece - and use it to plug holes in the budget and to maintain unsustained living standards - then yeah Government debt puts you on the road to ruin - or the IMF which is essentially the same thing.
"But if the overwhelming bulk of debt is undertaken to invest in infrastructure - both human (schools) and physical (NBNs) and there is a reasonable prospect of these investments yielding a decent return in future then we are not simply saddling the future with our debts at all - we are providing the means of not only paying off those debts but also towards improving living standards.
"My point is that there are few absolutes in economics - few simple aphorisms or slogans - for example that surplusses are always good deficits always bad. Depends when and what for over the longer term. What the level of demand in the economy is doing. What the money is to be used for.
"And that's where governments have the inside running on the private sector - the long term. Private sector investors don't - can't - afford a long term view. Governments can and do if they have the courage. Sadly the Howard Governments didn't have this courage to invest in the future - which is why they have left nothing at all of lasting value."


Peter, you raised a good question, although the previous discussions have not gone to that far.
You are correct that there are different uses of government expenditures. However, even with your examples, one may find issues with governments debts in worthwhile causes.
For example, the school education revolution programs, one can argue that there were both design and implementation problems that some of the investments are not effective and productive, say even the state governments were trying to skip some fats out of those programs, not to mention some school halls and libraries are not necessarily what those school needed most.
From policy design the restriction of school halls and libraries was problematic. From implementation when it became clear that there were problems with those programs and that stimulus were no longer necessary, the government could have make some changes to increase the effectiveness of those spending.
For the NBN, leaving the politics aside, it is still open to debate to whether it is cost effective or not and whether it is the best course of action or not. Clearly, no CBA was done or publicly available.

Peter, for your last paragraph's mention of "the Howard government didn't have this courage to invest in the future - which is why they have left nothing at all of lasting value."
Although I am not a defender of either government, I think the future fund established by the Howard government may provide an example that does not support or is contrary to what is argued there.
I have to say that I don't know how many billions that was and whether that is significant as compared to the NBN amount, though.

In answer to Henry "Lincoln, please illustrate these huge debts by quoting figures and percentages of GNP etc rather than making unsubstantiated, emphatic comments. Comparative figures also are needed.
"My position is that of most economists: our debt is relatively small as a proportion of GNP."


Henry, yes you are correct if that is compared to other high debts countries in the current levels and that is clearly one way to argue it. But there are other aspects, such as rate of increase and the increased amount in a year.
Perhaps you can calculate that to substantiate I am "making unsubstantiated, emphatic comments" and to see for yourself?

In answer to Ngoc's second part "Lincoln
There are three issues in fiscal management; (i) the revenue constraint; (ii) economic efficiency of gov spending; and (iii) distributive efficiency of gov spending.
I think Prof Lewis' article focused on (ii) and (iii), that is, squandering excessive revenue in time of economic (mining) booms without paying much attention on how and where to spend, leaving bad budgetary problems in the long run, especially in downturns of the business cycle shows lack of vision. May I add here that if gov of the time reform the tax system at the beginning of the mining boom to keep a share of the excessive profits generated from minerals export sales for the people. Part of this additional revenue can be saved in income generating assets for future generations. Another part can be used to help non-mining industries where competitiveness and productivity are severely disadvantaged by the mining boom via its impacts on terms of trade, labour markets etc and to finance long awaited reforms of the education and health care systems as well as the protection of environment. The rest can be saved in gov coffer to help balance the budget when the economic downturn comes without incurring excessive debts. (That said, I think the debts you mentioned is a by-product of past budgeting practice the current gov has to bear.)
For your information, just go to ABARES statistics, get data on minerals export sales in the last 10 years and sum them up, use price elasticity also available from ABARES' various model adjust this sum, take a percentage of the adjusted sum, say between 5 and 10 per cent, then you can see how much opportunity has been missed in the last boom boom and how much harder to manage the economy in the coming years due to a faux pas in the past.
BTW, if you only use your posting name then innocent people (including me) can mistakenly say you are a 'self proclaimed economist', can't they? Anyhow, forget this and accept my thousand apologies if it is not true."

