Comments on Stephen King "We know what to do, but how do we do it", 12/07/2015
If the difficulties in reforms for the good of the majority are the minority losers intensive lobbies at the expense of the silent majority, then it seems the experience of the Stockholm referendum may prove to be a successful strategy, that is, to have a referendum on a major reform, so the majority have their says heard. A referendum would neutralise lousy minority's disproportionate influence through lobbies.
Of course the method from the Vancouver experience with carbon tax is also a very good approach, particularly its revenue neutrality and linking any misuse of the carbon tax with the minister's pay cuts as a penalty is excellent.
Showing posts with label political reforms. Show all posts
Showing posts with label political reforms. Show all posts
2015-07-12
2012-07-12
An Australian political reform?
Comments on Greg Craven "Parliament needs the voice of reason to raise the tone of politicians", 12/07/2012,
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/opinion/parliament-needs-the-voice-of-reason-to-raise-the-tone-of-politicians/story-e6frgd0x-1226423839617
It is an interesting idea to have eminent Australians participate in parliament debates. Equally, the same effects could be achieved with an effective forum for eminent Australians to voice their opinions and inform the parliament. The only reform needed is for the parliament to note and debate recommended opinions by the forum. Such a forum could also include creative opinions of other Australians.
2010-09-20
Timing and steps of China's political reforms important
Comments on Justin Li “Political reform in China: Wen will it happen and Hu will lead it?” 19/09/2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/09/19/political-reform-in-china-wen-would-it-happen-and-hu-will-lead-it/
Although political reforms in China will be inevitable and will occur sooner or later, timing will be of essence and will determine the costs of the reforms and its progress trajectory.
Common sense means that it would be easier to embark on major political reforms when a new group of leaders are in place and have plenty of time to design and implement reforms and see them through.
Having said that, I think there are a number of areas where political reforms can be realistically expected.
For example, China could start political reforms from two fronts. The first is to increase press freedom, so reporters and journalists can freely report what is happening in the country’s political, economic, social and cultural lives. This will force the government to be more accountable and responsive to people’s needs, and reduce corruptions.
The second is to start direct election of lower levels of government. This will allow people to be used to direct election and to respect the simple fact of an election outcome whether it is in line with a person’s expectation or will. To start with lower levels of government will allow the political stability of the nation and will accumulate valuable experience and lessons for political reforms at higher levels of government.
Of course, it goes without saying that China will need to strengthen its law and order, and allow judicial system independence and enforce and operate under the law.
Although political reforms in China will be inevitable and will occur sooner or later, timing will be of essence and will determine the costs of the reforms and its progress trajectory.
Common sense means that it would be easier to embark on major political reforms when a new group of leaders are in place and have plenty of time to design and implement reforms and see them through.
Having said that, I think there are a number of areas where political reforms can be realistically expected.
For example, China could start political reforms from two fronts. The first is to increase press freedom, so reporters and journalists can freely report what is happening in the country’s political, economic, social and cultural lives. This will force the government to be more accountable and responsive to people’s needs, and reduce corruptions.
The second is to start direct election of lower levels of government. This will allow people to be used to direct election and to respect the simple fact of an election outcome whether it is in line with a person’s expectation or will. To start with lower levels of government will allow the political stability of the nation and will accumulate valuable experience and lessons for political reforms at higher levels of government.
Of course, it goes without saying that China will need to strengthen its law and order, and allow judicial system independence and enforce and operate under the law.
2010-09-19
Wen's advocate of political reforms in China
Comments on David Kelly “China’s top leaders tango on political reform”, 19/09/2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/09/19/chinas-top-leaders-tango-on-political-reform/
Whether there was any split in the Chinese top leadership or not, it is interesting to note why Wen didn't advocate more political reforms earlier in his premiership.
