Comments on Stephen Costello "US North Korea policy should acknowledge past success", 14-15 January 2016
The following are comments on the article and on some comments by others.
In hind sight, efforts of the five parties involved in the attempt to prevent and limit the North Korea’s nuclear programs achieved very little. China may need to bear a greater share of responsibility, given the reliance of North Korea on China in terms of trade and other support. However, blaming China for the current North Korea nuclear situation overstates the limited influence of China on North Korea. Further, China has probably faced with huge uncertainties in terms of how to best deal with North Korea and potential consequences of a failed state should North Korea collapse. Nevertheless, China should review its policy towards North Korea and its effects. Maybe a tough love approach is needed.
From the conventional geopolitical point of view, I would agree to the point that Chinese leaders do “have a vested interest in using the DPRK as a cushion between them and the South/USA.” Any independent minded person would say, why not?
Don’t the US have, at least from time to time, attempt to contain China? What the current US president said on at least couple of occasions, that he does not like for China to write the rules and the US’ exclusion of China in the TPP negotiations, re the TPP in the context of economics and trade?
Even in that context, China did not and does not like to see the development of the North Korea’s nuclear program that is not in China’s interests.
Any link for China’s policy to the North Korea’s nuclear program is misguided and wrong. It is to blame China but that is wrong and unlikely to be helpful.
China have probably been hoping that the North Korea leader may heed its hope not to go forward with its nuclear program, given its support to North Korea. But the later obviously has not been following China’s wish.
I would argue China’s policy amid uncertainties regarding North Korea has not achieved its objectives. It should have long ago reviewed its policy effectiveness and changed course. In real world, its never too late to adopt a better policy.
Showing posts with label North Korea. Show all posts
Showing posts with label North Korea. Show all posts
2015-08-16
Singing swansong for North Korea now is too premature speculation
Comments on the comments by Dennis on "Time to tap Russia and China on North Korean denuclearisation"by Akanksha Sharma, 16/08/2015
The remark by Dennis that "... and China will never put any serious pressure on North Korea to give up their nukes for fear that N Korea will collapse", to the most may be partially correct and possibly very misleading. Yes, China probably does not wish to see the North Korea collapse, but it is not in China's interest to see North Korea really becomes a nuclear power, given its ramifications for geopolitical balance and the excuses the US and Japan use to station missile defence systems in East Asian countries. However, one should not overstate the influence of China on North Korea, given the wayward and unpredictable behaviour of the latter. China has been embarrassed by North Korea many times in recent years.
The predication that North Korea is in its end stage is likely to be a pure speculation and may not turn out to be true. Certainly it is premature to rely hopes on such a speculation. If that was true, then why is there an urgent need to persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear power? We could all just simply wait for its collapse and then rid off its nuclear bombs.
The US should probably not station any troops in the Korean peninsular at all as opposed to not station in the North as you argued.
PS: Dennis made a reply to my comments and as a result, I made the following reply (22:23 pm, 18/08/2015):
I am sure both the South Korean and the Japanese leaders know much better than you in terms of what is best for their respective countries. They should know far better what is in their own countries' interests. It would be arrogant to assume they don't know. I am not sure either country wishes to have become a nuclear power either with or without the persuasion from the US.
Further I am not sure that China didn't apply pressure to North Korea to stop nuclear testing. The public records indicate China did, contrary to your claim that it didn't. Simply ask a question, given Beijing could become a target of North Korea's nuclear missiles, is that in China's interest to not pressure for the North to stop testing?
There is a simple sanity test here.
The remark by Dennis that "... and China will never put any serious pressure on North Korea to give up their nukes for fear that N Korea will collapse", to the most may be partially correct and possibly very misleading. Yes, China probably does not wish to see the North Korea collapse, but it is not in China's interest to see North Korea really becomes a nuclear power, given its ramifications for geopolitical balance and the excuses the US and Japan use to station missile defence systems in East Asian countries. However, one should not overstate the influence of China on North Korea, given the wayward and unpredictable behaviour of the latter. China has been embarrassed by North Korea many times in recent years.
The predication that North Korea is in its end stage is likely to be a pure speculation and may not turn out to be true. Certainly it is premature to rely hopes on such a speculation. If that was true, then why is there an urgent need to persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear power? We could all just simply wait for its collapse and then rid off its nuclear bombs.
The US should probably not station any troops in the Korean peninsular at all as opposed to not station in the North as you argued.
PS: Dennis made a reply to my comments and as a result, I made the following reply (22:23 pm, 18/08/2015):
I am sure both the South Korean and the Japanese leaders know much better than you in terms of what is best for their respective countries. They should know far better what is in their own countries' interests. It would be arrogant to assume they don't know. I am not sure either country wishes to have become a nuclear power either with or without the persuasion from the US.
Further I am not sure that China didn't apply pressure to North Korea to stop nuclear testing. The public records indicate China did, contrary to your claim that it didn't. Simply ask a question, given Beijing could become a target of North Korea's nuclear missiles, is that in China's interest to not pressure for the North to stop testing?
There is a simple sanity test here.
2010-12-16
Hemmings' poor analysis of the Korean penisular
Comments on John Hemmings “A rational suggestion regarding North Korea”, 16/12/2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/12/15/a-rational-suggestion-regarding-north-korea/
This is by far the most moralistic approach based on ideal by a bystander on the one hand, and extremely irresponsible bordering humanitarian disaster on the other.
