How to compare trade and FDI?

Comments on James Laurenceson, UTS “In the US–AU–China love triangle, actions speak louder than words”, 12/10/2017

The author seems persuasive in arguing that trade and investment relations are both important. It is also probably true that it is difficult to be sure which of the two is more important and by how much. Notwithstanding those, it is probably also true that the two may not be completely equally important, or equally important in all circumstances and at all times. Some people may say they are two different things similar to things like apple and orange. Trade is a flow concept and FDI is more closely related to stock of capital.

Given that, a question to ask may: is there a way to assess which is more important and under which circumstances?

To begin to tackle that question, one may consider saving/consumption ratio, capital/labor ratio, capital/income ratio for the role of investment in the economy. Besides, a factor may be relevant is the depreciation rate of investment (maybe real economic depreciation rate). There is also the question of the role of FDI which is a little more difficult to have a fixed value on each dollar of FDI.

For trade, while there is the GDP identity, the question of trade to the economy and welfare is probably more than that seeming relationship of exports add to GDP and imports subtract from GDP.

The question is how to value/measure that and how to compare that with investment/FDI.

I don’t know how to answer that now, but hope someone may have that as an interest of a research topic.

Russia is indispensable to solving North Korea nuclear crisis

Comments on Editorial Board, East Asia Forum "Stepping back from the brink with North Korea", 2/10/2017

This article, like the leading article of the week, underestimates the important role of Russia in the context of the Korea peninsula nuclear crisis. Sidelining Russia will be a huge mistake and represents a serious misunderstanding of the world power dynamics. As a result, it is unlikely to work.

An obvious point is that the US often threatens China militarily but not against Russia, because it thinks China is no match in term of nuclear power.

Do the author really think that the US and China can guarantee the security of North Korea, given that China’s own security cannot be guaranteed? Do you think North Korea is that naïve as the authors are?

While it is true that China is very important economically, but Russia is much more important militarily than China.

Unfortunately, this is a security issue more than an economic issue involved here.

The PC draft report on GST system itself lacks comprehension

Comments on Peter Martin "GST system broken 'beyond comprehension', Productivity Commission finds", 9/10/2017

While it would take a careful reading of the draft report to fully understand it and to make constructive comments, a glance at the key points suggests that the draft report may suffer a fundamental weakness, that is, it may have based on incorrect premises and misunderstanding of the current HFE system.

For example, it includes the following key points:
· But the pure may be the enemy of the good: the current HFE system struggles with extreme circumstances, and this is corroding confidence in the system.
- Equalising comprehensively and to the fiscally strongest State means that the redistribution task is too great for any jurisdiction to bear; and is volatile at times of significant cyclical and structural change.
- There is scope for it to discourage desirable mineral and energy resources policies (royalties and development) and State policy for major tax reform (a costly first-mover disadvantage).
- The system is beyond comprehension by the public, and poorly understood by most within government — lending itself to a myriad of myths and confused accountability.

The first two subpoints appear to be incorrect.

The current system has not been equalising to the fiscally strongest State. To the contrary, it equalises to the average capacity of the states, although by doing so, it equalises away the strongest states capacity down to the average.

The second subpoint is misleading at best, because the current system is policy neutral or relies on the average policy.

Efficiency illusive to understand

Comments on Xinling Wang, China Policy "China’s twenty-year dream of SOE reform still unfulfilled", 8/10/2017

Efficiency seems so easy to define in theory yet very hard to really understand.

To illustrate this, consider two extremes in terms of efficiency.

First, the case of China. There have been and still are so many areas in China which are so inefficient, yet its economy has been growing remarkably fast.

Second, the case of the US. Arguably, it has been the leader of free market economies and should generally be very efficient. Yet, it was the source or epicentre of the GFC. Was it efficient in the time leading up to the GFC? One could argue that some parts of the US economy must have been highly problematic in efficiency term in the broadest sense.

It seems, there are still important issues in economic development processes that are still not well understood, notwithstanding that there is mainstream economics and many theories regarding development. There maybe some disconnect between aggregate economy and particular efficiency issues. There does not seem to be a perfectly efficient economy.

