Comments on the comments by YOSHIMICHI MORIYAMA26TH APRIL, 2016, 11:10 PM, on
Hugh White "Need to face the facts in Asia", 18 April 2016
You have sated the following: “America will keep its military superiortity over China for an idefinite time, and it seems that it can deter China in the South China Sea.”
So what?
With all the respect, the US and its allies were equally, if not more superior during the Korea War as compared to China. The fact is that China didn’t lose that war and that America together with its allies didn’t win that war either.
And further (on his/her second comments), with all the possible respect to you, I have to say that your central interpretation of “中華人民共和国” is incorrect.
Showing posts with label Japan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Japan. Show all posts
2016-04-28
Good answer to"Japan and Australia ramp up defence engagement in the South China Sea"
Comments on Tomohiko Satake "Japan and Australia ramp up defence engagement in the South China Sea", 28/04/2016
The award of building the 12 submarines for Australia to the French provides the best answer to this post.
I happened to met some people who were doing some jobs for the Australian government and they jokingly put it: "we are back to the Second World War when we were allied with France and fighting against Japan and Germany".
Afterall, history may repeat itself in a crude and unrelenting way! It is ironic, isn't it?
That perhaps summarises the insanity of the former Prime Minister Tony Abbott's earlier failed approach to the big project. Some have said that that was one of the issues that Abbott was seen as unsound and prong to funny and poor judgement.
Were Mr Abbott got his own funny way, Australia would lose out greatly. Some may say that Australia's interest would be sold out.
The award of building the 12 submarines for Australia to the French provides the best answer to this post.
I happened to met some people who were doing some jobs for the Australian government and they jokingly put it: "we are back to the Second World War when we were allied with France and fighting against Japan and Germany".
Afterall, history may repeat itself in a crude and unrelenting way! It is ironic, isn't it?
That perhaps summarises the insanity of the former Prime Minister Tony Abbott's earlier failed approach to the big project. Some have said that that was one of the issues that Abbott was seen as unsound and prong to funny and poor judgement.
Were Mr Abbott got his own funny way, Australia would lose out greatly. Some may say that Australia's interest would be sold out.
2016-04-18
Importance of justice and the foundation of justice
Comments on Editors, East Asia Forum "Australia’s fraught decision on submarines", 18/04/2016
This editorial is well balanced.
The following point from Tatsumi's post this week was quoted: ‘the bid for SEA1000 is important for Japan in the overall context of deepening security ties with Australia’. Japan’s ‘2013 National Security Strategy identified Australia as an important security partner not only as a fellow US ally, but also as a regional partner that shares Japan’s key strategic interest in upholding an international order based on the fundamental norms that have underpinned the post-WWII world. Such norms include the rule of law, freedom of navigation and the non-use of coercive measures to assert diplomatic positions’.
The norms mentioned there are based on the so called post-WWII world international order, as Tatsumi stated. Some of the foundations were unjust, because some territories which had belonged to different countries were given by the Americans to its allies including Japan, particularly as the world gradually became divided into the American led and the Soviet led two opposing camps, with some in between. Certainly some Chinese have held the view that some of its former territories were dealt with in such deals between the Americans and some of its allies or its controlled subordinating countries.
If the foundation of the current international order is unjust, then is the argument to maintain this order just or justified?
We can write another story in which someone has stole other peoples' properties then after that that person argues for the rule of law and the protection of existing property rights, a seemingly quite 'just' prevailing order. We also have some accomplices has a strong force and police the existing order!
This editorial is well balanced.
The following point from Tatsumi's post this week was quoted: ‘the bid for SEA1000 is important for Japan in the overall context of deepening security ties with Australia’. Japan’s ‘2013 National Security Strategy identified Australia as an important security partner not only as a fellow US ally, but also as a regional partner that shares Japan’s key strategic interest in upholding an international order based on the fundamental norms that have underpinned the post-WWII world. Such norms include the rule of law, freedom of navigation and the non-use of coercive measures to assert diplomatic positions’.
The norms mentioned there are based on the so called post-WWII world international order, as Tatsumi stated. Some of the foundations were unjust, because some territories which had belonged to different countries were given by the Americans to its allies including Japan, particularly as the world gradually became divided into the American led and the Soviet led two opposing camps, with some in between. Certainly some Chinese have held the view that some of its former territories were dealt with in such deals between the Americans and some of its allies or its controlled subordinating countries.
If the foundation of the current international order is unjust, then is the argument to maintain this order just or justified?
We can write another story in which someone has stole other peoples' properties then after that that person argues for the rule of law and the protection of existing property rights, a seemingly quite 'just' prevailing order. We also have some accomplices has a strong force and police the existing order!
New emperor's new cloths re security order in Asia
Comments on H. D. P. Envall from ANU "Strategy under the surface of the Australia–Japan sub deal", 18/04/2016
I sense the undertone of this post is to strengthen the so called 'trilateral alliance' of the US, Australia and Japan to encircle or tackle China.