However, there is no guarantee that what John Hemmings proposes is workable or even as good as the one he despises as not working.
It is a biased analysis and a dangerous advocate for an extremely risky experiment that has little prospect to succeed but is destined to fail.
This is when people get desperate and attempt to try anything irrespective what it is!
This is by far the most moralistic approach based on ideal by a bystander on the one hand, and extremely irresponsible bordering humanitarian disaster on the other.
However, there is no guarantee that what John Hemmings proposes is workable or even as good as the one he despises as not working.
It is a biased analysis and a dangerous advocate for an extremely risky experiment that has little prospect to succeed but is destined to fail.
This is when people get desperate and attempt to try anything irrespective what it is!
2010-07-27
Rising tensions surrounding the Korea peninsular
Comments on Rowan Callick “Cheonan sinking brings larger spat to surface”, 27/07/2010, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/opinion/cheonan-sinking-brings-larger-spat-to-surface/story-e6frg7e6-1225897171800
While many may think it was North Korea that sank the Korean warship based on what the so called international investigation, it is by no means certain that was conclusively the case.
Was the international investigation completely neutral and unbiased? Were there any North Koreans, Chinese or Russians included in that international investigation team, or at least as observers in the investigation?
Why did the Korean government said shortly after the sinking that was quite different from the investigation report's result?
What were the likely motives for the North to do that, should the investigation result be correct?
While we may have no reasons not to believe the investigation result, the Chinese may have every reason to be suspect of it.
There are no short of history that the truth of a significant event was never clear at the time.
While many may think it was North Korea that sank the Korean warship based on what the so called international investigation, it is by no means certain that was conclusively the case.
Was the international investigation completely neutral and unbiased? Were there any North Koreans, Chinese or Russians included in that international investigation team, or at least as observers in the investigation?
Why did the Korean government said shortly after the sinking that was quite different from the investigation report's result?
What were the likely motives for the North to do that, should the investigation result be correct?
While we may have no reasons not to believe the investigation result, the Chinese may have every reason to be suspect of it.
There are no short of history that the truth of a significant event was never clear at the time.
2010-05-15
Broad context of the NK issues
Comments on Andrei Lankov “Why does China continue to support North Korea?” 14/05/2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/05/14/why-does-china-continue-to-support-north-korea/
While I may or may not share the argument, analysis and conclusions of both the author and the comments, I think the focus on China on issues related to North Korea and not to mention others is likely to be highly problematic and biased.
It is not only China but also other parties that are involved in this issue and contribute to the development of the issues and responses from North Korea, whether those responses are reasonable and rational or not.
I remember one earlier post identified that some of the failures in the six party meetings on North Korea issues including denuclearisation had been caused or at least contributed by some other party members.
Conceivably, everyone would acknowledge that North Korea would consider its own interests and those are inevitably differs from some the other parties including China's.
While the focus has been on North Korea, the full resolution of the issues from the Korea peninsular is likely to require every party to make concessions, not just North Korea, or China, or any other single member.
Only examining and analysing the issues in that broader context is it possible to be rational, sensible and practical. Anything otherwise is unlikely to be particularly productive and fruitful.
One should not be kidding oneself and others.
While I may or may not share the argument, analysis and conclusions of both the author and the comments, I think the focus on China on issues related to North Korea and not to mention others is likely to be highly problematic and biased.
It is not only China but also other parties that are involved in this issue and contribute to the development of the issues and responses from North Korea, whether those responses are reasonable and rational or not.
I remember one earlier post identified that some of the failures in the six party meetings on North Korea issues including denuclearisation had been caused or at least contributed by some other party members.
Conceivably, everyone would acknowledge that North Korea would consider its own interests and those are inevitably differs from some the other parties including China's.
While the focus has been on North Korea, the full resolution of the issues from the Korea peninsular is likely to require every party to make concessions, not just North Korea, or China, or any other single member.
Only examining and analysing the issues in that broader context is it possible to be rational, sensible and practical. Anything otherwise is unlikely to be particularly productive and fruitful.
One should not be kidding oneself and others.
2009-09-27
Important progresses of world peace
Comments on “Breaking the Iran stalemate”, Stratfor.com 26/09/2009, http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/Breaking-the-Iran-stalemate-pd20090925-W84JT?OpenDocument&src=sph
The world needs a sensible compromise and real progress in nuclear non-proliferation.
Both the Americans and the Russians have made some sensible steps recently, starting with the Americans’ decisions not to build missile defence system in East Europe and Russia’s decision not to deploy missiles in its western territory.
It is an important start. The world is expecting more solid development to consolidate the progress on world peace in general and the Iran nuclear issue in particular.
Once there is progress in that front, we need to make similar progress on the North Korea nuclear issue. Both the US and China, the two most important key players, need to make the right and courageous decisions to ensure the denuclearisation of the Korea peninsular.
Let’s hope we are moving to a more peaceful world from now on.
The world needs a sensible compromise and real progress in nuclear non-proliferation.
Both the Americans and the Russians have made some sensible steps recently, starting with the Americans’ decisions not to build missile defence system in East Europe and Russia’s decision not to deploy missiles in its western territory.
It is an important start. The world is expecting more solid development to consolidate the progress on world peace in general and the Iran nuclear issue in particular.
Once there is progress in that front, we need to make similar progress on the North Korea nuclear issue. Both the US and China, the two most important key players, need to make the right and courageous decisions to ensure the denuclearisation of the Korea peninsular.