China, the US and the Thucydides Trap

Comments on Peter Van Ness, ANU: “Are China and the US falling into the Thucydides Trap?” 20/08/2017

While the author of the post has presented some good points, it appears that either the critics or the author have probably misrepresented a basic fact. That fact is, among the known nuclear powers, there are both qualitative and quantitative differences to many orders. The US and Russia are the only two nuclear super powers and all others are minuscule by comparison and are no match to those two.

The second point presented by the author of the post states the likelihood of readiness of the US, Russia and China for launching a nuclear attack, that point confused a fact that China is the only country among those three that will not use nuclear weapons first. That is an extremely important point of difference between China and most of other nuclear powers.

Do those two facts make any differences to the risks of war among the known nuclear powers? I bet they do, because it means imbalance of powers among them and that imbalance implies the nuclear super powers can bully others while the opposite is unthinkable.

We have all observed that President Trump has treated Russia and China very differently. That imbalance between the among the US, Russia and China in terms of their nuclear capacities may be a factor in explaining President Trump’s attitudes.

If one incorporates that fact into analysis, one may add an additional point to the risks of potential conflicts between the US and China.

US–China cooperation on North Korea remains critical?

Comments on Brendan Taylor, ANU “US–China cooperation on North Korea remains critical”, 26/07/2017

This is a useful and interesting post. I have some comments on it.

Firstly, the statement that the "Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull is in lockstep with Washington, asserting at last month’s Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore that ‘China has the capacity and responsibility to bring North Korea to its senses’", describes the PM's either lack of or superficial understanding of the real situation in terms of China's influence on NK, or his simply grandiose political standing to show to both his domestic audience and his US ally how 'strong' and 'principled' he is. It is likely to be political hypocrisy to the extreme but preformed very poorly.

The PM way think it is so simple, logical and elegant to blame China for having not exerted enough pressure on NK, but is it really like that? Is it that impressive or effective? I am not sure how impressed Chinese leaders are by that performance.

Secondly, the use of the phrase "the so-called middle and hermit kingdoms" in the paragraph, "Yet ties between the so-called middle and hermit kingdoms have drifted over the past quarter century, deteriorating sharply under the reign of the current North Korean leader, the young and reckless dictator Kim Jong-un", is unfortunate and misleading. China is by no means a kingdom, far from it! The use reflects some sort of unwarranted stereotype of China in the west.

Thirdly, in addition to the few reasons (I don't necessarily share or agree with all of them, because there is no mention of any humanitarian concerns or motivations at all but only self-interests) that the author uses to explain why "Beijing’s unwillingness to exert greater economic pressure against Pyongyang ", is another one. That is, the US and Korea have frequently or regularly been conducting military exercises, of which some of them obviously very intimidating not only to the NK, but seriously affecting regional peace and stability.

It is no use and no good to just only mention one side of the NK nuclear and missile issues while ignoring the other contributing side. Aren't people saying that what occurred to the former Libyan leader Gaddafi and Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein provided some examples that partially motivated NK's leader for NK's programs?

Fourthly, “the recent chill in US–China relations does not auger well” in terms of successful resolving the issues, as the author puts it. In addition to those factors the author mentioned as contributing factors, it should not be to anyone’s surprise that it would not be easy to work with the current US president, whether it is for people from within the US or outside the US. He wants to do things his own way, let him do it. The ball is in his court and let’s see how best he can play with it.

Growth potential out of regional disparity in income?

Comments on Yang Yao and Mengqi Wang, Peking University, “Maximising China’s growth potential”, 21/07/2017

While I agree with the general point of this post, it should be pointed out that the statement that "Analysis shows that a region should grow more slowly at high levels of GDP per capita and more quickly at low levels" should be properly interpreted as a possibility to present a potential rather than inevitability or definite. Otherwise the world would not have the developed and developing regions/countries.

To realise that potential, there is a lot of hard and intelligent work involved. Such as those proposed by the authors, to be adopted and implemented by those involved and work hard for many years to come.

What assumptions are required for the follow statement: "the lower GDP per capita — but higher growth rate — of the inland provinces could actually increase China’s growth rate of GDP per capita by 11.7 per cent in the next 15 years." Alternatively, what would be the base case scenario?

The numbers presented in the following statements are or appear to be quite large: "Specifically, the central and western regions would respectively grow 4.7 and 4.8 per cent faster on average in the coming 15 years, leading to an average of 2.6 per cent increase in the national growth rate forecasted for 2016–30." Undoubtedly, technological will need to play a key role to realise those numbers as the author argued.

