Comments on Patrick Mendis and Dániel Balázs "When the TPP and One Belt, One Road meet", 28/04/2106
While it may be the hopes and more like wishes of the authors of this post, one has to face the reality that President Obama’s clear statement on his purposes of TTP in terms of the relationship between the US and China. His TPP is to deliberately exclude China and make it extremely difficult for China to join. The TPP is not aimed at promote the benefits of trade and to promote regional growth and prosperity.
On the other hand, the One Belt One Road initiative by China is to strengthen economic growth for the whole region at least covered by that initiative and does not purposefully exclude any countries if they wish to join.
There is a strong and unambiguously contrast between the two, reflecting a declining and difficult power versus a rising, friendly and hopeful and helpful power.
There is no point to ‘make up’ things to make an ugly thing falsely appearing looking good and to wishfully think in almost the manner of the ’emperor’s new cloth’. One should be able to see and say what it is or what they are.
The authors should expose the ugly truth of the TPP, or more precisely, some of the ugly intention behind it, as it is.
Showing posts with label US. Show all posts
Showing posts with label US. Show all posts
2016-04-21
US increasingly waning capacity to be the world policeman
Comments on James Curran "Trouble at sea for the US and its Asian allies", 20/04/2016
This post appears to suggest that the US confrontational style approach in the context of maintaining US supremacy is justified. Ironically, the US has a choice to make and it is interesting to know that not every American shares the author’s view.
While many people both outside and inside the US may find that the Trump phenomenon puzzling and frightening, the very phenomenon certainly reflects some uncomforting reality.
One has to consider whether the US will continue to have the capacity to be the world policeman, irrespective whether the policeman has done a good job or not.
Another question is whether it is in the US interest to attempt to continue the role of world policeman. It is not costless to the US. At some point it may find that it will no longer be able to afford it.
This post appears to suggest that the US confrontational style approach in the context of maintaining US supremacy is justified. Ironically, the US has a choice to make and it is interesting to know that not every American shares the author’s view.
While many people both outside and inside the US may find that the Trump phenomenon puzzling and frightening, the very phenomenon certainly reflects some uncomforting reality.
One has to consider whether the US will continue to have the capacity to be the world policeman, irrespective whether the policeman has done a good job or not.
Another question is whether it is in the US interest to attempt to continue the role of world policeman. It is not costless to the US. At some point it may find that it will no longer be able to afford it.
2016-04-18
Importance of justice and the foundation of justice
Comments on Editors, East Asia Forum "Australia’s fraught decision on submarines", 18/04/2016
This editorial is well balanced.
The following point from Tatsumi's post this week was quoted: ‘the bid for SEA1000 is important for Japan in the overall context of deepening security ties with Australia’. Japan’s ‘2013 National Security Strategy identified Australia as an important security partner not only as a fellow US ally, but also as a regional partner that shares Japan’s key strategic interest in upholding an international order based on the fundamental norms that have underpinned the post-WWII world. Such norms include the rule of law, freedom of navigation and the non-use of coercive measures to assert diplomatic positions’.
The norms mentioned there are based on the so called post-WWII world international order, as Tatsumi stated. Some of the foundations were unjust, because some territories which had belonged to different countries were given by the Americans to its allies including Japan, particularly as the world gradually became divided into the American led and the Soviet led two opposing camps, with some in between. Certainly some Chinese have held the view that some of its former territories were dealt with in such deals between the Americans and some of its allies or its controlled subordinating countries.
If the foundation of the current international order is unjust, then is the argument to maintain this order just or justified?
We can write another story in which someone has stole other peoples' properties then after that that person argues for the rule of law and the protection of existing property rights, a seemingly quite 'just' prevailing order. We also have some accomplices has a strong force and police the existing order!
This editorial is well balanced.