Let’s hope we are moving to a more peaceful world from now on.
2009-07-16
Whatever they are from, no nuclear weapons should be in Japan
Comments on Tobias Harris “Who’s afraid of the conservatives in Japan?” 15/07/2009, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/07/15/whos-afraid-of-the-conservatives-in-japan/
While North Korea's nuclear program poses a threat to every country in the East Asia region, why does it improve Japan's security by having US nuclear weapons in Japan, given that Japan has been under the US nuclear umbrella?
It should be noted that the 1960 secret agreement was made during the cold war era, obviously. It reminds people of the Cuba missiles crisis in 1962, not too long after 1960. If it were not a secret agreement, the Cuba missiles crisis may have had been different.
How did the US take the missiles in Cuba then? Why didn't it allow them to stay there? What are the implications of having US nuclear weapons in Japan for other countries in the region? How China and Russia will react, given that the way the US reacted to the Cuba missiles? Will it be a stabilising or destabilising to the regional security?
While it is important to prevent nuclear proliferation, to have US nuclear weapons in Japan would hardly contribute to that cause.
It would be a much more serious regional security issue than just that of a reaction to the North Korea’s nuclear program and would have much wider implications. If that happens, it would have the potential to shift the focus away from North Korea to a whole new issue.
While North Korea's nuclear program poses a threat to every country in the East Asia region, why does it improve Japan's security by having US nuclear weapons in Japan, given that Japan has been under the US nuclear umbrella?
It should be noted that the 1960 secret agreement was made during the cold war era, obviously. It reminds people of the Cuba missiles crisis in 1962, not too long after 1960. If it were not a secret agreement, the Cuba missiles crisis may have had been different.
How did the US take the missiles in Cuba then? Why didn't it allow them to stay there? What are the implications of having US nuclear weapons in Japan for other countries in the region? How China and Russia will react, given that the way the US reacted to the Cuba missiles? Will it be a stabilising or destabilising to the regional security?
While it is important to prevent nuclear proliferation, to have US nuclear weapons in Japan would hardly contribute to that cause.
It would be a much more serious regional security issue than just that of a reaction to the North Korea’s nuclear program and would have much wider implications. If that happens, it would have the potential to shift the focus away from North Korea to a whole new issue.
Achieving permanent peace in the Korea peninsular
Comments on Hitoshi Tanaka “The North Korea nuclear crisis: Five guiding principles”, 14/07/2009, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/07/14/the-north-korea-nuclear-crisis-five-guiding-principles/
The essence of Tanaka’s five guiding principles seems good. They need to be applied very carefully, though. For example, while Tanaka says that “the joint statement released during the recent summit in Washington between President Obama and South Korean President Lee Myung-bak is a fine example of what is necessary” for the first principle, that is, North Korea must never be recognized as a nuclear state. However, some people say that the North sees the part on Korea unification with hostility, because it implies the vanish of the North with the style of German unification.
Secondly, it is important to have a clear consensus among all parties on how to achieve “the establishment of a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula,” under the fourth principle of “a comprehensive, negotiated settlement is the only practical way forward”. What would be such a peace regime? How would peace in the peninsular be safeguarded? Would US troops still remain in the South?
Thirdly, would the fifth principle, “the Six-Party process must continue with informal negotiations before the talks resume”, be workable and potential bilateral talks not undermine the six party approach and be used by the North to play the other members against each other? The party members need to make sure the two processes are consistent with each other.
The essence of Tanaka’s five guiding principles seems good. They need to be applied very carefully, though. For example, while Tanaka says that “the joint statement released during the recent summit in Washington between President Obama and South Korean President Lee Myung-bak is a fine example of what is necessary” for the first principle, that is, North Korea must never be recognized as a nuclear state. However, some people say that the North sees the part on Korea unification with hostility, because it implies the vanish of the North with the style of German unification.
Secondly, it is important to have a clear consensus among all parties on how to achieve “the establishment of a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula,” under the fourth principle of “a comprehensive, negotiated settlement is the only practical way forward”. What would be such a peace regime? How would peace in the peninsular be safeguarded? Would US troops still remain in the South?
Thirdly, would the fifth principle, “the Six-Party process must continue with informal negotiations before the talks resume”, be workable and potential bilateral talks not undermine the six party approach and be used by the North to play the other members against each other? The party members need to make sure the two processes are consistent with each other.
Understand North Korea?
Comments on Andrei Lankov “Pyongyang strikes back”, 15/07/2009, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/07/15/pyongyang-strikes-back/
While the arguments in this article are seemingly logic, I wonder whether there could be other explanations or reasons behind the North Korea's changing behaviour in the recent past.
It appears that there are still some unanswered questions.
I had thought it was the fault of the North's political leaderships that caused all this, but then I encountered the comments by Richard Broinowski that shed some different light, suggesting that some other parties also contributed to that (see http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/07/05/obamas-north-korea-policy-and-the-june-15-south-north-joint-declaration/#comments).
The fear of the potential destabilisation of a rich South on the North sounds attractive. But didn’t the leadership think about that during the relatively relaxed period in the first place?
Further, how the North leaderships think strategically about the future of the North? Do they really think they can hide the different realities between the two Koreas forever?
While the arguments in this article are seemingly logic, I wonder whether there could be other explanations or reasons behind the North Korea's changing behaviour in the recent past.
It appears that there are still some unanswered questions.