Ngoc
I really don't understand your logic and you really lost me in your arguments.
As I have mentioned earlier, I am not a defender of either government.
However, your arguments seem inconsistent and appear saying one thing is good but ignore the history. E.g. save for the future and save for downturns. Didn't the Howard government paid the debts and established the future fund with billions of dollars of money in it? Those are not save for the future and not save for the downturns? And those were done with no the new mining tax. And dare I say that money in the funds is better than money squandered in some government investments.
Those who argue that the Howard government should have far greater foresight and forecasting power than others so they could foresee things that others even couldn't see later than their time?
Is that a reasonable expectation? Isn't it saying we are not super rich because our ancestors didn't invent the computer thousands of years ago?

2013-02-19

Savings, investments and industrialisation/urbanisation versus external balance


Comments on Michael Pettis “Ten signals to watch as the world resets”, 19/02/2013, http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/China-rebalancing-growth-markets-GDP-trade-pd20130219-52RAQ?OpenDocument
I am not too sure how much finance Professor Michael Pettis understands economics, even the basic economic principles.
China is still industrialising and urbanising. It's level of per capita income is very low compared to industrialised countries. It has more than half of its population, probably more 700 million, still live in rural villages. There are a lot of infrastructures that need to be built to facilitate its industrialisation and urbanisation.
Naturally, that needs investments, huge investments over many years.
It is against this background that Professor argues the following highly questionable points:
"China must bring both its savings rate and its investment rate down sharply. If it can bring savings down faster than investment, China is probably rebalancing in the right way, and this should show up as strong growth and a declining trade surplus."
Without savings and investments, how could China industrialise and urbanise?
This is where some academics just simply follows some popular topical sayings and prescribe non-sense ideas.
Given its needs for investments, the sensible policy is to channel its savings to investments in infrastructure and urban constructions to accommodate the transfer of hundreds of millions of rural people to urbanised living.
Professor is understndably worried more about so called external balance. But that should not necessarily require a cut of both savings and investments. As long as savings are balanced by investments, external trade should also be balanced.
That is probably economics 101 and even a finance professor should understand that.
Apparently Professor Pettis does not appear to.
This is also why many Chinese university students are so disappointed with their professors and lectures.
Now we can see some of the reasons why that is the case.

2013-01-10

Effect of globalisation on the supply side

Comments on Stephen Grenville “Why forecasting has broken down”, 10/01/2013, http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/Global-economy-fiscal-policy-forecasting-models-ec-pd20130108-3R4MS?OpenDocument

I think the reasons why those international forecasters consistently got their forecasts wrong you mentioned are correct ones, though there might be more than those.

I think there might be a different effect of globalisation on the aggregate demand and supply of an economy.

The conventional frameworks for macroeconomics may suffer from lacking a closer look at the effect of globalisation on the supply side in the context of a serious supply side shock in the wake of the GFC and the ensuing various other related government debts and fiscal problems.

Let's say various macro policies do have an effect on increasing the aggregate demand of an economy, but that may not necessarily restore the domestic supply side when international supply can substitute domestic supply due to their advantages in being unaffected by the supply side forces that exist in the more advanced economies such as the US and EU.

This increased effect of globalisation and trade substitution on the side supply may suggest that the full recovery of the advanced economies to their normal growths may take longer time even though the macroeconomic policy particularly the monetary policy is much more accommodating now as compared to the 1930s.

Unless the governments can come up with new ways to restore the domestic supply side of an economy, the road to recovery will be long and hard for those economies.

2012-12-04

Theories and practices of economics with innovation in between

Comments on Shaun Vahey "Academics v practitioners: split views within the Shadow Board", 4/12/2012, https://theconversation.edu.au/academics-v-practitioners-split-views-within-the-shadow-board-11110

The views of both practioning and academic economists are "should be", though they may have different perspectives in their thinking.


The academic economists there may have a too theoretic focused and may be a little too rigid and inflexible. In their mind, it is all theories that matter. If it is not in accordance to the theories, they cannot be. But the Fed has operated on a non conventional basis for quite sometime and that points out the potential shortcomings with the academic macroeconomists (their thinking).

Practitioning economists may be too affected by the markets.

2012-07-04

What is the criterion for economic balance or not?

Comments on Ligang Song and Huw McKay "Rebalancing the Chinese economy to sustain long-term growth", July 3rd, 2012, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/07/03/rebalancing-the-chinese-economy-to-sustain-long-term-growth/


While it popular to say that the Chinese economy is unbalanced, it seems not convincing and rational basis has been presented to put it beyond dispute or doubt, except to use the facts of China has surplus in trade and its investment/consumption shares are high/low.


What economic models would demonstrate that balanced trade is always optimal and that a lower/higher investment/consumption are always optimal over the course of economic development and when people and nations clearly can have different preferences?

