Comments on Deepanshu Mohan "Is it the end of the dominant dollar?" 10/12/2015
While the Yuan will have an increasing role in international exchanges and as a reserve currency when its inclusion in the SDR takes effects, the initial effects may be relatively small and it will take at least a decade and possibly two before the Yuan to have the possibility to have an equal role as the US dollar.
Likewise, the weight of Yuan in the SDR will take the same length for it to have the prospect of an equal weight as the US dollar.
Of course, it will obviously depend on how China will handle its currency. Will China allow its Yuan as free as the US dollar? The freer a currency, the more likely people want to hold it, all other things equal.
Having said that, the combination of a SDR currency and China's status of a large trading partner for many countries may work in favour of increasing the role of Yuan to be used by many countries to minimise the costs of trade.
Showing posts with label Chinese currency. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Chinese currency. Show all posts
2015-09-28
Different ways for a currency to become international reserve
Comments on Yukon Huang "Rationalising China’s exchange rate policy", 28/09/2015
While the author, Yukon Huang argues it is easier to make the Chinese currency a regional reserve currency than a global one, China is probably more interested in making the RMB a global one. A global currency does not mean the stability against a particular major currency. The British pound, the Japanese yen and the euro all have had much greater fluctuations against the US dollar and against each other. So the idea that China must have a stable exchange rate with the US dollar is unnecessary in China's endeavour for the RMB to become a major international currency. If China's authority or its monetary authority has had that idea, that is naïve and unnecessary too.
However, it is probably good to have a stable currency in terms of against a basket of the major international currencies, as opposed to a particular one, even though the US dollar is by far the one used by most countries as the world currency reserve.
I am confounded by the argument that for a currency to become a major international reserve currency its host country must run a trade deficit to do it. There must be more than one way and different ways to make to happen, as lone as there is a need for other countries to hold that currency as a reserve. For example, the host countries can run trade deficits, or purely exchange its currency for another major or a number of other major currencies, so its currency can be available to other countries which need them. The host country can then invest those other currencies internationally, such as buy US bonds and other securities. The host country can, of course also buy gold from other countries.
It seems people see the US has run trade deficits and the US dollar is a major international reserve currency and therefore mistakenly think any host country of an international currency must run trade deficits.
While the author, Yukon Huang argues it is easier to make the Chinese currency a regional reserve currency than a global one, China is probably more interested in making the RMB a global one. A global currency does not mean the stability against a particular major currency. The British pound, the Japanese yen and the euro all have had much greater fluctuations against the US dollar and against each other. So the idea that China must have a stable exchange rate with the US dollar is unnecessary in China's endeavour for the RMB to become a major international currency. If China's authority or its monetary authority has had that idea, that is naïve and unnecessary too.
However, it is probably good to have a stable currency in terms of against a basket of the major international currencies, as opposed to a particular one, even though the US dollar is by far the one used by most countries as the world currency reserve.
I am confounded by the argument that for a currency to become a major international reserve currency its host country must run a trade deficit to do it. There must be more than one way and different ways to make to happen, as lone as there is a need for other countries to hold that currency as a reserve. For example, the host countries can run trade deficits, or purely exchange its currency for another major or a number of other major currencies, so its currency can be available to other countries which need them. The host country can then invest those other currencies internationally, such as buy US bonds and other securities. The host country can, of course also buy gold from other countries.
It seems people see the US has run trade deficits and the US dollar is a major international reserve currency and therefore mistakenly think any host country of an international currency must run trade deficits.
2015-08-13
More transparent in Chinese exchange rate is in the right direction
Comments on Alice de Jonge "Fans of a more open China should welcome the devalued yuan", 13/08/2015
I believe that China will move further in the direction of letting the market play a greater role in determine its exchange rate, even though the PBC has strong power to intervene when it is necessary.
The announcement that the midpoint of the Chinese Yuan and the $US is the close point of the previous day makes the process more transparent in general and the operation closer to market forces in particular. These steps by the PBC is likely to further facilitate China’s desire and objective to internationalise its currency to commensurate with its economic status in the world.
It will be interesting to see how the PBC will determine the midpoint of its exchange rate when there is a clear conflict between the previous day’s close and any information point to a likely significant impact on the Chinese currency that has newly been available since the close.
If it is mechanically following the previous day’s close, people may trade according to the new information to profit from that. And that will likely force the PBC to consider some deviation from the previous day’s close. It may need to assess how much to deviate and in what directions, so the new midpoint is much more aligned with market forces.