I had thought it was the fault of the North's political leaderships that caused all this, but then I encountered the comments by Richard Broinowski that shed some different light, suggesting that some other parties also contributed to that (see http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/07/05/obamas-north-korea-policy-and-the-june-15-south-north-joint-declaration/#comments).
The fear of the potential destabilisation of a rich South on the North sounds attractive. But didn’t the leadership think about that during the relatively relaxed period in the first place?
Further, how the North leaderships think strategically about the future of the North? Do they really think they can hide the different realities between the two Koreas forever?
2009-07-12
North Korea and US policies for the Northeast Asia region
Comments on Scott Snyder “What’s driving Pyongyang?” 11/07/2009, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/07/11/whats-driving-pyongyang/
I agree that a positive vision for the future of the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia that would clarify US expectations and intentions toward the region is extremely important not only to the North Korea nuclear and missiles issues in the short to media term, but also for the long term regional security and stability.
Ultimately, any products of cold war era should be and need to be dismantled. They include US troops in South Korea, for example.
The US president commented on Russia Prime Minister’s possible outdated thinking in terms of cold war era. The US needs to set the example in doing so and also needs to rid of cold war era thinking and doing. Otherwise, the president would not look credible when asking others to move away from cold war thinking.
The world has changed. So both former cold war foes need to change. This is especially the case for the US, given that the former USSR has long collapsed.
It seems a permanent solution to the Korea peninsular security and stability may need a collective security guarantee of the two Koreas security, and leave the door open for an eventual unification of the Koreas on their own terms, with no external pressures.
If a collective security guarantee is worked out, then there will not be any need for the US troops to stay in South Korea, because otherwise it would send wrong messages to the region and will not be in the interests of the region.
North Korea is smaller than the South in both the economy and population. If security is guaranteed, the North should reduce its military forces. That will eliminate the needs for the stay of US troops in the peninsular. One would ask what the purpose of their stay would be for.
I agree that a positive vision for the future of the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia that would clarify US expectations and intentions toward the region is extremely important not only to the North Korea nuclear and missiles issues in the short to media term, but also for the long term regional security and stability.
Ultimately, any products of cold war era should be and need to be dismantled. They include US troops in South Korea, for example.
The US president commented on Russia Prime Minister’s possible outdated thinking in terms of cold war era. The US needs to set the example in doing so and also needs to rid of cold war era thinking and doing. Otherwise, the president would not look credible when asking others to move away from cold war thinking.
The world has changed. So both former cold war foes need to change. This is especially the case for the US, given that the former USSR has long collapsed.
It seems a permanent solution to the Korea peninsular security and stability may need a collective security guarantee of the two Koreas security, and leave the door open for an eventual unification of the Koreas on their own terms, with no external pressures.
If a collective security guarantee is worked out, then there will not be any need for the US troops to stay in South Korea, because otherwise it would send wrong messages to the region and will not be in the interests of the region.
North Korea is smaller than the South in both the economy and population. If security is guaranteed, the North should reduce its military forces. That will eliminate the needs for the stay of US troops in the peninsular. One would ask what the purpose of their stay would be for.
2009-07-08
All members of the six party need to be reasonable and work together
Comments on Richard Broinowski”s comments on “Obama’s North Korea policy and the June 15 South-North Joint Declaration”, 8/07/2009, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/07/05/obamas-north-korea-policy-and-the-june-15-south-north-joint-declaration/#comments
If Richard Broinowski says is true and I don't have any reasons not to assume so, then it is disturbing to see three of the six party members (presumably in addition to whatever the North has done) to have contributed to the failures of the international efforts.
While the US, Japan and the South have tended to say that China has been too soft to the North, they perhaps need to reflect on their own strategies and their effects. The six party members all need to work together realistically and effectively, with well defined and clear objectives. No members should "violate" reached agreements.
It seems there are lessons for all members.
If Richard Broinowski says is true and I don't have any reasons not to assume so, then it is disturbing to see three of the six party members (presumably in addition to whatever the North has done) to have contributed to the failures of the international efforts.
While the US, Japan and the South have tended to say that China has been too soft to the North, they perhaps need to reflect on their own strategies and their effects. The six party members all need to work together realistically and effectively, with well defined and clear objectives. No members should "violate" reached agreements.
It seems there are lessons for all members.
2009-07-06
Respect the six party forum
Comments on Chung-in Moon “Obama’s North Korea policy and the June 15 South-North Joint Declaration”, 5/07/2009, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/07/05/obamas-north-korea-policy-and-the-june-15-south-north-joint-declaration/
If the current situation if that "the deep concern is that any military escalation might not end in a conventional military conflict as North Korea nears the possession of operational nuclear weapons", then imagine what would hold for the future if North Korea's nuclear programs are more advanced and it becomes a full nuclear power? What could international community do then if North Korea continues to act in the way as it has done recently?
The summit diplomacy by US, the two Koreas only is unlikely to work in the long term, but only generates short term confusions. While there have been short comings of the six party talks, that forum may be the only effective way to further progress the denuclearisation issue in the Korea peninsular, because Japan, China and Russia will also be affected by what will happen to North Korea and in the Korea peninsular.
It seems a little too early and premature to specify how the two Koreas should be unified at this moment. As the article states already, North Korea views the US stated support of unification on those conditions as a hostile move to foster regime transformation in the North and to facilitate ‘Korean reunification through absorption’ a la mode Germany. It is unlikely to accept that in the short term.
