Comments on Lionel Babicz "A new chapter for Tokyo–Seoul relations, 50 years on?" 11/07/2015
Are the following statements correct?
"Furthermore, the deepening American involvement in the Vietnam War was also a key element of this rapprochement. Japan was required to contribute large sums to the South Korean economy, while Seoul agreed to send some three hundred thousand troops to Vietnam, making it the second largest military contingent after the United States."
Did South Korea really send 300,000 troops to Vietnam? That is a huge number.
I am not sure the author's interpretation of the two leaders' separate statements or remarks was correct. To me, the South Korea President's statement is likely to imply a very confident and equal South Korea, a strong message to the audiences of both countries. South Korea now is certainly very different from the South Korea back 50 years ago then.
It seems both audiences would be much more sensitive and attuned to what have been said than the author does, who is a lecture in Japanese history.
Showing posts with label Korea. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Korea. Show all posts
2015-07-11
2011-04-26
Gillard spent first ANZAC day as PM in South Korea!
Comments on Joe Kelly “Julia Gillard urged to back new Asia order and embrace China's leadership in the region”, 26/04/2011, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/foreign-affairs/julia-gillard-urged-to-back-new-asia-order-and-embrace-chinas-leadership-in-the-region/story-fn59nm2j-1226044999397
Both security experts have a point each.
It is interesting that Gillard chose to visit Korea on Anzac day, given that Korea has had nothing to do with Anzac whatsoever.
If Gillard deliberately thought that Australia had participated the Korea war and that that was a good reason to spend that day in Korea, then that would not sit very nicely with her subsequent visit to China, given China was on the other side of that war as Mr Medcalf mentioned.
It is another Gillard's mystery decisions.
And she is good at making those decisions, even though few people would understand her - intelligent or rushing blood in the head?
Both security experts have a point each.
It is interesting that Gillard chose to visit Korea on Anzac day, given that Korea has had nothing to do with Anzac whatsoever.
If Gillard deliberately thought that Australia had participated the Korea war and that that was a good reason to spend that day in Korea, then that would not sit very nicely with her subsequent visit to China, given China was on the other side of that war as Mr Medcalf mentioned.
It is another Gillard's mystery decisions.
And she is good at making those decisions, even though few people would understand her - intelligent or rushing blood in the head?
2010-07-27
Rising tensions surrounding the Korea peninsular
Comments on Rowan Callick “Cheonan sinking brings larger spat to surface”, 27/07/2010, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/opinion/cheonan-sinking-brings-larger-spat-to-surface/story-e6frg7e6-1225897171800
While many may think it was North Korea that sank the Korean warship based on what the so called international investigation, it is by no means certain that was conclusively the case.
Was the international investigation completely neutral and unbiased? Were there any North Koreans, Chinese or Russians included in that international investigation team, or at least as observers in the investigation?
Why did the Korean government said shortly after the sinking that was quite different from the investigation report's result?
What were the likely motives for the North to do that, should the investigation result be correct?
While we may have no reasons not to believe the investigation result, the Chinese may have every reason to be suspect of it.
There are no short of history that the truth of a significant event was never clear at the time.
While many may think it was North Korea that sank the Korean warship based on what the so called international investigation, it is by no means certain that was conclusively the case.
Was the international investigation completely neutral and unbiased? Were there any North Koreans, Chinese or Russians included in that international investigation team, or at least as observers in the investigation?
Why did the Korean government said shortly after the sinking that was quite different from the investigation report's result?
What were the likely motives for the North to do that, should the investigation result be correct?
While we may have no reasons not to believe the investigation result, the Chinese may have every reason to be suspect of it.
There are no short of history that the truth of a significant event was never clear at the time.
2009-10-13
I am optimistic about an East Asia Community
Comments on Joel Rathus “East Asia Community: Little chance of a breakthrough at the Trilateral Summit”, 11/10/2009, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/10/11/east-asia-community-little-chance-of-a-breakthrough-at-the-trilateral-summit/comment-page-1/#comment-66931
From the article one gets a sense that although the processes are slow, it is progressing and it will not be surprising that East Asia Community comes to shape in the not too distant future, although the author appears to be pessimistic and dismissive.
Let's look at the three reasons Rathus used for the pessimism.