Just consider the fact, his tenure has always been expected to be 10 years from the day he become the premier. If he intended to introduce more political reforms, it should have been done or at least started much earlier. This is generally the case in western democracy, a government will introduce nastier budget in the first year of government and sweeten the electorate with a nicer budget for the election year.
The question is: why didn't Wen do that in his first 5 year term? Now it is close to the end of his premiership, he is talking about political reforms.
One explanation is that his present political reform urge has been the knowledge accumulated or learnt over the past years.
However, if that is the case, it may have the risk to create problems for his future successor in terms of political stability or instability rather.
It is better for a political leader to finish what he or she can do and achieve while on the post.
It is another matter to bring in a situation where he or she could not do and cannot finish and leave difficulties to newcomers.
A true statesman needs to show leadership at the most appropriate time. Timing is the key in many issues, especially for difficult political reforms in China.
Whether there was any split in the Chinese top leadership or not, it is interesting to note why Wen didn't advocate more political reforms earlier in his premiership.
Just consider the fact, his tenure has always been expected to be 10 years from the day he become the premier. If he intended to introduce more political reforms, it should have been done or at least started much earlier. This is generally the case in western democracy, a government will introduce nastier budget in the first year of government and sweeten the electorate with a nicer budget for the election year.
The question is: why didn't Wen do that in his first 5 year term? Now it is close to the end of his premiership, he is talking about political reforms.
One explanation is that his present political reform urge has been the knowledge accumulated or learnt over the past years.
However, if that is the case, it may have the risk to create problems for his future successor in terms of political stability or instability rather.
It is better for a political leader to finish what he or she can do and achieve while on the post.
It is another matter to bring in a situation where he or she could not do and cannot finish and leave difficulties to newcomers.
A true statesman needs to show leadership at the most appropriate time. Timing is the key in many issues, especially for difficult political reforms in China.
2010-09-16
Unique opportunties for parliamentary reforms in Australia
Comments on Graham Bradley “Parliament must focus on reform”, 16/09/2010, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/opinion/parliament-must-focus-on-reform/story-e6frg6zo-1225924277533
The list represents a good wish list from business of the current parliament, although only the last point falls mostly into parliamentary reforms and it is an excellent point.
The current parliament should undertake parliamentary and political reforms that are mostly impossible under the normal partisan approach with one of the main parties being in a dominant position in the lower house.
Those reforms may include election terms to a fixed term, removing preference requirement and whoever has the most votes should be the elected one, government to be formed with most MPs and only 2/3 of MPs' vote of no confidence can change a government to the next most MPs, parliamentary office of budget and policy assessments (Bradley's last point), limiting the federal government's power over the States and ensuring the rights of States not to be eroded by federal government, that is, needs a much higher threshold than a simple majority to take any state rights away from them, and so on.
These sort of reforms will be far reaching and in the long term interests of the nation and businesses.
The taxation summit is likely to be disappointing given the current political environment with the Greens in an important position to move the ALP to the Left even further and reduce efficiency.
Politicians should take the unique opportunities to reform the parliament and national governing mechanisms that will be long lasting but otherwise would be impossible to do.
Bradley’s other reforms can be undertaken under normal governance.
The list represents a good wish list from business of the current parliament, although only the last point falls mostly into parliamentary reforms and it is an excellent point.
The current parliament should undertake parliamentary and political reforms that are mostly impossible under the normal partisan approach with one of the main parties being in a dominant position in the lower house.
Those reforms may include election terms to a fixed term, removing preference requirement and whoever has the most votes should be the elected one, government to be formed with most MPs and only 2/3 of MPs' vote of no confidence can change a government to the next most MPs, parliamentary office of budget and policy assessments (Bradley's last point), limiting the federal government's power over the States and ensuring the rights of States not to be eroded by federal government, that is, needs a much higher threshold than a simple majority to take any state rights away from them, and so on.
These sort of reforms will be far reaching and in the long term interests of the nation and businesses.
The taxation summit is likely to be disappointing given the current political environment with the Greens in an important position to move the ALP to the Left even further and reduce efficiency.