The issue of unification should be deferred until the denuclearisation issue has been resolved successfully. The unification issue should be left for the two Koreas to decide, but for the foreseeable future, the interests of the two sides need to be respected.
If the current situation if that "the deep concern is that any military escalation might not end in a conventional military conflict as North Korea nears the possession of operational nuclear weapons", then imagine what would hold for the future if North Korea's nuclear programs are more advanced and it becomes a full nuclear power? What could international community do then if North Korea continues to act in the way as it has done recently?
The summit diplomacy by US, the two Koreas only is unlikely to work in the long term, but only generates short term confusions. While there have been short comings of the six party talks, that forum may be the only effective way to further progress the denuclearisation issue in the Korea peninsular, because Japan, China and Russia will also be affected by what will happen to North Korea and in the Korea peninsular.
It seems a little too early and premature to specify how the two Koreas should be unified at this moment. As the article states already, North Korea views the US stated support of unification on those conditions as a hostile move to foster regime transformation in the North and to facilitate ‘Korean reunification through absorption’ a la mode Germany. It is unlikely to accept that in the short term.
The issue of unification should be deferred until the denuclearisation issue has been resolved successfully. The unification issue should be left for the two Koreas to decide, but for the foreseeable future, the interests of the two sides need to be respected.
2009-06-24
Parties act together to achieve common goals
Comments on Peter Van Ness “Stick to the Six Party Talks on North Korea”, 23/06/2009, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/06/23/stick-to-the-six-party-talks-on-north-korea/
Peter Van Ness's article is excellent. The six party approach, supported by the UNSC, is the only practical way to deal with the challenges posed by the North Korea reckless regime.
The five party members must act together as a united front with a common aim: the denuclearisation of the Korea peninsular, peace, security and stability of the Northeast Asia region.
There are no other more effective and practical ways than the six party approach. It is in every member's interest to work to achieve the common objectives.
Peter Van Ness's article is excellent. The six party approach, supported by the UNSC, is the only practical way to deal with the challenges posed by the North Korea reckless regime.
The five party members must act together as a united front with a common aim: the denuclearisation of the Korea peninsular, peace, security and stability of the Northeast Asia region.
There are no other more effective and practical ways than the six party approach. It is in every member's interest to work to achieve the common objectives.
2009-06-18
New thinking and new strategies to denuclearisation the Korea peninsular
Comments on Ken Jimbo “Rejecting high-risk coexistence with North Korea”, 17/06/2009, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/06/17/rejecting-high-risk-coexistence-with-north-korea/comment-page-1/
This is an excellent article and Ken Jimbo has really injected new strategic thinking into considering practical options to deal with the North Korea regime and the denuclearisation in the Korea peninsular.
However, the six-party framework is important and Russia should be included as an important partner in the process, although some matters could be decided among if others if they only concern them.
There is an urgent need for a new approach to the six party talks to achieve denuclearisation in the Korea peninsular. We need practical and pragmatic strategies that really work.
The most important isue is to assure China that the other party members are with it in dealing with any challenges. If China’s is really resolute and the five are a united front, the denuclearisation issue should not be too difficult.
This is an excellent article and Ken Jimbo has really injected new strategic thinking into considering practical options to deal with the North Korea regime and the denuclearisation in the Korea peninsular.
However, the six-party framework is important and Russia should be included as an important partner in the process, although some matters could be decided among if others if they only concern them.
There is an urgent need for a new approach to the six party talks to achieve denuclearisation in the Korea peninsular. We need practical and pragmatic strategies that really work.
The most important isue is to assure China that the other party members are with it in dealing with any challenges. If China’s is really resolute and the five are a united front, the denuclearisation issue should not be too difficult.
2009-06-08
Hard and effective sanctions against DPRK are the only way left
Comments on Ron Huisken “Is Pyongyang reacting to or shaping events?” 6/06/2009, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/06/06/is-pyongyang-reacting-to-or-shaping-events/
It is disappointing that the UNSC has been so slow in coming up with a new sanction resolution. The slowness and indecisiveness of UNSC may create an impression that the international community is unable to effectively deal with DPRK and its missile and nuclear tests. That is unfortunate, no matter who have been holding up the UNSC process.
China should realise that it has lost its kind and subtle influence over DPRK and continue its past strategies will not work. DPRK appears to have got an upper hand over whatever China’s strategies in the six party talks have been. It can only be forced to the negotiation table through hard and effective sanctions. So China needs to fundamentally reconsider its approaches. Fearing the implications of the collapse of DPRK can only encourage it to act more reckless and ignore anyone’s advice.
There should no longer be any illusions over the current DPRK leadership. The solidarity of the international community is the only way to deal with DPRK reckless gambles to take the advantages created by any inconsistency within the international community.
It is disappointing that the UNSC has been so slow in coming up with a new sanction resolution. The slowness and indecisiveness of UNSC may create an impression that the international community is unable to effectively deal with DPRK and its missile and nuclear tests. That is unfortunate, no matter who have been holding up the UNSC process.
China should realise that it has lost its kind and subtle influence over DPRK and continue its past strategies will not work. DPRK appears to have got an upper hand over whatever China’s strategies in the six party talks have been. It can only be forced to the negotiation table through hard and effective sanctions. So China needs to fundamentally reconsider its approaches. Fearing the implications of the collapse of DPRK can only encourage it to act more reckless and ignore anyone’s advice.