The Chinese exchange rate regime

Comments on Yu Yongding, CASS “Backpedalling or a step forward in renminbi reform?” 20-22/07/2017

There are a few interesting points arose from this post. Firstly, it is a case of whether one views that as "half bottle empty" or "half bottle full" as far as the case of the equal weights being given to both previous day's close and the ‘theoretical RMB exchange rate’ in setting the renminbi central parity rate against the US dollar, although the author appears to be taking on the side of half bottle empty and possibly more negative than that. Yes, there might be a question of whether it is worthy to do such the way may be a little fiddling, but any negatives could also be viewed as positively through the lens of half empty to half full analogue.

Secondly, while free exchange may be viewed as a market way to sort out the exchange rate and may be a preferred way, it is by no means free of problems and often big and significant problems. For example, there can be big swings in the exchange rate that are exacerbated by speculative traders. Just as assets bubbles can arise and cause or have the potential to cause huge damages to the economy, bubbles can also arise in the foreign exchange markets. That is not to mention the so called overshooting phenomemon.

Maybe a simple question should be asked: why should a nation or nations suffer/incur the costs because of exchange bubbles caused by currency speculators?

It seems there is a point to have a stable exchange rate regime, given the role exchange rate plays as the relative prices of one country's goods and services as well as capital against another country, and particularly the tendency of instability of the foreign exchange market in light of speculative trading (as opposed to the real needs to buy foreign currency).

Governments would have greater difficulty in management/regulate asset prices even they would like to (some governments may not want to). On the other hand, it may be a little easier for governments to manage/regulate foreign exchange rate.

I think there is a case for economists to revisit the case of free versus fixed exchange rate regimes, or a combination of the two, even though the author appears to be in favour of a free exchange rate regime.

Any fixed exchange rate regime also needs some appropriate adjustment mechanisms to achieve longer term balance.

Elegant wording and stuff!

Comments on Gary Hawke, VUW, "Is the TPP a sleeping beauty or an organ donor?" 26/06/2017

The use of sleeping beauty and organ donor aiming to best characterise the real situation and to provide a very vivid description is itself beautiful!
I appreciate the analysis and share its logic conclusion.
The last two paragraphs sum up them so elegantly!

A peace regime on the Korean Peninsula may require more to be done

Comments on Stephan Haggard, University of California San Diego, "A peace regime on the Korean Peninsula?" 28/06/2017

It seems that the Chinese proposal represents a good compromise that may provide a solid and acceptable method to advance and resolve the nuclear and peace issues on the Korean peninsula. Both North Korea and the US should make and need to make some compromises and it is in their respective interests as well as that of the region and the world as a whole.
A peace agreement may need also to bring into the picture of Russia at least and possibly Japan, given North Korea’s reliance on Russia and its opportunistic gaming in using China and Russia. The North may be more willing to have Russia on its side for a peace agreement with the US, one would think.
And arguably, Russia would make a peace agreement more effective because it can provide much more weight in preventing the US into unilateral military actions, or a threat of such actions. China does not have and will not be able to provide such a deterrence.

Time for Trump to hit back at China’s new cybersecurity law?

Comments on Claude Barfield, AEI "Time for Trump to hit back at China’s new cybersecurity law", 1/07/2017

Hasn’t the US, and for that matter Australia too, shut some Chinese firms out from participating in their projects? For example, Huawei has been shut out from Australia’s NBN work, even though Huawei is allowed in Europe.
Given the dubious reasons for shutting out Huawei and other Chinese firms by the US and Australia governments, what could China do to institute such similar reciprocal actions as the author argued here, leaving aside whether those arguments are sensible or not?
The Trump Administration has threatened a lot of trade measures against quite a number of countries, some of its allies included; aren’t they enough? Isn’t it enough, enough?
Is there any country in the world that is more unreasonable than the current posturing and rhetoric in the US, like asking Mexico to pay for the wall the US is to build along its border?
Is the world going insane?