Politicians should take the unique opportunities to reform the parliament and national governing mechanisms that will be long lasting but otherwise would be impossible to do.
Bradley’s other reforms can be undertaken under normal governance.
2010-08-27
China's challenges on road to prosperity
Comments on Wing Thye Woo “Avoiding economic crashes on China’s road to prosperity”, 26/07/2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/08/26/avoiding-economic-crashes-on-chinas-road-to-prosperity/
The analogue of hardware, software and fuel/power is nice.
I agree that the "software" is likely to be the most important one among the three.
For softwares, China has both severe challenges and blessings, due to its size, speed of growth and its political system.
Challenges come from influences both within the country and abroad.
Blessings is likely in the form of rapidly rising living standards that would allow the government to mitigate domestic political challenges and smooth the political transition processes. How to successfully democratise and what the most optimal path for it is the greatest challenge of all.
That political transition will inevitably be associated and influenced by the state of play in the management of economic growth. In a sense, the interactions between economic management and political transition are likely to be most challenging to China's political leaders.
International challenges are also multi-folds, with the most likely potential challenges coming from hostilities in one form or another to its rapid growth, although from power supply point of view the challenges are not along for China as long as China does its share of responsibilities and obligations in dealing with global challenges like climate change (in which China has probably done more than its share of responsibilities, but it has lacked behind in tactics so a poor impression has been created out of Copenhagen).
The analogue of hardware, software and fuel/power is nice.
I agree that the "software" is likely to be the most important one among the three.
For softwares, China has both severe challenges and blessings, due to its size, speed of growth and its political system.
Challenges come from influences both within the country and abroad.
Blessings is likely in the form of rapidly rising living standards that would allow the government to mitigate domestic political challenges and smooth the political transition processes. How to successfully democratise and what the most optimal path for it is the greatest challenge of all.
That political transition will inevitably be associated and influenced by the state of play in the management of economic growth. In a sense, the interactions between economic management and political transition are likely to be most challenging to China's political leaders.
International challenges are also multi-folds, with the most likely potential challenges coming from hostilities in one form or another to its rapid growth, although from power supply point of view the challenges are not along for China as long as China does its share of responsibilities and obligations in dealing with global challenges like climate change (in which China has probably done more than its share of responsibilities, but it has lacked behind in tactics so a poor impression has been created out of Copenhagen).
2010-05-24
The China model to be developed
Comments on David Kelly “Costs of maintaining stability in China”, 23/05/2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/05/23/costs-of-maintaining-stability-in-china/
The so called China model does not really exist, or is so fluid or evolving or in transition that is not a model. It is like what Deng said of Chinese economic reforms, "cross the river by toughing stones".
However, it is likely that China has got to a stage that it needs to consider its future strategic directions that may lead to China model eventually.
Such considerations should adopt the same overarching strategies as Deng did for economic reforms, but in a much broader context.
The so called China model does not really exist, or is so fluid or evolving or in transition that is not a model. It is like what Deng said of Chinese economic reforms, "cross the river by toughing stones".
However, it is likely that China has got to a stage that it needs to consider its future strategic directions that may lead to China model eventually.
Such considerations should adopt the same overarching strategies as Deng did for economic reforms, but in a much broader context.
2010-02-23
Also on the scale of China's economic impact
Comments on Ligang Song “The scale of China’s economic impact”, 23/02/2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/02/23/the-scale-of-chinas-economic-impact/
Song's article is an interesting one.
I'd like to comment on some points in the article.
First, some challenges are also opportunities, as touched in some parts of the article. For example, the so called low carbon economy can be both extremely challenging for the world as a whole because it will represent as an additional constraint and possibly very rewarding for some economies. Assuming the presumed low carbon economy or changing towards it will be true in the next couple of decades, one has to consider not only from an absolute advantage, but also a comparative advantage point of view.