The author may benefit from reading the following by a respected Australian journalist or media commentator, Michael Pascoe: "Australia shouldn't pay price for 'pivot', available on the Canberra Times website, April 18 2016 - 12:50PM, http://www.canberratimes.com.au/business/world-business/australia-shouldnt-pay-price-for-pivot-20160418-go8rat.html.
It presents facts as opposed to the often argued and hyped what is 'right' under existing security order in Asia.
Those hypocrites have been exposed as another version of Emperor's new cloths story.
Michael Pascoe's article should be republished on the Eastasiaforum, as a well respected and independent Australian journalist and current affairs commentator.
The Eastasiaforum has, regretablly and unfortunately, published many distorting articles, not based on facts but reflecting biased views serving the purposes of some circles.
It is unclear whether the editors have thoughtfully and dutifully sought factual based responses to those articles.
I sense the undertone of this post is to strengthen the so called 'trilateral alliance' of the US, Australia and Japan to encircle or tackle China.
The author may benefit from reading the following by a respected Australian journalist or media commentator, Michael Pascoe: "Australia shouldn't pay price for 'pivot', available on the Canberra Times website, April 18 2016 - 12:50PM, http://www.canberratimes.com.au/business/world-business/australia-shouldnt-pay-price-for-pivot-20160418-go8rat.html.
It presents facts as opposed to the often argued and hyped what is 'right' under existing security order in Asia.
Those hypocrites have been exposed as another version of Emperor's new cloths story.
Michael Pascoe's article should be republished on the Eastasiaforum, as a well respected and independent Australian journalist and current affairs commentator.
The Eastasiaforum has, regretablly and unfortunately, published many distorting articles, not based on facts but reflecting biased views serving the purposes of some circles.
It is unclear whether the editors have thoughtfully and dutifully sought factual based responses to those articles.
2016-03-30
Reasons beyond demographic factors behind Japan's lost decades?
Comments on Naohiro Yashiro "Is Japan caught in an upper income trap?" 30/03/2016
Although demographic factors are important factors to unleash Japan’s aggregate productivity as a whole, there would be other important factors that are equally important if more so.
For example, Japan seems to have fallen behind in the competition of contemporary technologies such as smart mobile phones, for example. Japan used to be very innovative, but it has lost much of its edge in the past two decades or so, it seems.
It would be important to understand the reasons behind those sort of issues.
Although demographic factors are important factors to unleash Japan’s aggregate productivity as a whole, there would be other important factors that are equally important if more so.
For example, Japan seems to have fallen behind in the competition of contemporary technologies such as smart mobile phones, for example. Japan used to be very innovative, but it has lost much of its edge in the past two decades or so, it seems.
It would be important to understand the reasons behind those sort of issues.
2016-03-15
An interesting but distorted analysis
Comments on Mie Oba "Japan and the new wave of regionalism in Asia", 15/03/2016
It seems the author has an interesting but highly questionable interpretation or statements of certain events.
For example, the third paragraph reads “China’s new regionalism is not limited to economic cooperation. In a May 2014 speech, Xi outlined a new perspective on regional security, insisting that ‘it is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold the security of Asia’. This perspective stresses the necessity of China’s leadership in building a new Asian security structure.”
The last sentence, “This perspective stresses the necessity of China’s leadership in building a new Asian security structure”, would certainly represents a distorted meaning of what “it is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold the security of Asia”.
The fact is that Asia does not equal China alone and the people of Asia is not Chinese alone! It is hard to understand how that could be interpreted as “This perspective stresses the necessity of China’s leadership in building a new Asian security structure.”
Then, there is the following paragraph: “RCEP is an effort to promote ASEAN-centred regional economic integration. Compared to the TPP, RCEP emphasises the importance of economic developmental cooperation in the region. Some analyses tend to characterise the TPP and RCEP as reflecting a confrontation or competition between the United States and China for hegemony in Asia.”
One the one hand, the author acknowledges RCEP is ASEAN-centred and on the other hand the author seems to also imply or at least accept RCEP is a Chinese tool to confront or compete with the US for hegemony in Asia.
Is that simply an oversimplification? I am not sure.
It seems the author has an interesting but highly questionable interpretation or statements of certain events.
For example, the third paragraph reads “China’s new regionalism is not limited to economic cooperation. In a May 2014 speech, Xi outlined a new perspective on regional security, insisting that ‘it is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold the security of Asia’. This perspective stresses the necessity of China’s leadership in building a new Asian security structure.”
The last sentence, “This perspective stresses the necessity of China’s leadership in building a new Asian security structure”, would certainly represents a distorted meaning of what “it is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold the security of Asia”.
The fact is that Asia does not equal China alone and the people of Asia is not Chinese alone! It is hard to understand how that could be interpreted as “This perspective stresses the necessity of China’s leadership in building a new Asian security structure.”
Then, there is the following paragraph: “RCEP is an effort to promote ASEAN-centred regional economic integration. Compared to the TPP, RCEP emphasises the importance of economic developmental cooperation in the region. Some analyses tend to characterise the TPP and RCEP as reflecting a confrontation or competition between the United States and China for hegemony in Asia.”