Further, investment is absolutely necessary for economic growth, especially for developing countries which have relatively low physical capitals and inadequate infrastructure and low urbanisation. Besides, better technologies are embedded in investment


Let’s look at some of the arguments in this article. It argues “Although the non-state sector accounted for the majority of industrial output in 2007, the SOEs accounted for more than 53 per cent of non-agricultural fixed investment while employing only 13 per cent of the total workforce. These discrepancies reflect the fact that SOEs operate in capital-intensive heavy industries. But they also suggest an inefficient allocation of capital across sectors and underline that there are still large distortions in China’s factor markets.”

Even though it is acknowledged the influences of capital intensity on investment needs, it simply states that they also suggest inefficiencies in capital allocation without supporting materials/facts. Further it does not mention the role of the grey or underground banking and finance sector in providing capitals to non SOEs and its relative importance. Without those facts how the reader can be sure the argument is correct?

The article also argues the potential effect of a reform to the Hu Kou system on consumption. Although it mentions urbanisation will require investment but it does not present the fact of which effect is greater. Without those facts the reader is left wondering whether the argument is sound or not. Besides, urbanisation has different models and it does not necessarily mean that all people will need to move to mega-cities.

It is also puzzling that it has been argued that the Hu Kou system has resulted in lower wages for migration workers while no mention of the effects of excess supply of rural migration workers.
On this particular point, whether the low wages of rural migration workers were the effects of the labor market with relatively unlimited labor supply or whether it was due to the Hu Kou system, most economists would likely to argue it was the former rather than the latter.

2011-12-30

Economic ideology and reality

Comments on TONY MAKIN “Fiscal stimulus, not Europe, to blame for economy”, 30/12/2011, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/opinion/fiscal-stimulus-not-europe-to-blame-for-economy/story-e6frgd0x-1226232857308
While it is ideally good that governments run balanced budgets, is there a point of process optimisation that may give rise to budget deficits and surplus in some years?
While monetary policy has been argued by many economists to be used as the macroeconomic policy tool to regulate the economy, haven't we already seen that monetary policy has its limitation as well, especially during the GFC 1, where interest rates were at or near 0 and economies were still struggling even with strong fiscal stimulus in the US and Europe?
Why do some economists only think along a particular line of thought with little regard to the reality and to whether it is working or not?
Besides, how can the traditional monetary policy along to deal with the two speed or patch work economy as Australia has witnessed with mining booms?

2011-04-21

Time to rethink exchange rate regime

Comments on “Aust dollar clears 107 US cents”, see NEWS – Currencies, http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/Australian-dollar-clears-107-US-cents-record-high-pd20110421-G4SRZ?OpenDocument&src=hp2

Two points: 1. the $A has entered uncharted territory and no one knows how high it will go in the next year or so. It may go as high as $US1.10, 1.20 or even 1.50, though few people would dare to say the last figure. The point is no one is sure about it.

2. Given the pervasive effects of the high $A, is there a case for some RBA intervention to keep it lower? Why does the RBA continue its conventional operations and stay away from intervention while the US Fed has been doing unconventional quantitative easing? Isn't time for the RBA to catch up with the changed international finance and monetary politics?

I think those are legitimate questions to ask and the RBA needs to have a serious review of what is best for Australia, getting out of its comfort zone of conventional thinking and conventional operating.

While free exchange rate has been the norm and dominate economic theory, excessive movements and fluctuations of a currency against others, especially the ones that are having a big effect on the country such as the $US for Australia given that many commodities are priced in $US, may not be optimal or desirable.

If the GFC has promoted a rethink of macroeconomic theories, a thorough review of international exchange rate regimes is also overdue and equally important.

2010-08-13

Inconsistent macroeconomics

Comments on Yiping Huang “Focus upon the Chinese yuan on both sides of the Atlantic”, 12/08/2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/08/12/focus-upon-the-chinese-yuan-on-both-sides-of-the-atlantic/
The point that PBOC should shift focus on to the basket of currencies from the $US is excellent. In fact, China should be much more transparent on the basket of currencies the yuan is managed to be pegged to.

It should publish the weight of each currency in the basket the yuan pegs to, at least the framework how it works or the central bank manage it. It is hard to understand why that can't or shouldn't be done.