PS: in response to comments on the potential impact on Australians and New Zealanders' properties by John Hill:
It is probably less likely for them to sell right now as compared to reduced demand/buyers due to relative movement between the Chinese Yuan and the Aussie dollar.The property bubble may not burst as a result, but its further inflation may be somewhat more checked.
I believe that China will move further in the direction of letting the market play a greater role in determine its exchange rate, even though the PBC has strong power to intervene when it is necessary.
The announcement that the midpoint of the Chinese Yuan and the $US is the close point of the previous day makes the process more transparent in general and the operation closer to market forces in particular. These steps by the PBC is likely to further facilitate China’s desire and objective to internationalise its currency to commensurate with its economic status in the world.
It will be interesting to see how the PBC will determine the midpoint of its exchange rate when there is a clear conflict between the previous day’s close and any information point to a likely significant impact on the Chinese currency that has newly been available since the close.
If it is mechanically following the previous day’s close, people may trade according to the new information to profit from that. And that will likely force the PBC to consider some deviation from the previous day’s close. It may need to assess how much to deviate and in what directions, so the new midpoint is much more aligned with market forces.
PS: in response to comments on the potential impact on Australians and New Zealanders' properties by John Hill:
It is probably less likely for them to sell right now as compared to reduced demand/buyers due to relative movement between the Chinese Yuan and the Aussie dollar.The property bubble may not burst as a result, but its further inflation may be somewhat more checked.
2015-06-21
Pegging RMB to a basket of currencies
Comments on Heikki Oksanen "Should China peg the renminbi to a genuine basket?" 29 May 2015
Pegging the Ren Min Bi (RMB) with a basket of major currencies appears to be a sensible approach given China’s economic development and capital account regime.
Pegging the Ren Min Bi (RMB) with a basket of major currencies appears to be a sensible approach given China’s economic development and capital account regime.
While many economists may have very strong faith in the floating exchange regime, foreign exchange markets can and do exhibit excessive fluctuations showing bubbles similar to asset markets like stock and housing markets. Excessive fluctuations in foreign exchange markets may indicate some undesirability of complete floating.
Pegging to a basket of currencies increases stability and can reduce the degree of fluctuations.
2011-12-03
A second best at best
Comments on Yin-Wong Cheung, Guonan Ma and Robert N. McCauley “Why is China attempting to internationalise the renminbi?” 2/12/2011, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/12/02/why-does-china-attempt-to-internationalise-the-renminbi/
Leaving the real motivations of China's push for internationalisation of the RMB aside, there are alternatives to internationalisation of the RMB for avoiding or at least mitigating the potential huge losses for China associated with a rapid currency appreciation.
Beside considerations and argument based on the effects of RMB appreciation on both China's and indeed regional economies in terms of jobs and production of manufacturing, China could and should mount an argument to those parties that argue for a rapid appreciation that those countries must allow any assets China holds in any other currencies against which the RMB would appreciate to be denominated in dual currencies, that is, both their and China's currencies.
If any of them refuses to do that, it would be hypocrite of them by asking China to make a huge loss in terms of its assets holding in those other currencies.
If any of them refuses to do that, it would be hypocrite of them by asking China to make a huge loss in terms of its assets holding in those other currencies.
However, one may suspect that internationalisation of the RMB might have other more important effects as the Chinese economy becomes even larger and transaction costs of international trade and FDI become more significant.
How long would it take for the RMB to internationalise?
Comments on Gunter Dufey “The renminbi’s internationalisation: a reality check”, 29/11/2011, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/11/29/the-renminbi-s-internationalisation-a-reality-check/#more-23060
I have no idea about the reality and more Importantly the prospect of the renminbi’s internationalisation, but one may be totally surprised or even shocked if the pace accelerates rapidly to an unprecedented speed.
Just as the rapid rise of the Chinese economy along with its international trade, it is entirely possible that the renminbi’s internationalisation may be even fast once China realise its benefits greatly outweigh its costs.
In theory, internationalise a currency should be easier than rapidly increase a country's share in international trade, given the fact currency similar to monetary adjustment can be instantaneous, while trade or the real economy would move rather slowly, as demonstrated by the famous exchange rate overshooting and the simple IS-LM curve macroeconomic framework.