One the one hand, the author acknowledges RCEP is ASEAN-centred and on the other hand the author seems to also imply or at least accept RCEP is a Chinese tool to confront or compete with the US for hegemony in Asia.
Is that simply an oversimplification? I am not sure.
2016-02-01
Changed relationship between QE and inflation
Comments on Masanaga Kumakura "Japan is sinking in a sea of money", 28/01/2016
The recent QEs in the US, European Central Bank and Japan appear to have cast doubt on the conventional economic theory, i.e. the monetisation of government debt is a recipe for fiscal profligacy and hyperinflation. Whether it is because the special circumstances or other reasons, the QE in the US played a useful role in averting more nasty economic depression. Economists should revisit that conventional economic theory, perhaps.
The recent QEs in the US, European Central Bank and Japan appear to have cast doubt on the conventional economic theory, i.e. the monetisation of government debt is a recipe for fiscal profligacy and hyperinflation. Whether it is because the special circumstances or other reasons, the QE in the US played a useful role in averting more nasty economic depression. Economists should revisit that conventional economic theory, perhaps.
China unlike to catch up with the US on per capita income in three decades
Comments on Peter Robertson and Longfeng Ye "China’s greatest challenge will be escaping the middle income trap', 30/01/2016
The terms of the richest and most powerful country in the following paragraph is confusing. China will not be the richest country in many decades to the future. One should not be confused by the size of a nation and the average income or per capita income. Most powerful or not, it is also debatable. “China’s slower growth figures have caused jitters in world financial markets. Nevertheless its growth remains at miracle levels. At this pace, China would appear to remain on track to become the richest and most powerful country in the world, bar none.”
Further, the following paragraph is questionable, the implied calculation seems to be incorrect: “In a scenario where Chinese “miracle” growth continues around 5-6% for three decades and gradually slows to the average world growth rate, the average Chinese citizen would be as wealthy as the average American.”Per capita income in China is around one fifth of that in the US. Growth rate of around 5-6% is at the best only 2-3 percentage points higher than the US. Three decades of that greater growth rate does not give a factor of 5!
China in its current stage of development shares more similarities with Japan and Korea in their relative developmental stage than with Brazil or Turkey, in culture and economic characteristics, such as saving rates, education state role in growth. Purely from that perspective, China is more likely to avoid the middle income trap, barring disastrous government policies.
PS: Professor Robertson replied to my earlier comments with the following: "Hi Lincoln
I think you have overestimated the US growth rate and underestimated China’s current per capita GDP in $PPP.
The growth rate gap is more likely to be around 4 percentage points as the US per capita income growth unlikely to exceed 2 percentage points per year.
Also China’s per capita income (in $PPP) today is closer to 26-27% of the USA’s.
Obviously one can question the assumptions but I hope that answers your question."
My tcourtsy to Professor Robertson "Thanks Professor Robertson for your reply and clarification that clears some confusion that I had."
PSS: Notwithstanding Professor Robertson's clarification, I still doubt China could practically catch up with the US on per capita income in three decades. While it is possible for a small economy like Singapore or Hong Kong, it is unlikely for a large economy. Japan's per capita income ($37,500 in 2014, re CIA World Factbook) is still quite a bit below the US's ($54,400 in 2014), not to mention South Korea's (interestingly also $35,400 in 2014).
Both Japan and Korea, with reasonably large economic size, are two of the best examples of catching up in the post war era and up to now as well.
One may argue that Japan has had a period of lost decades, but that is exactly part of the parcel of economic development and catch up processes, and reflects the difficulties for a large country to catch up in a short period.
The terms of the richest and most powerful country in the following paragraph is confusing. China will not be the richest country in many decades to the future. One should not be confused by the size of a nation and the average income or per capita income. Most powerful or not, it is also debatable. “China’s slower growth figures have caused jitters in world financial markets. Nevertheless its growth remains at miracle levels. At this pace, China would appear to remain on track to become the richest and most powerful country in the world, bar none.”
Further, the following paragraph is questionable, the implied calculation seems to be incorrect: “In a scenario where Chinese “miracle” growth continues around 5-6% for three decades and gradually slows to the average world growth rate, the average Chinese citizen would be as wealthy as the average American.”Per capita income in China is around one fifth of that in the US. Growth rate of around 5-6% is at the best only 2-3 percentage points higher than the US. Three decades of that greater growth rate does not give a factor of 5!
China in its current stage of development shares more similarities with Japan and Korea in their relative developmental stage than with Brazil or Turkey, in culture and economic characteristics, such as saving rates, education state role in growth. Purely from that perspective, China is more likely to avoid the middle income trap, barring disastrous government policies.
PS: Professor Robertson replied to my earlier comments with the following: "Hi Lincoln
I think you have overestimated the US growth rate and underestimated China’s current per capita GDP in $PPP.
The growth rate gap is more likely to be around 4 percentage points as the US per capita income growth unlikely to exceed 2 percentage points per year.
Also China’s per capita income (in $PPP) today is closer to 26-27% of the USA’s.
Obviously one can question the assumptions but I hope that answers your question."