From that point, there will be very different implications for different economies. For some, it may be double whamming, while for some it may be a new, rare and extremely valuable development opportunity.
Secondly, while it may be perceived desirable to have a systematic institutional reform, history does not necessarily prove that is always feasible and realisable. China’s economic reforms in the past 30 years or so was on the premise of “cross the river by touching stones” as opposed to a well designed, systematic, big bang approach to reform.
Thirdly, it may be more pertinent to talk about systematically economic reforms in China 30 or even 20 years ago, the reform tasks in that front, while still incomplete, are largely accomplished.
Fourthly, political reforms, while undoubtedly extremely important in the long run, can be equally extremely tricky and difficult. What is the target “model” for political reforms for China? While many people either explicitly or implicitly assume the western style political system as THE model for China to follow, is it an inevitable end and/or path of the political reform?
Fifthly, in terms of the process or stage of economic development, while China’s growth might not be expected to slow, it does not necessarily mean that its energy, resource and carbon intensity of growth will not recede, as the Song states. Definitely the intensity of energy, some resources and carbon of the Chinese economy as a whole is likely to decline. I guess this is the reason and underlying logic why the Chinese government has proposed for its carbon intensity to decrease by 40-45% by 2020 over that of 2005. 40-45% reduction is by no means a small recession in the intensity.
So my view on China’s impact on many things is that it is now at a very interesting stage where there will be a sharp difference in terms of the absolute and relative magnitude. The next phase of the Chinese economy is likely to increase the share of quality growth in its total growth as opposed to a sheer focus on quantity growth. The implications of that transformation on many things, especially on resources, will be very interesting to see.
We perhaps need to borrow an analogue to the adaptive and rational expectations theories in analysing the Chinese economic growth for the next decade or two.
Song's article is an interesting one.
I'd like to comment on some points in the article.
First, some challenges are also opportunities, as touched in some parts of the article. For example, the so called low carbon economy can be both extremely challenging for the world as a whole because it will represent as an additional constraint and possibly very rewarding for some economies. Assuming the presumed low carbon economy or changing towards it will be true in the next couple of decades, one has to consider not only from an absolute advantage, but also a comparative advantage point of view.
From that point, there will be very different implications for different economies. For some, it may be double whamming, while for some it may be a new, rare and extremely valuable development opportunity.
Secondly, while it may be perceived desirable to have a systematic institutional reform, history does not necessarily prove that is always feasible and realisable. China’s economic reforms in the past 30 years or so was on the premise of “cross the river by touching stones” as opposed to a well designed, systematic, big bang approach to reform.
Thirdly, it may be more pertinent to talk about systematically economic reforms in China 30 or even 20 years ago, the reform tasks in that front, while still incomplete, are largely accomplished.
Fourthly, political reforms, while undoubtedly extremely important in the long run, can be equally extremely tricky and difficult. What is the target “model” for political reforms for China? While many people either explicitly or implicitly assume the western style political system as THE model for China to follow, is it an inevitable end and/or path of the political reform?
Fifthly, in terms of the process or stage of economic development, while China’s growth might not be expected to slow, it does not necessarily mean that its energy, resource and carbon intensity of growth will not recede, as the Song states. Definitely the intensity of energy, some resources and carbon of the Chinese economy as a whole is likely to decline. I guess this is the reason and underlying logic why the Chinese government has proposed for its carbon intensity to decrease by 40-45% by 2020 over that of 2005. 40-45% reduction is by no means a small recession in the intensity.
So my view on China’s impact on many things is that it is now at a very interesting stage where there will be a sharp difference in terms of the absolute and relative magnitude. The next phase of the Chinese economy is likely to increase the share of quality growth in its total growth as opposed to a sheer focus on quantity growth. The implications of that transformation on many things, especially on resources, will be very interesting to see.
We perhaps need to borrow an analogue to the adaptive and rational expectations theories in analysing the Chinese economic growth for the next decade or two.
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