There should no longer be any illusions over the current DPRK leadership. The solidarity of the international community is the only way to deal with DPRK reckless gambles to take the advantages created by any inconsistency within the international community.
2009-05-30
Don't be stupid - even for Japan's sake
Comments on Tobias Harris “A nuclear Japan is not an option”, 29/05/2009, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/05/29/a-nuclear-japan-is-not-an-option/
I cannot agree more with Tobias Harris that “There is no problem that will be solved by a Japanese nuclear arsenal”. Further, a nuclear armed Japan will destabilise the Northeast Asia, East Asia, Asia and the world, due to the particular history in East Asia in the first half of the last century.
Firstly China is unlikely to take that kindly and would probably do whatever it can to counter Japan’s nuclear arsenals. Secondly, other East Asian countries, including possibly South Korea, are likely to respond accordingly and a new arms race would start to counter balance Japan. Thirdly, Russia is also unlikely to take it kindly and would develop a new strategy to counter that. As a result, complete new, unpredictable and dangerous military and security games would emerge.
The proposal of using a nuclear armed Japan to force China to be more forceful with North Korea to solve the nuclear problems of the North is nonsense and nonsensical. The idea would lead to a chaotic East Asia, diverting its limited resources for economic development to a wasteful arms race. It is likely to turn many East Asian countries that suffered from Japan’s invasion or occupations before and during the Second World War against their former chief enemy. It is not in Japan’s interest either.
Would a nuclear armed Japan really force China to change its tactics towards North Korea? Yes and no. No first. If China perceives a nuclear armed Japan as a threat to its security as it is very likely, instead of a willingness to stop North Korea’s nuclear programs, China might tolerate them and take advantage of the likely nuclear rivalry between Japan and North Korea. Therefore the proponents of such stupid ideas, even assuming they are well wished, are unlikely to see that China is forced to take a harsher and hardline attitude towards North Korea. They are badly mistaken.
Now yes. As mentioned, China might change its attitude towards North Korea, but not to the like of those proponents’. If you have a potential nuclear threat from Japan, why don’t you use a nuclear North Korea as a friend to counter that?
As I said in my comment on Tobias Harris’ article of “The North Korean test: a study in powerlessness” the other day, North Korea’s violation of international laws does not give anyone the right to violate them. We need to find effective ways to enforce international laws and using legal means to bring North Korea to the road of denuclearisation.
Anyone who has a strong interest in seeing a peaceful, stable and prosperous Korea peninsular, Northeast Asia and East Asia as well as the world needs to be vigilant against those who wish to see a different world, and those who may be well wished but nevertheless so irrational in their thinking to make nonsensical proposals.
I cannot agree more with Tobias Harris that “There is no problem that will be solved by a Japanese nuclear arsenal”. Further, a nuclear armed Japan will destabilise the Northeast Asia, East Asia, Asia and the world, due to the particular history in East Asia in the first half of the last century.
Firstly China is unlikely to take that kindly and would probably do whatever it can to counter Japan’s nuclear arsenals. Secondly, other East Asian countries, including possibly South Korea, are likely to respond accordingly and a new arms race would start to counter balance Japan. Thirdly, Russia is also unlikely to take it kindly and would develop a new strategy to counter that. As a result, complete new, unpredictable and dangerous military and security games would emerge.
The proposal of using a nuclear armed Japan to force China to be more forceful with North Korea to solve the nuclear problems of the North is nonsense and nonsensical. The idea would lead to a chaotic East Asia, diverting its limited resources for economic development to a wasteful arms race. It is likely to turn many East Asian countries that suffered from Japan’s invasion or occupations before and during the Second World War against their former chief enemy. It is not in Japan’s interest either.
Would a nuclear armed Japan really force China to change its tactics towards North Korea? Yes and no. No first. If China perceives a nuclear armed Japan as a threat to its security as it is very likely, instead of a willingness to stop North Korea’s nuclear programs, China might tolerate them and take advantage of the likely nuclear rivalry between Japan and North Korea. Therefore the proponents of such stupid ideas, even assuming they are well wished, are unlikely to see that China is forced to take a harsher and hardline attitude towards North Korea. They are badly mistaken.
Now yes. As mentioned, China might change its attitude towards North Korea, but not to the like of those proponents’. If you have a potential nuclear threat from Japan, why don’t you use a nuclear North Korea as a friend to counter that?
As I said in my comment on Tobias Harris’ article of “The North Korean test: a study in powerlessness” the other day, North Korea’s violation of international laws does not give anyone the right to violate them. We need to find effective ways to enforce international laws and using legal means to bring North Korea to the road of denuclearisation.
Anyone who has a strong interest in seeing a peaceful, stable and prosperous Korea peninsular, Northeast Asia and East Asia as well as the world needs to be vigilant against those who wish to see a different world, and those who may be well wished but nevertheless so irrational in their thinking to make nonsensical proposals.
2009-05-28
Nuclear not the only issue of Korea peninsular
Comments on Greg Sheridan “Three lessons from Pyongyang's test”, 29/05/2009, http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,25547827-5013460,00.html
Sheridan’s lesson number 2 is that “China is overestimated as a geo-strategic partner and as a central player in any solution to the problems North Korea presents.” It is both correct and incorrect.
It is correct because the six party talk processes so far has been a failure and is not up to the expectations of many. In that regard, the expectation that China could play a pivot role in solving the North nuclear problem has been shattered, and China has failed to deliver the realisation of that expectation. Further China was disappointing as a geo-strategic partner and a central player to have brought a resolution to the denuclearisation in the Korea peninsular.