My tcourtsy to Professor Robertson "Thanks Professor Robertson for your reply and clarification that clears some confusion that I had."
PSS: Notwithstanding Professor Robertson's clarification, I still doubt China could practically catch up with the US on per capita income in three decades. While it is possible for a small economy like Singapore or Hong Kong, it is unlikely for a large economy. Japan's per capita income ($37,500 in 2014, re CIA World Factbook) is still quite a bit below the US's ($54,400 in 2014), not to mention South Korea's (interestingly also $35,400 in 2014).
Both Japan and Korea, with reasonably large economic size, are two of the best examples of catching up in the post war era and up to now as well.
One may argue that Japan has had a period of lost decades, but that is exactly part of the parcel of economic development and catch up processes, and reflects the difficulties for a large country to catch up in a short period.
Beeson's bizarre comparison of China with Japan's military past
Comments on Mark Beeson "What China did and should learn from Japan", 30/01/2016
This article, though probably good in economics, is unfortunately overblown in terms of comparing China’s current military stance, or even its or approach in the South China Sea or East China Sea, with that of Imperial Japan in the second half of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century. Japan was then a militarised country, expansionary and aggressor, invaded quite a number of countries in Asia.
It is hard to understand the author could get the comparison so wrong. Even in economic and developmental aspects, it is doubtful that the China model is similar to the Japan model.
In terms of development stage, China is now far from the stage of 1990 Japan. As a result, there is still a long way for China to go to ‘exhaust’ the role of state in maintain rapid growth, if the argument of the different roles of state (institution reforms) needs to evolve.
PS: That piece by Beenson, shows some economists may get very strange perspective when they apply their economics knowledge to something new to them, even though I am an economist too.
This article, though probably good in economics, is unfortunately overblown in terms of comparing China’s current military stance, or even its or approach in the South China Sea or East China Sea, with that of Imperial Japan in the second half of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century. Japan was then a militarised country, expansionary and aggressor, invaded quite a number of countries in Asia.
It is hard to understand the author could get the comparison so wrong. Even in economic and developmental aspects, it is doubtful that the China model is similar to the Japan model.
In terms of development stage, China is now far from the stage of 1990 Japan. As a result, there is still a long way for China to go to ‘exhaust’ the role of state in maintain rapid growth, if the argument of the different roles of state (institution reforms) needs to evolve.
PS: That piece by Beenson, shows some economists may get very strange perspective when they apply their economics knowledge to something new to them, even though I am an economist too.
2015-08-16
Tessa Morris-Suzuki: Shinzo Abe is rewriting Japanese war history
This is only a reference to a useful and just article by a scholar on Japanese history at the ANU, Professor Tessa Morris-Suzuki "Shinzo Abe divides our region with a rewrite of Japan's war history", 16/08/2015. See the link here to the article at the Canberra Times:
Read more: http://www.canberratimes.com.au/comment/shinzo-abe-divides-region-with-a-rewrite-of-japans-modern-history-20150815-gizxev.html#ixzz3iyZov3VV
Read more: http://www.canberratimes.com.au/comment/shinzo-abe-divides-region-with-a-rewrite-of-japans-modern-history-20150815-gizxev.html#ixzz3iyZov3VV
2015-08-10
Reflection on war and peace - at the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII
Comments on Tessa Morris-Suzuki “70 years on, peace remains incomplete”, 8/08/2015
Yes, the 70th anniversary of the end of the second world war should be a time for reflections of costs of terrible wars and the benefits of lasting peace for the Asian and Pacific region. It would be terrible to have another and second period of cold war in the world.
The US is currently the sole superpower in every sense and it is only interested in maintaining its military, economic and political superiority over any other individual countries. In that context, the rise of China poses significant challenges to the US. China has risen to the second largest economy only behind the US and it is expected that it will overcome the US as the largest economy in the world in the not so distant future (even though some have argued that China has already been the world largest economy in purchasing power parity terms). As the Chinese economy grows further at a significantly faster speed, its military expenditures are likely to grow to be commensurate with its economic power. Given its much larger population, it won't be too long for it to catch up with the US militarily, at least in terms of military expenditures. That will be likely to cause concerns and insecurity in the US. As a result, the US will continue to take measures to contain China as much as possible.
On China's part, it has been used to the containment by the US, even though the future containment is likely to be different from the past, as an increasingly felt insecure in US may take more stringent containment strategies.
While China is a minor nuclear power, particularly as compared to the US and Russia, its industrial capacities as the world's factories mean it could become a nuclear power if it really faced with stringent security threats and if it chose to do so. Let's hope it will never be necessary for China to choose that route, given that route could mean other minor nuclear powers could do the same.
Russia is still a superpower in terms of its nuclear weapons and the recent events in Ukraine and the deterioration between Russia and the West is a reminder of Russia's power as well as its vulnerabilities.
China and Russia are likely to maintain a good bilateral relationship in the face of the containment by the US.
So what lies ahead will, to a large degree, depend on how the US to choose its future and the strategies towards newly emerging and definitely growing powers.