The following point from Tatsumi's post this week was quoted: ‘the bid for SEA1000 is important for Japan in the overall context of deepening security ties with Australia’. Japan’s ‘2013 National Security Strategy identified Australia as an important security partner not only as a fellow US ally, but also as a regional partner that shares Japan’s key strategic interest in upholding an international order based on the fundamental norms that have underpinned the post-WWII world. Such norms include the rule of law, freedom of navigation and the non-use of coercive measures to assert diplomatic positions’.
The norms mentioned there are based on the so called post-WWII world international order, as Tatsumi stated. Some of the foundations were unjust, because some territories which had belonged to different countries were given by the Americans to its allies including Japan, particularly as the world gradually became divided into the American led and the Soviet led two opposing camps, with some in between. Certainly some Chinese have held the view that some of its former territories were dealt with in such deals between the Americans and some of its allies or its controlled subordinating countries.
If the foundation of the current international order is unjust, then is the argument to maintain this order just or justified?
We can write another story in which someone has stole other peoples' properties then after that that person argues for the rule of law and the protection of existing property rights, a seemingly quite 'just' prevailing order. We also have some accomplices has a strong force and police the existing order!
2016-01-26
The failures of the six parties on North Korea nuclear
Comments on Stephen Costello "US North Korea policy should acknowledge past success", 14-15 January 2016
The following are comments on the article and on some comments by others.
In hind sight, efforts of the five parties involved in the attempt to prevent and limit the North Korea’s nuclear programs achieved very little. China may need to bear a greater share of responsibility, given the reliance of North Korea on China in terms of trade and other support. However, blaming China for the current North Korea nuclear situation overstates the limited influence of China on North Korea. Further, China has probably faced with huge uncertainties in terms of how to best deal with North Korea and potential consequences of a failed state should North Korea collapse. Nevertheless, China should review its policy towards North Korea and its effects. Maybe a tough love approach is needed.
From the conventional geopolitical point of view, I would agree to the point that Chinese leaders do “have a vested interest in using the DPRK as a cushion between them and the South/USA.” Any independent minded person would say, why not?
Don’t the US have, at least from time to time, attempt to contain China? What the current US president said on at least couple of occasions, that he does not like for China to write the rules and the US’ exclusion of China in the TPP negotiations, re the TPP in the context of economics and trade?
Even in that context, China did not and does not like to see the development of the North Korea’s nuclear program that is not in China’s interests.
Any link for China’s policy to the North Korea’s nuclear program is misguided and wrong. It is to blame China but that is wrong and unlikely to be helpful.
China have probably been hoping that the North Korea leader may heed its hope not to go forward with its nuclear program, given its support to North Korea. But the later obviously has not been following China’s wish.
I would argue China’s policy amid uncertainties regarding North Korea has not achieved its objectives. It should have long ago reviewed its policy effectiveness and changed course. In real world, its never too late to adopt a better policy.
The following are comments on the article and on some comments by others.
In hind sight, efforts of the five parties involved in the attempt to prevent and limit the North Korea’s nuclear programs achieved very little. China may need to bear a greater share of responsibility, given the reliance of North Korea on China in terms of trade and other support. However, blaming China for the current North Korea nuclear situation overstates the limited influence of China on North Korea. Further, China has probably faced with huge uncertainties in terms of how to best deal with North Korea and potential consequences of a failed state should North Korea collapse. Nevertheless, China should review its policy towards North Korea and its effects. Maybe a tough love approach is needed.
From the conventional geopolitical point of view, I would agree to the point that Chinese leaders do “have a vested interest in using the DPRK as a cushion between them and the South/USA.” Any independent minded person would say, why not?
Don’t the US have, at least from time to time, attempt to contain China? What the current US president said on at least couple of occasions, that he does not like for China to write the rules and the US’ exclusion of China in the TPP negotiations, re the TPP in the context of economics and trade?
Even in that context, China did not and does not like to see the development of the North Korea’s nuclear program that is not in China’s interests.
Any link for China’s policy to the North Korea’s nuclear program is misguided and wrong. It is to blame China but that is wrong and unlikely to be helpful.