While official statistics shows inflation has been low in China, has that been consistent with the reality and people's experiences? It is highly doubtful probably. It is likely that the real story about the Chinese real exchange may be different from the official statistics tells, with significant real appreciation than its nominal appreciation has suggested.

I would be very cautious in using deliberately higher inflation as a tool for exchange rate adjustment, because that is very dangerous with playing of expectations on inflation.

Of course, 1% annual inflation would be low, especially in the context of high economic growth. If that was true, it would mean there could be room to allow a modest inflation target.

An inherent inconsistency in macroeconomics is the policy for domestic price stability and the wild swings shown in international exchange rate market under the flexible exchange regime. Economists do not seem to have a consistent framework to deal with both domestic and international macroeconomic stabilities.

It is the same issue of market and the management of aggregate demand and supply, albeit with international borders involved.

Why is that difficult to do for managing international issues?

That is question economists have to realise, ask and answer.

Further, they need to come up with a satisfactory solution.

It should not be too difficult task for the economic profession.

2009-09-15

Economists need to revisit the rational and efficient market assumption

Comments on Alan Kohler “The Lehman lesson is ongoing”, 14/09/2009, http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/The-Lehman-lesson-is-ongoing-pd20090914-VUSXM?OpenDocument&src=sph

I totally agree with you on that "it’s imperative that economists do the same and come up with a new theory that accepts that economies are run by flawed humans and that they are buffeted by a financial system that is subject to the madness of crowds."

I also agree with you on that "Macroeconomists have suffered a terrible blow to their confidence", except some small handful exceptionally strong Keynesians.

The rational and efficient market assumption just blinded too many economists and diverted too much resource of economic research and policy research away from studying the real market and policies that could have avoided the financial and economic crises.

Economists need to correct that.

2009-07-22

Still a need for new macroeconomic tools

Comments on Alan Kohler “Policy without ammunition”, 22/07/2009, http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/Out-of-the-game-pd20090722-U6SPS?OpenDocument&src=sph

There is a big gap in macroeconomics in terms of policy responses to such scenarios. The Fed, and some other central banking authorities have used quantity easing, a creative response that stabilised their and the world financial markets. The world avoided the complete shut-down of key national and the international banking system. That was good.

But now there is still a deep problem of how to get the economies going forward and avoid the Japanese experience of the lost decade in the 1990s, which requires equally creative thinking.

Economists or otherwise, people need to come up with new policy tools for dealing with the so called balance sheet recessions.

2009-05-29

Macro managing asset markets without a framework - easily said than done

Comments on Alan Wood “Regulators should be neither bubble poppers nor blowers”, 29/05/2009, http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,25552776-5013578,00.html

Now it is high time to have a debate on a macro approach to asset prices, in the context of the great recession following the financial crisis that had its direct root of the bursting in the bubbles of asset markets, including housing and equity markets.

The current recession has been characterised by some as balance sheet recession. Balance sheet, no matter it is for banks, firms, or households, is affected by asset market conditions and asset prices. Although the current recession is a highly synchronised one, there have been these types of so called balance sheet recessions before, such as Japan in the 1990s.

In macroeconomics, there are goods, money, labour markets, but no other markets explicitly, such as housing and equity markets. The three markets in the macroeconomic framework jointly determine interest rate, output/employment, aggregate price (inflation). That macroeconomic framework has been good enough for using the two main macroeconomic management tools, namely fiscal and monetary policies to manage the real economy and inflation in the conventional sense, although there has always been so much desired for the effectiveness of those two policies.

While asset markets do not explicitly exist in the macroeconomic framework, their effects are included in more sophisticated models of some markets, though as exogenous variables, such as assets in household consumption demand. This treatment of other asset markets has left the main macro policy tools incapable of dealing with or managing those markets, from macro point of view.

Without a workable macro framework which includes important asset markets, it will be extremely difficult to see what macro policies should be used and how they will work in dealing with any perceived or real problems in those markets.

The current debate should and will prompt economists to come up with some workable macroeconomic frameworks that can guide policy makers in managing the economy more effectively than they have been.The great recession has presented economists with a very practical and urgent task in their research. They need to meet the challenges of our time.

2009-05-21

The state of economics and the challenges for economics

Comments on Doug McTaggart, Christopher Findlay and Michael Parkin “The state of economics”, 21/05/2009, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/05/21/the-state-of-economics/#more-4471

As an amateur economist, I sort of agree with the author’s points’, but only to a certain degree. The second dot point at the beginning was like the story of a bottle half empty versus a bottle half full, depending how you look at it. While it sounds obvious right, one can’t help have a sense of tautology in the argument. Nevertheless, it may inject some fine-tuning to the hot debate on strengthening financial regulations with some cold reasoning.