I hope my above concerns, out of the reflection of war and peace at the 70th anniversary of the end of the second world war, will be proven to be wrong and will never be realised.
Yes, the 70th anniversary of the end of the second world war should be a time for reflections of costs of terrible wars and the benefits of lasting peace for the Asian and Pacific region. It would be terrible to have another and second period of cold war in the world.
The US is currently the sole superpower in every sense and it is only interested in maintaining its military, economic and political superiority over any other individual countries. In that context, the rise of China poses significant challenges to the US. China has risen to the second largest economy only behind the US and it is expected that it will overcome the US as the largest economy in the world in the not so distant future (even though some have argued that China has already been the world largest economy in purchasing power parity terms). As the Chinese economy grows further at a significantly faster speed, its military expenditures are likely to grow to be commensurate with its economic power. Given its much larger population, it won't be too long for it to catch up with the US militarily, at least in terms of military expenditures. That will be likely to cause concerns and insecurity in the US. As a result, the US will continue to take measures to contain China as much as possible.
On China's part, it has been used to the containment by the US, even though the future containment is likely to be different from the past, as an increasingly felt insecure in US may take more stringent containment strategies.
While China is a minor nuclear power, particularly as compared to the US and Russia, its industrial capacities as the world's factories mean it could become a nuclear power if it really faced with stringent security threats and if it chose to do so. Let's hope it will never be necessary for China to choose that route, given that route could mean other minor nuclear powers could do the same.
Russia is still a superpower in terms of its nuclear weapons and the recent events in Ukraine and the deterioration between Russia and the West is a reminder of Russia's power as well as its vulnerabilities.
China and Russia are likely to maintain a good bilateral relationship in the face of the containment by the US.
So what lies ahead will, to a large degree, depend on how the US to choose its future and the strategies towards newly emerging and definitely growing powers.
I hope my above concerns, out of the reflection of war and peace at the 70th anniversary of the end of the second world war, will be proven to be wrong and will never be realised.
2015-08-04
Turton's ridiculous comments on Japan's new security laws
Comments on Michael Turton's comments on "Storm brews over Japan’s new security laws" by Ben Ascione, 4/08/2015
Your comments are extremely biased and disappointing.
There are two points regarding your comments. Firstly, leaving aside how those bills will affect China and its security, the Senkaku/Diayu Island is at least a disputed territory, not undisputed Japanese territory as you biasedly claimed.
Secondly, China will not kill Taiwanese and the unification of Taiwan with the mainland is not annexation.
There is another point, that is, China is not the aggressor as you claimed, both China and Taiwan claim the Diayu/Sankaku Island as their own territory.
Your comments are extremely biased and disappointing.
There are two points regarding your comments. Firstly, leaving aside how those bills will affect China and its security, the Senkaku/Diayu Island is at least a disputed territory, not undisputed Japanese territory as you biasedly claimed.
Secondly, China will not kill Taiwanese and the unification of Taiwan with the mainland is not annexation.
There is another point, that is, China is not the aggressor as you claimed, both China and Taiwan claim the Diayu/Sankaku Island as their own territory.
2015-08-02
A suggestion to the editors of the eastasiaforum
Comments on Arthur Stockwin "Japan’s defence and diplomacy heading in the wrong direction", 2/08/2015
This is a suggestion to the editors of the eastasiaforum.
Ii is very disappointing to see that while there are so many Chinese scholars and scholars who are involved in Chinese/China studies (whether it is economics, politics, cultural, historical or whatever), working in Australian tertiary institutions and particularly at the Australian National University (ANU), there are very few who are actively involved in the eastasiaforum. I don't know whether they are not interested in this at all, because of the forum's rating or something else?
I am sure it is worthwhile to be involved to contribute to the building up of public goods for the benefit of the public. Some of them surely should have known better the facts or better knowledges regarding China, such as the war reparations were received and compensations for comfort women as Cathy Yang claimed, , due to the nature of their professional work.
I would suggest the editors of eastasiaforum should reflect on that and identify the key reasons as to why, and encourage those to be actively involved in the forum.
PS: When I compare the eastasiaforum and the conversation, it seems the former is quite slow to have comments appear with the article, as opposed to the latter. The latter has the default for any comments to appear after they were provided and take out those they deem not to meet the standards for one reason or another. The former, however, has the default that does not allow any comments to appear automatically and only allow they to appear after some time. There is a clear difference between the two.
The editors should improve their work in this regard. They should not delay the appearance of comments due to their slowness.
This is a suggestion to the editors of the eastasiaforum.
Ii is very disappointing to see that while there are so many Chinese scholars and scholars who are involved in Chinese/China studies (whether it is economics, politics, cultural, historical or whatever), working in Australian tertiary institutions and particularly at the Australian National University (ANU), there are very few who are actively involved in the eastasiaforum. I don't know whether they are not interested in this at all, because of the forum's rating or something else?
I am sure it is worthwhile to be involved to contribute to the building up of public goods for the benefit of the public. Some of them surely should have known better the facts or better knowledges regarding China, such as the war reparations were received and compensations for comfort women as Cathy Yang claimed, , due to the nature of their professional work.