China have probably been hoping that the North Korea leader may heed its hope not to go forward with its nuclear program, given its support to North Korea. But the later obviously has not been following China’s wish.
I would argue China’s policy amid uncertainties regarding North Korea has not achieved its objectives. It should have long ago reviewed its policy effectiveness and changed course. In real world, its never too late to adopt a better policy.
Lack of leadership on democracy by world leader of democracy
Comments on Andrew Sheng "Navigating the rocky road to a multipolar order", 25/01/2016
The refusal to ratify the 2009 G20 agreement to widen the voting rights distribution of the IMF by the US Congress appeared to show hypocrisy on the part of the world leader of democracy. It showed that the US congress did not accept democracy when its influence is going to wane. It did not show leadership on its part. The fact that so many major EU countries joined the China initiative of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank reflect the US congress is losing support from its traditional allies on its irrational behaviour on IMF voting rights reform.
The refusal to ratify the 2009 G20 agreement to widen the voting rights distribution of the IMF by the US Congress appeared to show hypocrisy on the part of the world leader of democracy. It showed that the US congress did not accept democracy when its influence is going to wane. It did not show leadership on its part. The fact that so many major EU countries joined the China initiative of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank reflect the US congress is losing support from its traditional allies on its irrational behaviour on IMF voting rights reform.
2015-08-20
Tristram Sainsbury: "US global economic leadership: responding to a rising China"
A useful paper for reference, by Tristram Sainsbury "US global economic leadership: responding to a rising China", 19/08/2015. It discussed a few poor responses by the US towards the rise of China, including the AIIB, IMF reforms, and the TPP.
The full report website: http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/us-global-economic-leadership-responding-rising-china
The full report website: http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/us-global-economic-leadership-responding-rising-china
2015-08-10
China and US looking past each other on trade and investment - for very different reasons
Comments on Gary Clyde Hufbauer “China, US looking past each other on trade and investment” 7/08/2015
There is a very significant difference between the reason why China is not included in the TPP and the reason why the US is not in the AIIB. China has been deliberately excluded by the US (and possibly Japan), while the US has deliberately chosen not to join the AIIB, and also lobbied its allies not to join it).
The US has demonstrated that it has been containing China’s rise not only militarily but also economically.
However, whether the US attempts to do those will be in its own interest or not is yet to be seen. It will likely damage its own interests more than damage to China’s.
There is a very significant difference between the reason why China is not included in the TPP and the reason why the US is not in the AIIB. China has been deliberately excluded by the US (and possibly Japan), while the US has deliberately chosen not to join the AIIB, and also lobbied its allies not to join it).
The US has demonstrated that it has been containing China’s rise not only militarily but also economically.
However, whether the US attempts to do those will be in its own interest or not is yet to be seen. It will likely damage its own interests more than damage to China’s.
2015-08-05
No point for US to preach its high standards
Comments on Paul Hubbard "China takes the lead on the silk road", 5/08/2015
In relation to the following paragraph, China should reject the US offer politely, given it is not a member of the AIID:
"Nevertheless, the United States and Japan both chose not to become founding members of the bank. This was driven partly by concerns that the AIIB would undermine the lending standards of the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, which these powers have traditionally led. But despite early lobbying from the United States, key allies — including Australia, South Korea and the United Kingdom — eventually joined the rush to the new institution. And the United States has pledged to ‘engage directly with China’ to help the AIIB implement the high-quality standards it seeks."
There is no point for the US, that is not interested in joining the AIID, to preach how it can help with its high quality standards. That is not too much different from the actions of hypocrisy, self indulgence and arrogance.
In relation to the following paragraph, China should reject the US offer politely, given it is not a member of the AIID:
"Nevertheless, the United States and Japan both chose not to become founding members of the bank. This was driven partly by concerns that the AIIB would undermine the lending standards of the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, which these powers have traditionally led. But despite early lobbying from the United States, key allies — including Australia, South Korea and the United Kingdom — eventually joined the rush to the new institution. And the United States has pledged to ‘engage directly with China’ to help the AIIB implement the high-quality standards it seeks."