Just as the rapid rise of the Chinese economy along with its international trade, it is entirely possible that the renminbi’s internationalisation may be even fast once China realise its benefits greatly outweigh its costs.
In theory, internationalise a currency should be easier than rapidly increase a country's share in international trade, given the fact currency similar to monetary adjustment can be instantaneous, while trade or the real economy would move rather slowly, as demonstrated by the famous exchange rate overshooting and the simple IS-LM curve macroeconomic framework.
2010-09-16
Rely on the market more and administrative measures less
Comment on Yiping Huang “Improving China’s art in dealing with external pressures”, 16/09/2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/09/16/improving-chinas-art-in-dealing-with-external-pressures/comment-page-1/#comment-158342
While there is much more to be desired in the administration of the exchange rate in dealing with the so called international imbalance, the focus on the exchange rate, though having some merit, may have missed important points in the real issues of trade imbalance.
For example, it is often said trade subsidies like tax rebate for exports and import barriers, may be more important in terms of improving resources allocation and welfare.
Removing those market distorting factors and having a flexible and stable exchange rate linked to a basket of main currencies is likely to be a much better policy approach.
Further, it is beneficial to relax foreign currency management and allowing the Chinese and Chinese firms to hold and exchange foreign currencies inside China. That will also greatly reduce the superficial pressures for the yuan to appreciate.
Yes, all these mean to use the market more as opposed to administrative measures that are arbitrary and inefficient.
While there is much more to be desired in the administration of the exchange rate in dealing with the so called international imbalance, the focus on the exchange rate, though having some merit, may have missed important points in the real issues of trade imbalance.
For example, it is often said trade subsidies like tax rebate for exports and import barriers, may be more important in terms of improving resources allocation and welfare.
Removing those market distorting factors and having a flexible and stable exchange rate linked to a basket of main currencies is likely to be a much better policy approach.
Further, it is beneficial to relax foreign currency management and allowing the Chinese and Chinese firms to hold and exchange foreign currencies inside China. That will also greatly reduce the superficial pressures for the yuan to appreciate.
Yes, all these mean to use the market more as opposed to administrative measures that are arbitrary and inefficient.
2010-04-12
Complex issues in Chinese currency and exchange rates
Second comments on Yiping Huang “Misperceptions about the RMB and Chinese exchange rate policy”, 11/04/2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/04/11/misperceptions-about-the-rmb-and-chinese-exchange-rate-policy/
There are a number of points relevant but missing in Yiping's analysis.
Firstly, the impact on employment of appreciation, especially on mobile workers from rural areas and associated social stability must be carefully analysed and considered. This, of course is what the authority has to consider when large scale closures of manufacturing plants as a consequence of currency appreciation are concerned.
It is not just an issue static versus dynamic adjustment issue, although it has some relevance. Any dynamic adjustment has to be realistic as opposed economists’ wishes for a sudden technical or management improvement. For economists, it is so easy to change the ratio of labour versus capital and adopt new technologies. But in reality, the story can be quite different. Managers and entrepreneurs are not as lazy as some economists think.
Secondly, the issue of China's official reserves and assets denominated in $US and its potential very damaging consequences in terms of social stability, given that now many Chinese are aware the effects of a yuan appreciation. It is obvious to so many Chinese, especially the so called elite what an appreciation means in terms of the values of those assets. It is, however, very difficult to judge the how the public will react to authority sanctioned appreciation and the losses in state assets values.
Thirdly, even China adopted a flexible exchange rate, there is no guarantee that the US or some others continue to pressure China. For example, they could and would argue that it is not flexible enough as long as they wish to use it as stick to achieve whatever purpose they may have. At some stage, a country has to stand up to powerful countries for its own interests, otherwise international bullies will repeat endlessly with no real prospect to be checked.
Fourthly, the argument of country can only achieve two out three goals of "monetary policy independence, the free flow of capital and exchange rate stability" is likely to be problematic, if bank credits can be controlled. It is more than likely that in China’s case, all three can be achieved, rather than the conventional view.
Fifthly, although Yiping used some of the key insights (the unholy trinity) from the Mundell-Fleming model of international trade, an important implication of the model is overlooked, that is, the differential growth in domestic income as compared to external income. That should mean a deterioration of the current account balance. The experience of the past months indicates that has been the case now and further and possibly increasing trade deficits are likely to occur.
