Better economic policy means less central bank independence

Comments on Graeme Wells “Stiglitz is wrong to dismiss central bank independence”, 29/01/2013, https://theconversation.edu.au/stiglitz-is-wrong-to-dismiss-central-bank-independence-11745

The independence of central banks from government of the day has its merits, although a central bank should be more ideally subject to the overall coordination of an integrated economic oversight committee so the best combination of monetary and fiscal policies can be more easily achieved, as what is meant in economics.

This view on the independence of cantral banks is different from the conventional view of dependence in relation to government of the day.

Based on this criterion, Stiglizt's idea is not too bad.

The key is how to have a national economic oversight committee that serves the people as opposed to political parties that have their own political interests that can often be in conflict with the people's interests.

Further, how to deal with a government formed by elected political party members by such a committee also needs careful considerations.

But a national debate should be had on these sorts of questions. Without such debates, new and more effective economic governance is unlikely to appear.