"Firstly, at the global level, movement towards an EAC must be understood as game played between the great powers, China and the US. Japan and Korea are better understood as middle powers, allied with the US but with an option to exit in favour of a China-led regional order under the EAC. With the US demonstrating a greater desire to take Asia seriously and on its own terms (signing of the TAC), it seems unlikely that Japan and Korea will do any more than explore with China the ‘exit’ option."
It is noted that China is half of the G2 and is more willing to endorse the EAC. So the picture is really different from what Rathus sees.
"Secondly, at the regional level, the Trilateral Summit looks inward, rather than outward, focusing on coordination and cooperation amongst themselves rather than joint-leadership of a wider East Asia, and, even here, successes have been shallow. Agreements reached at the Summit thus far have been in the fields of environmental protection, health and cultural exchange – i.e. of a ‘low-hanging fruit’ variety. Whereas agreement on substantive matters such as deeper economic integration has so far been elusive, with the three-party Free Trade Agreement proposed, studied (then studied again) but resulting in no further action."
It is a natural process for the big three among the potential EAC members to be in sync themselves before they can launch a bigger community, isn't it? That is not necessarily "inward looking". So the implications are also different from what Rathus got.
"Thirdly, domestic forces within at least two of the three parties still conspire against a ‘European moment in East Asia’."
Let's talk about Japan first. Rathus sees A FTA with China may present a problem at the moment. But the question is that is a Japan-China FTA a precondition for an EAC? It is likely to be not. Second, an EAC is broader than the three themselves, and EAC integration does not necessarily mean an immediate FTA. So there is no implication of FTA for the EAC, at least at the moment if that is what Rathus is concerned with. What Rathus sees as obstacles is in fact no obstacle at all.
Now let's turn to Korea, the other member that Rathus mention. Rathus says: "In fact, despite its own rhetoric, Korea’s position is very similar to Japan – regional community is a limited interest at best." We have shown that it is not a problem for Japan, so naturally it will not be a problem for Korea either.
To conclude, the same facts, there are quite different implications that can be drawn. I have derived quite different implications based on Rathus' argued reasons.I won't cast a judgement whose are correct, for now.
From the article one gets a sense that although the processes are slow, it is progressing and it will not be surprising that East Asia Community comes to shape in the not too distant future, although the author appears to be pessimistic and dismissive.
Let's look at the three reasons Rathus used for the pessimism.
"Firstly, at the global level, movement towards an EAC must be understood as game played between the great powers, China and the US. Japan and Korea are better understood as middle powers, allied with the US but with an option to exit in favour of a China-led regional order under the EAC. With the US demonstrating a greater desire to take Asia seriously and on its own terms (signing of the TAC), it seems unlikely that Japan and Korea will do any more than explore with China the ‘exit’ option."
It is noted that China is half of the G2 and is more willing to endorse the EAC. So the picture is really different from what Rathus sees.
"Secondly, at the regional level, the Trilateral Summit looks inward, rather than outward, focusing on coordination and cooperation amongst themselves rather than joint-leadership of a wider East Asia, and, even here, successes have been shallow. Agreements reached at the Summit thus far have been in the fields of environmental protection, health and cultural exchange – i.e. of a ‘low-hanging fruit’ variety. Whereas agreement on substantive matters such as deeper economic integration has so far been elusive, with the three-party Free Trade Agreement proposed, studied (then studied again) but resulting in no further action."
It is a natural process for the big three among the potential EAC members to be in sync themselves before they can launch a bigger community, isn't it? That is not necessarily "inward looking". So the implications are also different from what Rathus got.
"Thirdly, domestic forces within at least two of the three parties still conspire against a ‘European moment in East Asia’."
Let's talk about Japan first. Rathus sees A FTA with China may present a problem at the moment. But the question is that is a Japan-China FTA a precondition for an EAC? It is likely to be not. Second, an EAC is broader than the three themselves, and EAC integration does not necessarily mean an immediate FTA. So there is no implication of FTA for the EAC, at least at the moment if that is what Rathus is concerned with. What Rathus sees as obstacles is in fact no obstacle at all.
Now let's turn to Korea, the other member that Rathus mention. Rathus says: "In fact, despite its own rhetoric, Korea’s position is very similar to Japan – regional community is a limited interest at best." We have shown that it is not a problem for Japan, so naturally it will not be a problem for Korea either.
To conclude, the same facts, there are quite different implications that can be drawn. I have derived quite different implications based on Rathus' argued reasons.I won't cast a judgement whose are correct, for now.
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