I would suggest the editors of eastasiaforum should reflect on that and identify the key reasons as to why, and encourage those to be actively involved in the forum.
PS: When I compare the eastasiaforum and the conversation, it seems the former is quite slow to have comments appear with the article, as opposed to the latter. The latter has the default for any comments to appear after they were provided and take out those they deem not to meet the standards for one reason or another. The former, however, has the default that does not allow any comments to appear automatically and only allow they to appear after some time. There is a clear difference between the two.
The editors should improve their work in this regard. They should not delay the appearance of comments due to their slowness.
Cathy Yang's extraordinary arrogant claims!
Comments on Cathy Yang's comments on "Japan’s defence and diplomacy heading in the wrong direction", 2/08/2015
Cathy Yang, it seems your statements are wrong and have no basis in terms of, I quote, "War reparations were received, compensations for comfort women were offered."
China has never received war reparations and many ordinary Chinese have been unhappy or angry for that, partly it was past Chinese communist leaders who decided not to ask for war reparations when China and Japan established diplomatic relations during Mao and Zhou era.
As far as I am aware, no compensations for comfort women were offered to Chinese nationals involved.
Can you supply evidence to back up your claims please?
Your claim that "China will never attack, or take the US nor Japan by forces" implies you can foretell the future regarding to Chinese leaders actions in terms of China's relations with the US or Japan. That is extremely extraordinary and arrogant. How do you have that power?
Cathy Yang, it seems your statements are wrong and have no basis in terms of, I quote, "War reparations were received, compensations for comfort women were offered."
China has never received war reparations and many ordinary Chinese have been unhappy or angry for that, partly it was past Chinese communist leaders who decided not to ask for war reparations when China and Japan established diplomatic relations during Mao and Zhou era.
As far as I am aware, no compensations for comfort women were offered to Chinese nationals involved.
Can you supply evidence to back up your claims please?
Your claim that "China will never attack, or take the US nor Japan by forces" implies you can foretell the future regarding to Chinese leaders actions in terms of China's relations with the US or Japan. That is extremely extraordinary and arrogant. How do you have that power?
2015-07-27
TPP will be a mixed blessing for Australia
Comments on Shiro Armstrong "The race to a risky Trans-Pacific Partnership deal", 27/07/2015
Whether it is willingly or unwillingly on Australia's part, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) may prove to be a mixed blessing for Australia indeed, given that China is Australia's largest market and that Australia relies very heavily on Chinese economy to perform. China is excluded from the TPP and will suffer as a result of the trade diversion effects away from its exports. If China's exports is negatively affected by the TPP, then it in turn will have a negative effect on Australia.
But more seriously than that, the intention of the US and Japan to contain China's (and possibly India's too) rise economically as shown in their approach to the TPP memberships, there may be a long term and lasting damage to a number of bilateral relationships. In the future those countries which are deliberately excluded by the US and japan may take potentially remedy measures, whether it is retaliatory or purely a natural response.
The Chinese and Indians may not openly say anything but in their heart and minds it is crystal clear what the TPP is about and what it means for them. It may be forgiven sooner or later, but it will not be easily forgotten.
The damages have already been done and let's hope they would be contained without spiral out of control.
Whether it is willingly or unwillingly on Australia's part, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) may prove to be a mixed blessing for Australia indeed, given that China is Australia's largest market and that Australia relies very heavily on Chinese economy to perform. China is excluded from the TPP and will suffer as a result of the trade diversion effects away from its exports. If China's exports is negatively affected by the TPP, then it in turn will have a negative effect on Australia.
But more seriously than that, the intention of the US and Japan to contain China's (and possibly India's too) rise economically as shown in their approach to the TPP memberships, there may be a long term and lasting damage to a number of bilateral relationships. In the future those countries which are deliberately excluded by the US and japan may take potentially remedy measures, whether it is retaliatory or purely a natural response.
The Chinese and Indians may not openly say anything but in their heart and minds it is crystal clear what the TPP is about and what it means for them. It may be forgiven sooner or later, but it will not be easily forgotten.
The damages have already been done and let's hope they would be contained without spiral out of control.
2015-07-21
The "not-quite-quatrilateral" won't work
Comments on David Lang "The not-quite-quadrilateral: Australia, Japan and India", 21/07/2015
If the so called "not quite quadrilateral" are as that as the author described, it is unlikely to end up nicely.
For one thing, Australia may even have difficulties to decide in terms its relationships with China and the USA with the latter as its closest military ally and the former as by far its largest export market.
I would suggest the author compare who are more important to Australia, is that Japan and India, or the US?
Then it is not too difficult to see the futility of the attempt of so called "not quite quadrilateral" in containing China. It simply does not work.
If the so called "not quite quadrilateral" are as that as the author described, it is unlikely to end up nicely.
For one thing, Australia may even have difficulties to decide in terms its relationships with China and the USA with the latter as its closest military ally and the former as by far its largest export market.