Strategic vision and subtle diplomacy requried now to unite the world for good causes

Comments on Adam Triggs, ANU "Divided G7 an opportunity for Asia and the G20" 3/07/2017

It appears that the G20 meeting may make some real progress in terms of climate change and some other global and international issues, but it may be unlikely to be reflected in the meeting communique or documents, if the US is to veto or pressure others not to have those reflected in their wording.
It may require extremely high level of creativity in both diplomacy and wording to achieve a highly satisfactory meeting outcome.
But opportunities do exist for making some real achievements as the author suggested, given the needs for almost all other countries apart from the US (perhaps) to prevent the world from getting from bad to worse in the current very threating environment, even though they may take some time to show.
One should aim for some real progress.

Achieving real results: Balanced versus one sided approaches to nuclear and missile issues on Korean Penisula

Comments on Hitoshi Tanaka, JCIE: "Breaking the impasse with North Korea", 6/07/2017

While this post contains some good analysis of and proposals for resolving the nuclear issue on the Korea peninsula, I am afraid it still runs the risk that it remains in the realm of largely one-sided western thinking.
There are at least two areas to support such a conclusion. One is that it argues that China is able to apply much harsher sanctions but it has so far not done so. This may prove to be quite false. One could argue that that simply ignores the huge effort that China has made and is probably a handy excuse to use China as a scapegoat and for the US to take measures against china at will. Do people really think that North Korea will yield to harsh sanctions and gives up its nuclear and missile programs?
Further, is it right to ignore the effects on the ordinary people in North Korea of a complete cut off of trade by the international community that may starve the people and harden the resolve of the North Korean regime but may not be able to stop its programs?
Secondly, it only asks the North Korea to change but does not ask the side that the North Korea would argue and think to threaten or post threats to its security and existence to justify the development of its nuclear and missile programs as a response.
In comparison, it seems the joint proposal by China and Russia that demands both North Korea and the US/South Korea to make some compromise is more balanced and superior.
It is illogical and possibly irrational to only ask one side to compromise aimed at seeking a real solution, because that is unlikely to be a real solution and that may only prolong the resolution.
While we can argue that North Korea has been at fault for illegally developing its nuclear and missile programs, we run the risk of ignoring that continuing the same and one-sided approach may have been a significant factor that has so far prevented a successful resolution that we have been trying to achieve!

Revenue neutrality a better way to tax negative externalities

Comments on Lennert Veerman, Senior health economist, Cancer Council NSW “Taxing sugary drinks would boost productivity, not just health”, 22/06/2017

While the argument for a tax on sugary drinks may have some appeal for a number of reasons including the additional and new reason put forwarded by the author of this post, there is a danger that a country or politicians in a country may simply look for revenue sources to increase tax revenue, as opposed to achieving health and productivity benefits. Caution must be exercised in calling for a new tax, because it is not always good to increase taxes to raise further the burdens to taxpayers.

As a result, I would suggest that such a tax, and that may be better named, should be designed and done in such a way that it is revenue neutral and any tax revenue raised should be returned/redistributed among all taxpayers or citizens/residents of a jurisdiction in perhaps an equally manner, as opposed to being retained by the tax authorities.

I would further argue that if taxes for a particular purpose is done in such a way, supports for introducing those taxes will be much greater and policies to address some ill effects or negative externalities will be much easier to be carried out and implemented, therefore the objectives for addressing those problems can be achieved earlier and faster.

We should change the way how we approach and address things/issues/problems.

Withdraw THAAD not that too difficult for President Moon

Comments on Kai He, Griffith University “THAAD is no easy withdrawal for Moon”, 20/06/2017

It seems that the author is a bit too pessimistic on what the new president could do on this issue. I think he will be able to achieve a successful withdraw and to do it skilfully and elegantly without too much trouble.

While it would not be a very easy job to withdraw the THAAD in South Korea, it is never an impossibility completely to do so for the new president.
The key is how to best PR a withdraw so that can be perceived as a positive to South Korea as it would be. As the author mentioned, with THAAD installed in South Korea, both Russia and China will have to take counter measures that will be certainly detrimental to South Korea. It would not be totally and completely inconceivable that either Russia or China, when they are under significantly real and imminent threat from the THAAD at some point in the future, would that potential pre-emptive measures to neutralise those threats. It does not take to be a genius of the Einstein type to figure out Who would be the loser from that scenario?

As a result, it would be in South Korea's interest to not have THAAD on its land, even though it would be in the US interest to have it there. I believe that most South Koreans are intelligent enough to see through the issue when there is a divergent interest between it and its US ally. An ally is nothing more or less than an ally!