It would be prudent for both China and the US and other players to wait and assess the development in recent months before making any unwise moves. The Chinese economy is at a critical stage of structural transformation and in the short term it is highly likely to experience current account deficits until the transformation is completed.
Yes, China may move back to pegging to a basket of currencies and allows reasonable flexibility, but it does not necessarily mean currency appreciation measured by trade weighting.
Now it leads to ma last point on the missing elements in Yiping’s article, that is, the issue of China’s official holdings of $US denominated assets, that so many analysts have either ignored or think difficult to deal with.
It should be abundantly clear that it is reasonable for the Chinese authority to negotiate with the US authority on the issue of Chinese holdings of the US Treasury bonds. In fact it would be negligent of duty if the Chinese authority does not deal with this issue. Some move on that front is necessary for the Chinese authority to be able to tell its domestic audience on any currency moves.
It is unreasonable and indeed irrational for the US to ask for China to appreciate its currency and make a direct loss by holding the US government bonds. That will make the Chinese authority look so stupid.
A reasonable compromise is to use a mixed currency denomination, e.g. denominated in a basket of currencies.
There are a number of points relevant but missing in Yiping's analysis.
Firstly, the impact on employment of appreciation, especially on mobile workers from rural areas and associated social stability must be carefully analysed and considered. This, of course is what the authority has to consider when large scale closures of manufacturing plants as a consequence of currency appreciation are concerned.
It is not just an issue static versus dynamic adjustment issue, although it has some relevance. Any dynamic adjustment has to be realistic as opposed economists’ wishes for a sudden technical or management improvement. For economists, it is so easy to change the ratio of labour versus capital and adopt new technologies. But in reality, the story can be quite different. Managers and entrepreneurs are not as lazy as some economists think.
Secondly, the issue of China's official reserves and assets denominated in $US and its potential very damaging consequences in terms of social stability, given that now many Chinese are aware the effects of a yuan appreciation. It is obvious to so many Chinese, especially the so called elite what an appreciation means in terms of the values of those assets. It is, however, very difficult to judge the how the public will react to authority sanctioned appreciation and the losses in state assets values.
Thirdly, even China adopted a flexible exchange rate, there is no guarantee that the US or some others continue to pressure China. For example, they could and would argue that it is not flexible enough as long as they wish to use it as stick to achieve whatever purpose they may have. At some stage, a country has to stand up to powerful countries for its own interests, otherwise international bullies will repeat endlessly with no real prospect to be checked.
Fourthly, the argument of country can only achieve two out three goals of "monetary policy independence, the free flow of capital and exchange rate stability" is likely to be problematic, if bank credits can be controlled. It is more than likely that in China’s case, all three can be achieved, rather than the conventional view.
Fifthly, although Yiping used some of the key insights (the unholy trinity) from the Mundell-Fleming model of international trade, an important implication of the model is overlooked, that is, the differential growth in domestic income as compared to external income. That should mean a deterioration of the current account balance. The experience of the past months indicates that has been the case now and further and possibly increasing trade deficits are likely to occur.
It would be prudent for both China and the US and other players to wait and assess the development in recent months before making any unwise moves. The Chinese economy is at a critical stage of structural transformation and in the short term it is highly likely to experience current account deficits until the transformation is completed.
Yes, China may move back to pegging to a basket of currencies and allows reasonable flexibility, but it does not necessarily mean currency appreciation measured by trade weighting.
Now it leads to ma last point on the missing elements in Yiping’s article, that is, the issue of China’s official holdings of $US denominated assets, that so many analysts have either ignored or think difficult to deal with.
It should be abundantly clear that it is reasonable for the Chinese authority to negotiate with the US authority on the issue of Chinese holdings of the US Treasury bonds. In fact it would be negligent of duty if the Chinese authority does not deal with this issue. Some move on that front is necessary for the Chinese authority to be able to tell its domestic audience on any currency moves.
It is unreasonable and indeed irrational for the US to ask for China to appreciate its currency and make a direct loss by holding the US government bonds. That will make the Chinese authority look so stupid.
A reasonable compromise is to use a mixed currency denomination, e.g. denominated in a basket of currencies.
China's high or hidden rural unemployment can't be ignored
Comments on Yiping Huang “Misperceptions about the RMB and Chinese exchange rate policy”, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/04/11/misperceptions-about-the-rmb-and-chinese-exchange-rate-policy/
Yiping has discussed a number of issues related to the Chinese exchange rate that may go beyond my capacity to comment.