There is no point for the US, that is not interested in joining the AIID, to preach how it can help with its high quality standards. That is not too much different from the actions of hypocrisy, self indulgence and arrogance.
2015-08-04
China needs a realistic view on other mega free trade agreements
Comments on He Fan and Xiaoming Pan "China’s negotiation strategies at the crossroads of international trade" 4/08/2015
I have a number of comments on this post.
Firstly, I am not sure the authors really means that "at home, China’s reliance on export-oriented growth faces an unprecedented challenge in the face of shrinking global demand". Has the global demand really shrinked or has the growth slowed?
Secondly, is the remark that "Facilitating GVCs is the leading cause of the proliferation of regional and mega-regional trade negotiations, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)", correct? Is facilitating GVCs really the leading cause for TPP and TTIP? If it is then there would be huge holes or gaps in those two trade agreements, because China, a very important and the most important country in the value chains of many manufacturing activities is not in either of those two, and it has been deliberately excluded from the TPP that would defeat the purpose of facilitating the GVCs.
Thirdly, while the authors are correct in saying that "in the post-GFC world, exports are evidently no longer the engine of China’s economy", it does not necessarily or automatically mean that exports will never be an engine of growth for ever. In that sense, the new normal in relation to exports may be temporary rather than being permanent. As a result, the remarks that "the ‘new normal’ requires adjustments in domestic economic policies and externally-oriented trade policies and strategies. Trade strategies that are compatible with China’s domestic conditions will help China achieve a stable shift to the new normal", may need some caution, as the situation with exports may change when the global economy puts behind, the temporary "new normal", that is the consequences of the GFC and back to its real "normal".
Alternatively, the exports orientation should not be sacrificed but should adapt to the ever changing world economy and to grab every opportunity to increase trade and exports.
Fourthly, the remark that “in the Pacific Rim, while RCEP and the TPP complement each other in terms of their membership scope and issue coverage, they are in competition to offer the first update to the international trade rules of the WTO”, may represent an one-sided fantasy or day dreaming on the authors part, because the US does and will not think in that way. The authors also indirectly or implicitly acknowledged this point in the statement “despite its increasing trade power and enthusiasm to join international trade rule-making, China is currently excluded from TPP negotiations.”
The following paragraph also reflects the contradictory of the claim of the complementarity of the TPP and RECP: “At the same time, some new sensitive issues — such as SOEs, the environment and labour — pose challenges for China in 21st century trade negotiations and joining the TPP. Handled badly, they can also be impediments to genuinely free trade. The environment was once an area in which Chinese standards once diverged from most developed countries, but today Chinese standards in many areas exceed those of even some TPP member countries.”
Further, the authors also remarked that “the mega-regionals could either turn out to be a stumbling block for genuinely global free trade or pave the way to reaching a multilateral deal within the WTO’s framework.” It is another reflection of some of the contradictions in the authors’ arguments earlier on, as here the so called comlementarity gives way to problems. But that is where China’s approach to trade negotiations should be focused on, that is to say, on what is happening as opposed to what some fantasy may point to.
Nevertheless, I do share the view that China’s SOEs needs to be handled with care, creativity and boldness, by China and its leaders. Some reforms are needed in that particular areas, so China will not be disadvantaged due to its SOEs.
Finally the last sentence by the authors, while understandable, still hinges on wining the sympathy of those which deliberately do not have for China: “the internal reform of the Chinese economy and its changing role in the global economy provide common ground for China, a large developing country, and developed countries to work on their divergence and to agree to a new set of rules.” It is a miserable position to be.
I have a number of comments on this post.
Firstly, I am not sure the authors really means that "at home, China’s reliance on export-oriented growth faces an unprecedented challenge in the face of shrinking global demand". Has the global demand really shrinked or has the growth slowed?