The third dot point appears to be too much of a defence of the indefensible probably to save some face for the economist profession. The authors provided some examples to show their point. To quote from them:

[Evidence of a problem had started to accumulate from early 2007 and economists were already working on scenarios associated with sub-prime problems in the US. In early 2008, the body of academic economists in the US had sessions in their annual conference on exactly that topic. Nouriel Roubini and Paul Krugman were then making their warnings.
The focus at that time was on the sub-prime assets associated with housing loans and it was expected that any shock there would be a relatively small and manageable. That expectation was not met, because of the interconnectedness of the financial markets in different countries, the extent to which banks in other countries were exposed to these assets and the extent of leveraging that had taken place.]

It seems that the very examples they used actually disproved their point at the same time when they tried to argue it and shot their own feet. The root of the current crisis had its origine much earlier than 2007. As the authors said, in as early as 2002 the Fed began its overly loose monetary policy and persisted with that unwise monetary stimulus policy until 2006. The sub-prime would have started also well before early 2007 when the author said economist were working on that. As the author said, only until early 2008 “economists Nouriel Roubini and Paul Krugman were then making their warnings”.

Was that strong enough to say that economists didn’t fail to anticipate and avoid the crisis? As an amateur economist, I don’t feel that way, to be frank. To say otherwise is too defensive, if not being interpreted as offensive.

The fourth dot point is obvious correct, but is incomplete in the sense that it does not say there have been significant failures in economics, both at the microeconomics and the macroeconomics levels. From microeconomics point of view, there are the issues of correct valuation of securities, derivatives and etc, as well as the associated information failure. Economics needs to contribute to the resolution of those issues.

At the macroeconomics, the conventional macroeconomic tools or policies provided few ready policy prescriptions for the authorities to use to combat the financial and economic crisis, so that the Fed have recently had to resort to the so-called non-conventional methods in its attempt to find a way out. Conventional monetary policy has long become ineffective when interest rates are very low, as have been the cases in a number of countries.

The effectiveness of conventional fiscal policy has also been in doubt. This is because the levels of government debts in quite a number of advanced economies were high and further rises in government debts run into political difficulties and also undermine confidences. More to the point, if the private sector stops, it is probably too much to expect that the government can fill the entire void left. There are also the longer run consequences of too much government spending and debts. The long run efficiency of the economy is at risk if government plays too much the role of the private sector. More importantly, fiscal policy does not appear to be the right approach to solve the current financial and economic crisis, a balance sheet recession as some economists calls it, as opposed to insufficient aggregate demand, similar to the Japanese case following the bubble burst in the early 1990s that gave rise to the lost decade for Japan.

Economists’ two main arms of macroeconomic tools or policies have been ineffective. Like it or not, that has been the fact and economists should have the courage to admit it. Only by truthfully realising the failures of economics, can economists create new theories to remedy those failures, to provide new and more effective prescriptions for authorities to deal with similar future challenges.

The Keynesian theory was born following the great depression. Although having been criticised and ridiculed by many, it including both the conventional fiscal and monetary tools, has contributed in preventing another great depression until this great recession.

New theories will arise from the experience of this great recession. They will further enrich the body of economics and provide theoretic guidance to policy makers when they face another one. But hopefully, if advances in microeconomic theories can effectively address the correct valuation of securities and risks, we may not experience another great recession.

While it is too early or premature to say what is needed of macroeconomics, it appears that it might need to keep the stability and correctness of “asset market values”. They can’t be allowed to grow too fast to balloon to bubbles. Nor can they be allowed to fall too much when bubbles burst to such a degree that severely affects both the supply (firms don’t produce) and demand (consumers don’t consume) as a result of battered balance sheet due to falling assets values.

What the authorities in many countries have done so far have an effect to lift the values of both the housing markets and the equity markets or at least to prevent them to fall further, intentionally or not. But the efforts so far have appeared to lack of potence. But they are trying without the guidance from economists, or maybe ignoring theirs.

It is in this sense of advancing both microeconomics and macroeconomics that I totally agree with the authors’ fourth dot point, that is more economic research is the best hope. It is high time for economists, especially those who are in academics with considerable freedom to choose their research topics to meet the challenges as both the important and the emergent as the current ones.