However, I would like to raise an issue on one of the points that is the impact of an appreciation on China's huge unemployment or hidden unemployment.
As we all know, China's rural population share is high, or in another word, its urbanisation is low. As a result of its economic reforms, some rural labour has become mobile workforce. But addmittingly, there are still huge numbers of rural workers who are surplus to rural needs and are the hidden unemployed, due to the very limited and low land per capita and mechanisation in rural production.
That has always been why most mobile rural workers are not paid much and kept the Chinese products competitive internationally.
Further, it has been reported that there are seemingly shortage of mobile workers from rural areas in some big manufacturing areas. While seemingly contradictory to the hidden unemployment still existing in rural areas, it is a sign that the costs of labour will rise soon.
On top of that, the recent trade figures already show a trade deficit for China.
So it is difficult to understand why the Chinese currency should or would appreciate and its economic rationale.
It seems many analyses are based on political pressure. Alternatively, they may have been based on some prevailing views.
But the GFC has shown that some prevailing views or consensus are not necessarily always correct.
Yiping has discussed a number of issues related to the Chinese exchange rate that may go beyond my capacity to comment.
However, I would like to raise an issue on one of the points that is the impact of an appreciation on China's huge unemployment or hidden unemployment.
As we all know, China's rural population share is high, or in another word, its urbanisation is low. As a result of its economic reforms, some rural labour has become mobile workforce. But addmittingly, there are still huge numbers of rural workers who are surplus to rural needs and are the hidden unemployed, due to the very limited and low land per capita and mechanisation in rural production.
That has always been why most mobile rural workers are not paid much and kept the Chinese products competitive internationally.
Further, it has been reported that there are seemingly shortage of mobile workers from rural areas in some big manufacturing areas. While seemingly contradictory to the hidden unemployment still existing in rural areas, it is a sign that the costs of labour will rise soon.
On top of that, the recent trade figures already show a trade deficit for China.
So it is difficult to understand why the Chinese currency should or would appreciate and its economic rationale.
It seems many analyses are based on political pressure. Alternatively, they may have been based on some prevailing views.
But the GFC has shown that some prevailing views or consensus are not necessarily always correct.
US may wake up to new reality soon
Comments on Wang Yong “Avoiding a US-China currency war: Need for rational calculation”, 11/04/2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/04/11/avoiding-a-us-china-currency-war-need-for-rational-calculation/
Wang Yong assumes that the US will gain moderately from a trade and currency war between the US and China. It is puzzling how that would be the case.
Exports benefit an economy, so doe imports.
What will the US gain from a reduction in the availability of cheap goods?
What gains will Americans have if they have to pay higher prices for the same goods?
What if China also takes retaliatory measures to restrict exports from the US to China?
So it is difficult to understand the rationale of a possible US gain from a potential trade and currency war.
Wang Yong's presumption may have been based on the wrong premise that leads to the wrong conclusion.
Of course, the US political circles have been used to threat other nations if they don't follow its tune.
One day it will wake up to the new reality that its past practice will not work any more.
That day may be very near now.
Wang Yong assumes that the US will gain moderately from a trade and currency war between the US and China. It is puzzling how that would be the case.
Exports benefit an economy, so doe imports.
What will the US gain from a reduction in the availability of cheap goods?
What gains will Americans have if they have to pay higher prices for the same goods?
What if China also takes retaliatory measures to restrict exports from the US to China?
So it is difficult to understand the rationale of a possible US gain from a potential trade and currency war.
Wang Yong's presumption may have been based on the wrong premise that leads to the wrong conclusion.
Of course, the US political circles have been used to threat other nations if they don't follow its tune.
One day it will wake up to the new reality that its past practice will not work any more.
That day may be very near now.
2010-03-31
Exchange rate and cross country assets values
Second comments on Ronald McKinnon “The appreciation of the yuan: A compromise solution”, 30/03/2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/03/30/the-appreciation-of-the-yuan-a-compromise-solution/
Maybe, a potential solution is for the US and the Chinese governments to sign an agreement to change the denomination of Chinese official holdings of bonds from current $US alone into a mixed denomination of the two currencies, so the impact of the relative movement of the two currencies on the yuan value of those assets can be cushioned to a certain degree.
This de-coupling between trade issues and assets holdings may make both sides more comfortable and leave them enough flexibility and rooms to make changes to the exchange rate to address trade imbalances should they be deemed as important.