Yes, it would require a very careful and delicate negotiation with its big brother the US ally to achieve a withdraw, it is doable and is in the interest of South Korea to do so.

Inactions sometimes may not necessarily be bad

Comments on Editors, East Asia Forum “ASEAN, the region’s strategic convenor”, 19/06/2017

I think this editorial may need some rethinking of itself, particularly in terms of its view on 'the uncertainty about consensus within ASEAN on appropriate responses to manifestations of great power rivalries in the Asia and the Pacific', even though it should be commended for its correct judgement regarding 'critique of ASEAN’s achievements through a European lens', by stating that that critique only serves to underline ASEAN’s unlikely success'.

The editorial states: 'What should worry defenders of ASEAN’s relevance is the uncertainty about consensus within ASEAN on appropriate responses to manifestations of great power rivalries in the Asia and the Pacific.'

One should consider perhaps beyond 'the winner takes all approach', in governance and resolving issues and problems. By 'the winner takes all approach', it is meant the simply majority of elections and the subsequent governance. Even by a slightest majority, a government thus formed may want to implement its 'mandate' on issues and policies. While the majority method in deciding and resolving who wins or has won an election, 'the winner takes all approach' to policies may mean such a government may work against the other half of the electorate. Is that a right approach? It is unlikely to be. Rather, a better approach may be some sort of compromise or even no actions on highly non-consensual issues or policies.

Now let's come back to the issue I raised regarding the view or argument by the editorial board. When divisions exist within a nation, the world, a region, a group or an organisation, that is, when it is hard to have a consensus, inactions may be a better approach or result, as opposed to reflect its weakness. That would be my argument that is based on a rethink of dealing with complex issues in a complex world as opposed to the view that actions must be taken on all issues simply to be decisiveness and powerful! It can often occur that the truth or ‘betterness’ on issues may be with minority as opposed to majority.

I think we need to examine some approaches from a different, more innovative and likely to be a better philosophical method. Yes, it may not necessarily be conventional, but we need innovation and creativity in very complex issues.

Having said that, I must say that my comments have ventured to an area that I normally would not wish to be, that is, to comment on the very good work of a very good editorial board.

PS: I would further argue that inactions, sometimes, due to the lack of significant consensus may represent not only a good result/outcome but also a strength as opposed to weakness. Clearly flexibility and the ability to be able to bent as mentioned in this post, can often be superior and shows strengths as compared to rigidity and fragility. That is correct, isn't it?

Singapore has not been neutral between the US and China!

Comments on Ja Ian Chong, NUS "Singapore caught between a rock and a hard embrace", 17/06/2017

It seems that this post is based on a fundamentally slippery basis, that is, Singapore has been neutral and fence sitting. It has not and it has been a US ally and has been on the US side. The military training in Taiwan represents an interesting case of such non-neutrality, because China has always been very concerned with any military exchanges of any outside parties with Taiwan.

It is not Singapore's neutrality but China's willingness to tolerate Singapore's unsatisfactory and from time to time often opportunistic behaviour that has sustained a reasonably good relationship between China and Singapore.

To the contrary of the author’s argument and conclusion, I would think that a truly neutral international stance by any countries would be welcomed by China, given its long-held diplomatic principles, such as its five fundamental principles. Of course, whether a newly and truly neutrality by Singapore will be welcomed by the US or not is another matter, given that would represent a departure by Singapore of its long diplomatic stance and principle because that would also need to exit the ally position.

It appears, should the author really does not believe that Singapore has not been neutral between the US and China, that there may have been a serious misunderstanding of the real situation in this regard. And that would be really unfortunate given it is not hard or difficult to see the truth as it has been crystal clear. How such illusion could exit would be an extraordinary mystery!