Yet it is also incorrect and wrong. First, if Sheridan is correct in analysing the reality and China’s perceived interests in the regional peace, stability and security, then Sheridan should realise that a long term solution to the peace, stability and security of the Northeast Asia region should be to ensure that every country in the region feels peace and secure.
While the most important first steps are to prevent the North Korea to completely halt its nuclear programs and dismantle the related facilities, the next step is the disarmament of the Korea peninsular, including the eventual withdrawal of the US forces from the peninsular. That will remove the main excuse for the North Korea to develop its nuclear programs. It will also give China some regional security assurance.
If the long time disarmament is on the agenda, it is much more likely for both North Korea and China, and possibly Russia to see the end of North Korea’s nuclear facilities. China will be “a geo-strategic partner and a central player in any solution to the problems North Korea presents”.
So far, the focus of the six party talks have been on the nuclear issue and every party has been unable to face the broader strategic context and raise the question that is necessary following the end of the nuclear issue. That appears to have been the key issue that Sheridan number 2 lesson implies, but he failed to see and mention the broader issue.
How will China view the future unification of the two Koreas? Whether China likes it or not, it is a matter for the Koreas to sort out. But given China has its own unification of the mainland and Taiwan, it is unlikely to overly resist any moves of the Korean unification. It will be much easier for China to see a unified Korea if there is no presence of other external forces, because what is the purpose of their presence if there is no division of the Koreans?
So it appears that Sheridan only touched the surface of the peace and security of the Korea peninsular and the Northeast Asia when he was analysing the “lessons from Pyongyang's test”. If he thinks more strategically and has a real interest in seeing an effective resolution to Pyongyang's tests, it is not too difficult for him to see the bigger picture as a foreign affairs analyst.
Sheridan’s lesson number 2 is that “China is overestimated as a geo-strategic partner and as a central player in any solution to the problems North Korea presents.” It is both correct and incorrect.
It is correct because the six party talk processes so far has been a failure and is not up to the expectations of many. In that regard, the expectation that China could play a pivot role in solving the North nuclear problem has been shattered, and China has failed to deliver the realisation of that expectation. Further China was disappointing as a geo-strategic partner and a central player to have brought a resolution to the denuclearisation in the Korea peninsular.
Yet it is also incorrect and wrong. First, if Sheridan is correct in analysing the reality and China’s perceived interests in the regional peace, stability and security, then Sheridan should realise that a long term solution to the peace, stability and security of the Northeast Asia region should be to ensure that every country in the region feels peace and secure.
While the most important first steps are to prevent the North Korea to completely halt its nuclear programs and dismantle the related facilities, the next step is the disarmament of the Korea peninsular, including the eventual withdrawal of the US forces from the peninsular. That will remove the main excuse for the North Korea to develop its nuclear programs. It will also give China some regional security assurance.
If the long time disarmament is on the agenda, it is much more likely for both North Korea and China, and possibly Russia to see the end of North Korea’s nuclear facilities. China will be “a geo-strategic partner and a central player in any solution to the problems North Korea presents”.
So far, the focus of the six party talks have been on the nuclear issue and every party has been unable to face the broader strategic context and raise the question that is necessary following the end of the nuclear issue. That appears to have been the key issue that Sheridan number 2 lesson implies, but he failed to see and mention the broader issue.
How will China view the future unification of the two Koreas? Whether China likes it or not, it is a matter for the Koreas to sort out. But given China has its own unification of the mainland and Taiwan, it is unlikely to overly resist any moves of the Korean unification. It will be much easier for China to see a unified Korea if there is no presence of other external forces, because what is the purpose of their presence if there is no division of the Koreans?
So it appears that Sheridan only touched the surface of the peace and security of the Korea peninsular and the Northeast Asia when he was analysing the “lessons from Pyongyang's test”. If he thinks more strategically and has a real interest in seeing an effective resolution to Pyongyang's tests, it is not too difficult for him to see the bigger picture as a foreign affairs analyst.
2009-05-26
The North Korea regime must change its behaviour to survive
Comments on Mark Jacobs and Shiro Armstrong’s comments on “Roos to Japan” by Tobias Harris, 25/05/2009, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/05/25/roos-to-japan/
I think the members of the six parties may all have failed on the NK nuclear issue.
The world must be tired of being held as hostage by the current NK leadership. The carrot era is gone and now stick must be used. Many have been so frustrated by its missile tests, now the second and more powerful nuclear test, after it was supposed to have dismantled its facility.
China needs to realise that the NK cannot be accommodated in any other way except that all parties must act together and be prepared to use all measures, including the last resort, to denuclearise the Korea peninsular, and to prevent any further proliferation.
China needs also to prepare itself for the worst that it may have to open its borders with NK for receiving many millions of refuges, and other countries, especially the US, Japan and Russia must be prepared to help China and Korea if that ever happens.
The UN Security Council should decide three things now. The first is to authorise the six parties for any measures they decide are appropriate to achieve the denuclearisation of the Korea peninsular, so there is no need for any future delay. The second is a call for sanctions against NK, except basic humanitarian aid. The six party members should immediately enforce the sanctions.
Lastly, the UN and the six party members should be prepared for the worst that there might be a need for a regime change, if NK were to continue its reckless provocations.