Secondly, is the remark that "Facilitating GVCs is the leading cause of the proliferation of regional and mega-regional trade negotiations, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)", correct? Is facilitating GVCs really the leading cause for TPP and TTIP? If it is then there would be huge holes or gaps in those two trade agreements, because China, a very important and the most important country in the value chains of many manufacturing activities is not in either of those two, and it has been deliberately excluded from the TPP that would defeat the purpose of facilitating the GVCs.
Thirdly, while the authors are correct in saying that "in the post-GFC world, exports are evidently no longer the engine of China’s economy", it does not necessarily or automatically mean that exports will never be an engine of growth for ever. In that sense, the new normal in relation to exports may be temporary rather than being permanent. As a result, the remarks that "the ‘new normal’ requires adjustments in domestic economic policies and externally-oriented trade policies and strategies. Trade strategies that are compatible with China’s domestic conditions will help China achieve a stable shift to the new normal", may need some caution, as the situation with exports may change when the global economy puts behind, the temporary "new normal", that is the consequences of the GFC and back to its real "normal".
Alternatively, the exports orientation should not be sacrificed but should adapt to the ever changing world economy and to grab every opportunity to increase trade and exports.
Fourthly, the remark that “in the Pacific Rim, while RCEP and the TPP complement each other in terms of their membership scope and issue coverage, they are in competition to offer the first update to the international trade rules of the WTO”, may represent an one-sided fantasy or day dreaming on the authors part, because the US does and will not think in that way. The authors also indirectly or implicitly acknowledged this point in the statement “despite its increasing trade power and enthusiasm to join international trade rule-making, China is currently excluded from TPP negotiations.”
The following paragraph also reflects the contradictory of the claim of the complementarity of the TPP and RECP: “At the same time, some new sensitive issues — such as SOEs, the environment and labour — pose challenges for China in 21st century trade negotiations and joining the TPP. Handled badly, they can also be impediments to genuinely free trade. The environment was once an area in which Chinese standards once diverged from most developed countries, but today Chinese standards in many areas exceed those of even some TPP member countries.”
Further, the authors also remarked that “the mega-regionals could either turn out to be a stumbling block for genuinely global free trade or pave the way to reaching a multilateral deal within the WTO’s framework.” It is another reflection of some of the contradictions in the authors’ arguments earlier on, as here the so called comlementarity gives way to problems. But that is where China’s approach to trade negotiations should be focused on, that is to say, on what is happening as opposed to what some fantasy may point to.
Nevertheless, I do share the view that China’s SOEs needs to be handled with care, creativity and boldness, by China and its leaders. Some reforms are needed in that particular areas, so China will not be disadvantaged due to its SOEs.
Finally the last sentence by the authors, while understandable, still hinges on wining the sympathy of those which deliberately do not have for China: “the internal reform of the Chinese economy and its changing role in the global economy provide common ground for China, a large developing country, and developed countries to work on their divergence and to agree to a new set of rules.” It is a miserable position to be.
2015-07-27
TPP will be a mixed blessing for Australia
Comments on Shiro Armstrong "The race to a risky Trans-Pacific Partnership deal", 27/07/2015
Whether it is willingly or unwillingly on Australia's part, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) may prove to be a mixed blessing for Australia indeed, given that China is Australia's largest market and that Australia relies very heavily on Chinese economy to perform. China is excluded from the TPP and will suffer as a result of the trade diversion effects away from its exports. If China's exports is negatively affected by the TPP, then it in turn will have a negative effect on Australia.
But more seriously than that, the intention of the US and Japan to contain China's (and possibly India's too) rise economically as shown in their approach to the TPP memberships, there may be a long term and lasting damage to a number of bilateral relationships. In the future those countries which are deliberately excluded by the US and japan may take potentially remedy measures, whether it is retaliatory or purely a natural response.
The Chinese and Indians may not openly say anything but in their heart and minds it is crystal clear what the TPP is about and what it means for them. It may be forgiven sooner or later, but it will not be easily forgotten.