Don't be too sensational on Xinjiang policies and be balanced

Comments on Ben Hillman, ANU: "China’s dangerous ethnic policies in Xinjiang", 13/06/2017

This post fails in its grasp with the reality particularly in the context that even the British Prime Minister Theresa May recently has said that enough is enough after the terrorist attacks in Britain and the Australian government has updated its citizenship requirement where there are significant ‘assimilation’ to English, if you like.
What about the banning of electronic devices on planes from a number of countries by at least America flights?
It argues the risks of effects on Uyghur extremists combining forces with other terrorist groups as reflected in the following paragraphs:
“Beijing is already concerned that Uyghur extremists are coordinating with global terror networks, boosting their resources and capabilities for hitting Chinese targets outside China. Uyghurs were allegedly involved in an attack against the Chinese Embassy in Kyrgyzstan in 2016 and Thai police accuse Uyghurs of masterminding a 2015 bombing in Bangkok that killed 20 people, mostly Chinese tourists. There are reports that Uyghurs are training with Al Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) in preparation for launching future attacks.
“But if China is perceived as anti-Islam, its home-grown Uyghur extremists might not be the only threat. Chinese citizens and assets could become targets for terror outfits in Central Asia, South Asia and the Middle East. Chinese-funded ports, railways, canals, dams and pipelines could become vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Many of the first-phase Belt and Road projects are in politically unstable majority Muslim countries such as Bangladesh and Pakistan. Kazakhstan — a lynchpin in the Silk Road Economic Belt — is also under increasing social, economic and political strain.”
Why don’t you also condemn the terrorists and extremists for their terror acts, as opposed to blaming China for combating terrorists?
It may run the risk as being perceived as China bashing, because it seems different standards are applied to China and other western countries.
At the least it fails terribly to understand the complex reality in China and is likely to be biased in its analysis, I am afraid.
PS: Just listen to the ABC news radio this morning on Australian federal politics on terrorism and on the Prime Minister’s argument/statement on requiring new citizens to be Australian patriots in a bid to secure more supports or passing the new legislations on new citizenship and some visas requirements.
Don’t just criticise China to the degree when there were terrorists attacks there were muted responses from the West and if there is even a small terrorist incident in western countries then talk about it as if the sky is going to fall.

Unwise and ugly acts

Comments on Titli Basu, IDSA: "Asian Development Bank at 50 and Japan’s puzzle", 11/062017

This is a very interesting post that exposes the foolish, futile and self harm acts by some countries in the attempt to maintain their own and long held positions at the costs of other developing countries, as the author put it: “As the US-led international economic order has failed to reflect the shifting alignments, the ADB must grow in order to respond to the varying needs and ambitions of its developing member countries.”

I share the author’s view contained in the following paragraphs:
“The call for re-evaluating ADB’s voting rights is not new. Critics argue that present international institutions should permit space to developing nations and that failure to do so will hurt the relevance of these institutions. The emerging economies have long argued for representative governance, rationalising operations, easing the ADB’s internal processing time and encouraging public-private partnership investments. Japan must take the lead to facilitate governance reforms against the backdrop of AIIB and other new multilateral development banks. Failure to implement internal reforms will impact the ADB’s influence.
“Developing Asian nations will be the beneficiaries of this race for infrastructure financing. Productive competition will diversify emerging economies’ options to choose the most favourable financing terms. Long-term, this will support the larger purpose of empowering emerging Asian economies to augment national growth and enhance Asia’s ability to compete in the global economy.”
PS: I note the author is from the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi.

Many anti-dumping actions against China unfair and unjust

Comments on Minsoo Lee, ADB “China, the US and anti-dumping actions”,
10/062017

The use of anti-dumping against China by some western countries, as analysed by the author in this post, clearly demonstrate that it is ineffective in protecting the domestic producers and is more likely than not, harmful to both their domestic consumers as well as the overall welfare of those countries.

The main reason why some of those countries still hold China as hostage by refusing to acknowledge the market economy status of China, simply is due to the wish to contain China’s economic rise (or more realistically the pace or speed of that rise) and the strong lobbies by some of their domestic producers to protect their increasingly lost competitiveness as evidenced by changing in comparative advantages internationally.

Strong or stronger leaderships in those countries are badly needed to accept that the use of anti-dumping measures in the currently unfair and unjust international trading system and rules is detrimental to their national interests.

But sadly, politics can often trump rationality in economics in many if not all countries. It is particularly true in the contest where domestic politics is mixed with international politics, especially when China is concerned party.

In this case it is not hard to understand why the pure rational economics is compromised in reality. Economic models aiming at capturing the reality need to reflect this to be more effective and truthful.

I commend the objective analysis of this post by Minsoo Lee and tell what the truth is.