I would suggest the author compare who are more important to Australia, is that Japan and India, or the US?
Then it is not too difficult to see the futility of the attempt of so called "not quite quadrilateral" in containing China. It simply does not work.
2015-07-13
Japan may need some reflections
Further comments on Lionel Babicz "A new chapter for Tokyo–Seoul relations, 50 years on?" 13/07/2015
These comments on responding to the reply from Lionel Babicz.
While I welcome your reply, I do think that it is probably japan that needs a fundamental rethink of its attitudes towards its neighbours including South Korea, for at least two things.
Firstly, it should not exhibit any arrogant attitude towards others, irrespective its economic achievements and its past glories including its militarism past and its colonisation of other countries. Any revisions of Japan's militarism past will always be a very sensitive issue to its neighbours.
Secondly, it should not use a third country to advance its any containing China, particularly as South Korea is concerned. South Korea is unlikely to warm to any such attempt, given its strong and close economic and political ties with China. South Korea's relationship with China will be strong and possibly more important to South Korea than the relationship with Japan. China’s economy is larger than Japan’s and will continue to grow strongly over the next two decades with strong implications for both South Korea and Japan.
These comments on responding to the reply from Lionel Babicz.
While I welcome your reply, I do think that it is probably japan that needs a fundamental rethink of its attitudes towards its neighbours including South Korea, for at least two things.
Firstly, it should not exhibit any arrogant attitude towards others, irrespective its economic achievements and its past glories including its militarism past and its colonisation of other countries. Any revisions of Japan's militarism past will always be a very sensitive issue to its neighbours.
Secondly, it should not use a third country to advance its any containing China, particularly as South Korea is concerned. South Korea is unlikely to warm to any such attempt, given its strong and close economic and political ties with China. South Korea's relationship with China will be strong and possibly more important to South Korea than the relationship with Japan. China’s economy is larger than Japan’s and will continue to grow strongly over the next two decades with strong implications for both South Korea and Japan.
China and Japan must work towards closer and faster Asia integration
Comments on Seungjoo Lee "The politics of Asian integration", 13/07/2014
It is pity that Asia, particularly East Asia has not moved to a much more closer institutional framework to reflect its underlying economic integration or links. While it is understandable that Asia including East Asia, is more diverse than Western Europe and North America, every country, particular the bigger ones, must overcome historical legacies and difficulties to look forward to a new, more dynamic, more prosperous and more closely integrated Asia, so every country can benefit much more from it.
As I have remarked somewhere else before, the major countries in Asia, particularly China and Japan, need to be more creative in handling its bilateral relationships.
For any country or countries, the aspiration to be a global leader must start with an effective, constructive and inspirational regional leader first. Without being a good regional leader, it is impossible to become a global leader.
Both China and Japan, even though Japan is a US ally and China may face from time to time an attempt of containment by the US, must reflect on their strategic relationship and approaches with each other and come up with a better strategy to make Asia as a more integrated region economically, politically and from security point of view.
They have a greater responsibility in leading Asia.
For China, more confident and assertiveness should not be aggressiveness and being perceived as bully from a bigger brother. It need to pay attention to its leadership style. And it must approach territory issues/disputes with some other countries from a regional and global leadership point of view and to resolve those issues under international laws. If there are difficulties and or ambiguities with international laws, it should seek a solution peacefully, more creatively and more constructively with other parties.
For Japan, it will probably serve its interests much better if it acts independently as opposed to using and relying its ally with the US in dealing with China and being a partner of the US's China attainment. It will simply not work and will damage its own interests more than China's.
It is pity that Asia, particularly East Asia has not moved to a much more closer institutional framework to reflect its underlying economic integration or links. While it is understandable that Asia including East Asia, is more diverse than Western Europe and North America, every country, particular the bigger ones, must overcome historical legacies and difficulties to look forward to a new, more dynamic, more prosperous and more closely integrated Asia, so every country can benefit much more from it.
As I have remarked somewhere else before, the major countries in Asia, particularly China and Japan, need to be more creative in handling its bilateral relationships.
For any country or countries, the aspiration to be a global leader must start with an effective, constructive and inspirational regional leader first. Without being a good regional leader, it is impossible to become a global leader.
Both China and Japan, even though Japan is a US ally and China may face from time to time an attempt of containment by the US, must reflect on their strategic relationship and approaches with each other and come up with a better strategy to make Asia as a more integrated region economically, politically and from security point of view.
They have a greater responsibility in leading Asia.
For China, more confident and assertiveness should not be aggressiveness and being perceived as bully from a bigger brother. It need to pay attention to its leadership style. And it must approach territory issues/disputes with some other countries from a regional and global leadership point of view and to resolve those issues under international laws. If there are difficulties and or ambiguities with international laws, it should seek a solution peacefully, more creatively and more constructively with other parties.
For Japan, it will probably serve its interests much better if it acts independently as opposed to using and relying its ally with the US in dealing with China and being a partner of the US's China attainment. It will simply not work and will damage its own interests more than China's.