The damages have already been done and let's hope they would be contained without spiral out of control.
Whether it is willingly or unwillingly on Australia's part, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) may prove to be a mixed blessing for Australia indeed, given that China is Australia's largest market and that Australia relies very heavily on Chinese economy to perform. China is excluded from the TPP and will suffer as a result of the trade diversion effects away from its exports. If China's exports is negatively affected by the TPP, then it in turn will have a negative effect on Australia.
But more seriously than that, the intention of the US and Japan to contain China's (and possibly India's too) rise economically as shown in their approach to the TPP memberships, there may be a long term and lasting damage to a number of bilateral relationships. In the future those countries which are deliberately excluded by the US and japan may take potentially remedy measures, whether it is retaliatory or purely a natural response.
The Chinese and Indians may not openly say anything but in their heart and minds it is crystal clear what the TPP is about and what it means for them. It may be forgiven sooner or later, but it will not be easily forgotten.
The damages have already been done and let's hope they would be contained without spiral out of control.
2015-06-30
Contest of dominance
Comments on Hugh White "Asian Century must begin with great-power accommodation", 30/06/2015
While it would be ideal that the scenario in the second last paragraph becomes true, there is no certainty and assurance of that.
If people watch the animal world presented by David Attenborough, one may be left with the impression that the existing dominant male seldom voluntarily gives way to a new challenger male and there is often a fight between the two as a succession of the dominant males in the group.
Would the US and China come to that, or would human beings are more intelligent than those animals?
While it would be ideal that the scenario in the second last paragraph becomes true, there is no certainty and assurance of that.
If people watch the animal world presented by David Attenborough, one may be left with the impression that the existing dominant male seldom voluntarily gives way to a new challenger male and there is often a fight between the two as a succession of the dominant males in the group.
Would the US and China come to that, or would human beings are more intelligent than those animals?
2015-06-21
China's rise: a threat?
Comments on James Laurenceson and Hannah Bretherton "What Australians really think about a rising China", 27 May 2015
While China is likely to be more assertive as it becomes more powerful, it is highly unlikely to be a threat to the international order, as it is not in its interest to do so.
While China is likely to be more assertive as it becomes more powerful, it is highly unlikely to be a threat to the international order, as it is not in its interest to do so.
The main reason lies in that it has more to lose than to gain if it is to become a threat. The US and it’s extensive and powerful allies will remain a powerful check to any single country for a very long time to come, no matter how powerful any other single country may reasonably be expected to be.
This, however, does not necessarily apply to the case where a country unreasonably threats China.
Sino-Russian strategic accord?
Comments on Tom Lairson and Ilan Alon "Disparities limit the scope for a Sino–Russian strategic accord", 16/06/2015
While it is true that there are significant dissimilarities between China and Russia that may possibly mean certain barriers for them to become close allies, whether they will develop into close strategic allies or not is also dependent on how the US and NATO behave.
For example, should the latter pose existential security threats to the former, then it is not inconceivable that they would develop into strategic allies to defend themselves together. Even though they may be currently seen as unlikely strategic allies, they may not have other and better alternatives to them if both faced with that kind of threats.
Neutrality on South China Sea issues important
Comments on Mark J. Valencia "New round of China-bashing over the South China Sea", 18 June 2015
What is the purpose of such unbalanced critique?
2013-04-14
US and China need to understand each other for the common good
Comments on Yuhan Zhang and Lin Shi "Conflict between China and the US is not inevitable", 14/04/2013, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/04/13/conflict-between-china-and-the-us-is-not-inevitable/
People should realise that the so called idea of American offensive realists are already proven unworkable by the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.
If the US, together with the support of NATO and other coalition partners, find it impossible to win those wars where the two countries are really very small in many aspects and at a time when interest rates have been super low, how can the US alone win a major win with China where it has the world’s largest population and second largest economy and when interest rates are unlikely to remain as favorable as in the first decade of the twenty first century? Further the Chinese economy is likely to grow at a much higher speed than that of the US’s?