Besides, the US, China, Russia and the two Koreas must establish a new arrangement for the peace and stability of the Korea peninsular. Some key components of such a new peace agreement need to include the collective guarantee of the security of the two Koreas, if that is what the two sides want and the consequential withdrawal of the US forces from the peninsular. The withdrawal of the US forces is premised on the security guarantee of the South side from the agreement.
Only this will create a long lasting peace and stability in the North East Asia region. How the two Koreas achieve their unification will be a matter for them to sort out.
I think the members of the six parties may all have failed on the NK nuclear issue.
The world must be tired of being held as hostage by the current NK leadership. The carrot era is gone and now stick must be used. Many have been so frustrated by its missile tests, now the second and more powerful nuclear test, after it was supposed to have dismantled its facility.
China needs to realise that the NK cannot be accommodated in any other way except that all parties must act together and be prepared to use all measures, including the last resort, to denuclearise the Korea peninsular, and to prevent any further proliferation.
China needs also to prepare itself for the worst that it may have to open its borders with NK for receiving many millions of refuges, and other countries, especially the US, Japan and Russia must be prepared to help China and Korea if that ever happens.
The UN Security Council should decide three things now. The first is to authorise the six parties for any measures they decide are appropriate to achieve the denuclearisation of the Korea peninsular, so there is no need for any future delay. The second is a call for sanctions against NK, except basic humanitarian aid. The six party members should immediately enforce the sanctions.
Lastly, the UN and the six party members should be prepared for the worst that there might be a need for a regime change, if NK were to continue its reckless provocations.
Besides, the US, China, Russia and the two Koreas must establish a new arrangement for the peace and stability of the Korea peninsular. Some key components of such a new peace agreement need to include the collective guarantee of the security of the two Koreas, if that is what the two sides want and the consequential withdrawal of the US forces from the peninsular. The withdrawal of the US forces is premised on the security guarantee of the South side from the agreement.
Only this will create a long lasting peace and stability in the North East Asia region. How the two Koreas achieve their unification will be a matter for them to sort out.
2009-05-10
Mr Sheridan, reflect on the issue please
Comments on Greg Sheridan’s “Unstable trio endangers world”, the Australian, 9/05/2009, http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,25449729-7583,00.html
Mr Sheridan, your article has raised new challenges amid the ongoing world financial and economic crisis not seen since the great depression more than seventy years ago. Let’s leave your least threatening one North Korea aside for the moment and let’s talk about the more threatening first two – Iran and Pakistan.
I would argue that the situations in both countries in the context of posing a threat to the international community have been made worse by the Iraq war, for which Australia has been a member of the coalitions of willing.
The Iraq war has been a strategic failure not only for the US and the coalitions of willing, but for a greater international community. Firstly, it shifted the regional balance in that region in favour of Iran, not only in the sense that it does not have Iraq as a strong regional opponent, but also that the present Iraq government is closely related to Iran in many areas.
Secondly, t unnecessarily distracted the fight against Al Qaeda and the residual extreme Taliban in Afghanistan. This allowed them to regroup and now to destabilise Pakistan, not to mention the worsening situations in Afghanistan and rising military tolls for the international forces.
Thirdly, the Iraq war was done under the name of pre-empty actions based on false intelligence at the best and possibly manufactured and highly manipulated information. A war against another country has been proven to have based on false premise. It divided the international community and discredited the US in its leadership and undermined the strong support for the war against terror following 9/11. This damage may be more lasting.
Had not there been the Iraq war to distract the efforts of war in Afghanistan, the situations in both Iran and Pakistan would be much different and less threatening to the international security. It is a very fresh and useful lesson to learn, isn’t it?
I may be mistaken, but it appeared that you were a strong supporter of the Iraq war and Australia’s participation in it. It is an interesting irony that you might wish to reflect on this issue of the worsening international security situation due to the unstable trio?
Mr Sheridan, your article has raised new challenges amid the ongoing world financial and economic crisis not seen since the great depression more than seventy years ago. Let’s leave your least threatening one North Korea aside for the moment and let’s talk about the more threatening first two – Iran and Pakistan.
I would argue that the situations in both countries in the context of posing a threat to the international community have been made worse by the Iraq war, for which Australia has been a member of the coalitions of willing.
The Iraq war has been a strategic failure not only for the US and the coalitions of willing, but for a greater international community. Firstly, it shifted the regional balance in that region in favour of Iran, not only in the sense that it does not have Iraq as a strong regional opponent, but also that the present Iraq government is closely related to Iran in many areas.
Secondly, t unnecessarily distracted the fight against Al Qaeda and the residual extreme Taliban in Afghanistan. This allowed them to regroup and now to destabilise Pakistan, not to mention the worsening situations in Afghanistan and rising military tolls for the international forces.
Thirdly, the Iraq war was done under the name of pre-empty actions based on false intelligence at the best and possibly manufactured and highly manipulated information. A war against another country has been proven to have based on false premise. It divided the international community and discredited the US in its leadership and undermined the strong support for the war against terror following 9/11. This damage may be more lasting.
Had not there been the Iraq war to distract the efforts of war in Afghanistan, the situations in both Iran and Pakistan would be much different and less threatening to the international security. It is a very fresh and useful lesson to learn, isn’t it?
I may be mistaken, but it appeared that you were a strong supporter of the Iraq war and Australia’s participation in it. It is an interesting irony that you might wish to reflect on this issue of the worsening international security situation due to the unstable trio?
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
Posts