I am, however, not sure how they can handle the official reserves of $US, though. That is an issue that the Chinese central bank has to confront and consider how to handle it.
Maybe, a potential solution is for the US and the Chinese governments to sign an agreement to change the denomination of Chinese official holdings of bonds from current $US alone into a mixed denomination of the two currencies, so the impact of the relative movement of the two currencies on the yuan value of those assets can be cushioned to a certain degree.
This de-coupling between trade issues and assets holdings may make both sides more comfortable and leave them enough flexibility and rooms to make changes to the exchange rate to address trade imbalances should they be deemed as important.
I am, however, not sure how they can handle the official reserves of $US, though. That is an issue that the Chinese central bank has to confront and consider how to handle it.
McKinnon proposal has merits
Comments on Ronald I. McKinnon “The appreciation of the yuan: A compromise solution”, 30/03/2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/03/30/the-appreciation-of-the-yuan-a-compromise-solution/
Not a bad idea.
There is an issue that the two sides also need to come to some sort of accommodation, that is, the Chinese official $US reserves and holding of US government bonds.
I think for the Chinese government to be able to face its increasingly demanding and restless domestic audience, it has to have some way to say o them it has not sold out their interests in those assets.
That is not an easy job, given that many Chinese are now aware that issue related to the exchange rate and the implications of currency appreciation.
Not a bad idea.
There is an issue that the two sides also need to come to some sort of accommodation, that is, the Chinese official $US reserves and holding of US government bonds.
I think for the Chinese government to be able to face its increasingly demanding and restless domestic audience, it has to have some way to say o them it has not sold out their interests in those assets.
That is not an easy job, given that many Chinese are now aware that issue related to the exchange rate and the implications of currency appreciation.
2010-02-05
The US just shouldn't and can't be too clever
Comments on Karen Maley “Inching towards a trade war”, 5/02/2010, http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/China-packs-a-punch-pd20100205-2CRK5?OpenDocument&src=sph
There is a practical also easy solution to the currency problem.
The US government would have to guarantee the real value in Chinese currency for Chinese official holding of the US bonds.
Everyone understand that any appreciation of the Chinese currency against the $US now means the Chinese will lose in the value of its holding of the US bonds.
The US should not and cannot make fool of the Chinese leaders in such a stunt by demanding they make a direct loss by their currency appreciation. That is just a game too crude and lack of intelligence.
Once that is done, the Chinese is likely to be more willing to allow its currency to appreciate.
Otherwise, the Chinese government would have a huge political problem with the Chinese public, given that any issues can further exacerbate the unsatisfaction that they already have.
There is a practical also easy solution to the currency problem.
The US government would have to guarantee the real value in Chinese currency for Chinese official holding of the US bonds.
Everyone understand that any appreciation of the Chinese currency against the $US now means the Chinese will lose in the value of its holding of the US bonds.
The US should not and cannot make fool of the Chinese leaders in such a stunt by demanding they make a direct loss by their currency appreciation. That is just a game too crude and lack of intelligence.
Once that is done, the Chinese is likely to be more willing to allow its currency to appreciate.
Otherwise, the Chinese government would have a huge political problem with the Chinese public, given that any issues can further exacerbate the unsatisfaction that they already have.
2009-07-24
Funny things with the Chinese currency
This is a short comment (in Chinese) on h8631986j "人民币升值出现拐点？" 23/07/2009, http://www.pinggu.name/space-535507-do-blog-id-16588.html
That article is funny in many ways.
本人不熟悉人民币基点，但感到300点够大的了。如果是真正市场的话，那可能得以千点计算，够吓人的。
自7月16日，至昨日，不过一星期，怎么会是一个多月？
如一个多月才贬300基点，还不如许多货币一天内的变幅，有何可惊讶的？
加上所提到的单线走势，说明没什么市场，或不是市场。
既不是真正市场，有何走向和拐点可谈, 不可笑?
That article is funny in many ways.
本人不熟悉人民币基点，但感到300点够大的了。如果是真正市场的话，那可能得以千点计算，够吓人的。
自7月16日，至昨日，不过一星期，怎么会是一个多月？
如一个多月才贬300基点，还不如许多货币一天内的变幅，有何可惊讶的？
加上所提到的单线走势，说明没什么市场，或不是市场。
既不是真正市场，有何走向和拐点可谈, 不可笑?
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