China has always argued for its peaceful rise and there is no reason to believe peace is not in China’s own interests.
As a result, American offensive realists should realise that their ideas are unworkable and will be discreditable if they continue to push them.
The only realistic way forward in the US and China relations is for the two countries to understand that neither will be able to dominate the other without significant and unbearable costs to both sides.
Once this becomes clear, the two should engage in cooperation as well as economic competition as any two normal countries would do peacefully.
People should realise that the so called idea of American offensive realists are already proven unworkable by the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.
If the US, together with the support of NATO and other coalition partners, find it impossible to win those wars where the two countries are really very small in many aspects and at a time when interest rates have been super low, how can the US alone win a major win with China where it has the world’s largest population and second largest economy and when interest rates are unlikely to remain as favorable as in the first decade of the twenty first century? Further the Chinese economy is likely to grow at a much higher speed than that of the US’s?
China has always argued for its peaceful rise and there is no reason to believe peace is not in China’s own interests.
As a result, American offensive realists should realise that their ideas are unworkable and will be discreditable if they continue to push them.
The only realistic way forward in the US and China relations is for the two countries to understand that neither will be able to dominate the other without significant and unbearable costs to both sides.
Once this becomes clear, the two should engage in cooperation as well as economic competition as any two normal countries would do peacefully.
2013-04-02
Airport expansion in China
Comments on Wang Tao "Troubles with airport expansion in China", 18/03/2013, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/03/18/troubles-with-airport-expansion-in-china/
I would urge caution for using railway travel against air travel.
While it is true that a much higher proportion of people travel by train in China than those in the US, a point made by the author of this article, the article does not seem to make it clear why that should that be a limiting factor for further increases in the number of airports in China.
For example, China has more than three times the population of the US. This factor alone would suggest that it is still possible that there could be more air travellers in China even with a lower proportion of air travellers in China.
Secondly, fast train services in China are likely to be making losses, not much better than airports.
Thirdly, a better strategy may be to construct different types of airports with different scales.
Fourthly, if air travel and fast-train travel are competitors, it would be a good thing to increase competition as long as new constructions are by the private sector, or at least the private sector has a strong involvement to avoid public investments to be wasted.
Having said that, I think the main point I am making is that the article has not presented a systematic and thorough picture to be convincing in its arguments. The author may be right, but more analysis is needed, especially since in many places it would be too costly to construct rail tracks.
I would urge caution for using railway travel against air travel.
While it is true that a much higher proportion of people travel by train in China than those in the US, a point made by the author of this article, the article does not seem to make it clear why that should that be a limiting factor for further increases in the number of airports in China.
For example, China has more than three times the population of the US. This factor alone would suggest that it is still possible that there could be more air travellers in China even with a lower proportion of air travellers in China.
Secondly, fast train services in China are likely to be making losses, not much better than airports.
Thirdly, a better strategy may be to construct different types of airports with different scales.
Fourthly, if air travel and fast-train travel are competitors, it would be a good thing to increase competition as long as new constructions are by the private sector, or at least the private sector has a strong involvement to avoid public investments to be wasted.
Having said that, I think the main point I am making is that the article has not presented a systematic and thorough picture to be convincing in its arguments. The author may be right, but more analysis is needed, especially since in many places it would be too costly to construct rail tracks.
2012-01-27
The US has been the main obstacle in climate change
Comments on Judith Sloan “Doha is
dead and there's no case for reviving it”, 27/01/2011,
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/opinion/doha-is-dead-and-theres-no-case-for-reviving-it/story-fnbkvnk7-1226254691086
The US has been the worst international
culprit in terms of international climate change responsibility and
agreement, typified by its refusal to join the Kyoto agreement. So
there is no credibility in any of its arguments in this area and
there is no persuasion for citing that against demand and arguments
of the developing countries.
The US stance and the fact that no
other countries could do anything about it was the main reason why
Canada, Japan and Russia have taken their recent stances.
It is only fair and legitimate that
developing countries argue for what they have been argued for.
The fundamental issue of the
difficulties in reaching an binding international agreement on this
issue has been that the developed countries, especially the US, have
all failed to adopt the simplest and fairest approach, that is, equal
per capita right of emissions and the user pay principle.
Had that been adopted, developing
countries with low emissions are entitled for payments for below
average emissions.
Sloan should be able to acknowledge
this without too much difficulty, given her strong economic
background.
2011-12-23
A new and special structure for the unification of the Taiwan Strait
Comments on Bonnie S. Glaser and Brittany Billingsley “US, China await Taiwan elections with apprehension”, 23/12/2011 http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/12/23/us-china-await-taiwan-elections-with-apprehension/
In the short to media term, the stability in the relation cross the Taiwan strait will be good for every party involved, including both sides of the strait, the US, as well as the DPP.
In the long term, it would be conceivable to establish a new special structure for the eventual political unification of the two sides of the strait.
Deng Xioping was said to have stated that a structure more loose than the "one country, two systems" structure that has been applied to both Honk Kong and Macao, including Taiwan has its own military system etc.
In the long term, it would be conceivable to establish a new special structure for the eventual political unification of the two sides of the strait.
Deng Xioping was said to have stated that a structure more loose than the "one country, two systems" structure that has been applied to both Honk Kong and Macao, including Taiwan has its own military system etc.
I personally think that a special political name for reference to Taiwan, such as Taiwan特州(洲)(special state), to differentiate from the “Special Administration Region” used for both Honk Kong and Macao.
In China's long history, there were periods when 州 was used as a region within China, so the use of this Chinese character may be acceptable to the Chinese, especially as a compromise between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. 洲 could also be used, given that Taiwan is an big island, surrounded by water, hence the left part of the character.
If such a political structure or system were to be adopted, China would have several different special regions, including Taiwan as the most special one, then Hong Kong and Macao, then minority ethnic autonomous regions, special directly administered municipalities, beside the many provinces.
As long as Taiwan is unified with the mainland and both work for win-win outcome to benefit both, then Taiwan can be expected to have much broader international space.
2011-10-24
Professor Peter Morici's is China bashing, again
Comments on Peter Morici “Fed a US housing fantasy”, 24/10/2011, http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/US-Fed-economy-housing-rates-oil-bonds-Bernanke-pd20111024-MWUW4?OpenDocument&src=sph&src=rot
Prof Morici balmes China for the US trade deficits.
Even let's assume he's correct in his that particular argument,
he, however, is not consistent fundamentally in his argument by only focusing on trade and ignoring the saving investment conditions.
It is too easy for some Americans to blame others for their own problems, but how others outside the US could make the US government huge budget deficits?
The US trade deficits with the rest of the world is at least partly a reflection of over spending and insufficient savings nation wide.
Unless the Americans recognise their own problems and take effective actions to rectify them, blaming other will not solve their saving deficits problems.
When Prof Morici is saying the Fed fantasy, he is also creating his own fantasies about the US economy!
It's just as simple as that!
Instead of blaming others, the professor should be grateful for the rest of the world for providing funds available to the US!
2011-09-08
US cannot avoid Japan-style stagnation
Comments on Anatole Kaletsky “Barack Obama can still pull US back from a slide into Japan-style stagnation”, 8/09/2011, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/barack-obama-can-still-pull-us-back-from-a-slide-into-japan-style-stagnation/story-e6frg6ux-1226131676602
A major weakness of and indeed a serious problem with this analysis and the reforms is that most of European economies are in deep troubles too at the moment.
Secondly, what do some of the proposals mean for the two government owned lenders in terms of their profitability and solvency?
Further, while it is true that investment in aged infrastructure can be profitable and productive, the US government does not have the capacity to do it because of its very high levels of debts. It has to rely on the private sector to invest and that would require privatisation that would take time and whether it is now politically viable or not remains an open question, although in the medium and long run it is inevitably required to do so.
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