2015-07-11
Sense and sensitivity
Comments on Lionel Babicz "A new chapter for Tokyo–Seoul relations, 50 years on?" 11/07/2015
Are the following statements correct?
"Furthermore, the deepening American involvement in the Vietnam War was also a key element of this rapprochement. Japan was required to contribute large sums to the South Korean economy, while Seoul agreed to send some three hundred thousand troops to Vietnam, making it the second largest military contingent after the United States."
Did South Korea really send 300,000 troops to Vietnam? That is a huge number.
I am not sure the author's interpretation of the two leaders' separate statements or remarks was correct. To me, the South Korea President's statement is likely to imply a very confident and equal South Korea, a strong message to the audiences of both countries. South Korea now is certainly very different from the South Korea back 50 years ago then.
It seems both audiences would be much more sensitive and attuned to what have been said than the author does, who is a lecture in Japanese history.
Are the following statements correct?
"Furthermore, the deepening American involvement in the Vietnam War was also a key element of this rapprochement. Japan was required to contribute large sums to the South Korean economy, while Seoul agreed to send some three hundred thousand troops to Vietnam, making it the second largest military contingent after the United States."
Did South Korea really send 300,000 troops to Vietnam? That is a huge number.
I am not sure the author's interpretation of the two leaders' separate statements or remarks was correct. To me, the South Korea President's statement is likely to imply a very confident and equal South Korea, a strong message to the audiences of both countries. South Korea now is certainly very different from the South Korea back 50 years ago then.
It seems both audiences would be much more sensitive and attuned to what have been said than the author does, who is a lecture in Japanese history.
2015-07-08
Abe needs to live in the present not the 1930s and 1940s
Comments on Richard Katz "What drives Shinzo Abe?" 8/07/2015
The author, Mr Richard Katz, states the following as the last two paragraphs:
"There are two groups of politicians who wish to have Japan take an active role in collective self-defence and constitutional revision. The first group is motivated by cool consideration of present-day threat assessments. Abe, however, belongs to the second group, which is driven not just by present-day realities, but also by a romanticised view of the 1930s and 1940s. Abe in particular is devoted to restoring the ‘honour’ of his beloved grandfather and role model, Nobuo Kishi, as well as the entire generation of wartime leaders.
Kishi served in Tojo’s wartime cabinet, spent three years in Sugamo Prison as a suspected Class-A war criminal, and became prime minister in the late 1950s. Upon being elected to the Japanese Diet in 1993, Abe joined an Liberal Democratic Party ‘study group’ that published a book in 1995 calling the World War II a war for self-defence and denying that Japan committed war crimes like the Nanking Massacre and the forced recruitment of ‘comfort women’ (sex slaves). In February 1997, Abe formed another group of Diet members with similar views and became its executive director. Half of his cabinet ministers are members. He is forcing through changes in school textbooks to better reflect his revisionist view of history.
Despite all this, the accusation from some in Asia that Abe wants to — or could — lead Japan back to militarism akin to the 1930s is completely outlandish. Japan’s actions back then were an artefact of that era in world history and Japan’s own status as a traditional, rural, pre-democratic society. Today, Japan is a modern democratic society in alliance with the United States. There is no going back."
I have the following comment on them:
The last paragraph appears to imply that a modern democratic society, as Japan is at the moment, can not go back to or become militarism. In another word, that assumes, in its bare logic, that the majority of any society can not become militarism. I would argue that that assumption is wrong and that some societies can become militarism with the support of a majority. That is the danger of the history revisionists who deny its country's past wrong doing and war crimes committed to other nations. For example, I would argue that Hitler probably had majority support of Germany people at some time. back to the 1930s and 1940s We all know what that support developed into.
Secondly, while I don't know for sure what Abe wants to do with his "romanticised view of the 1930s and 1940s" of Japan, one thing for sure is that the relative international strengths have changed and that Japan, though having very strong capacities in many sectors, does not have its absolute power in Asia as it had during the 1930s and 1940s, irrespective its alliance with the US or not, or wether its has majority domestic support or not. For one thing for sure, China, as well as other East Asian countries, is/are much more powerful and Japan is and will no longer be allowed to do what it did in the 1930s and 1940s.
Thirdly, as long as the Japanese government has the view of Abe's regarding Japan's 1930s and 1940s, it will have difficulty relationships with its East Asian counterparts. And that damages and will damage its own national interests if it does not stop that view.
The days of 1930s and 1940s of Japan have long gone forever and any attempts to bring that back by any Japanese politicians will be completely futile and downright stupid. Should Japan become militarism again, it would risk its own total destruction with the modern military capacities of other East Asian countries.
The author, Mr Richard Katz, states the following as the last two paragraphs:
"There are two groups of politicians who wish to have Japan take an active role in collective self-defence and constitutional revision. The first group is motivated by cool consideration of present-day threat assessments. Abe, however, belongs to the second group, which is driven not just by present-day realities, but also by a romanticised view of the 1930s and 1940s. Abe in particular is devoted to restoring the ‘honour’ of his beloved grandfather and role model, Nobuo Kishi, as well as the entire generation of wartime leaders.
Kishi served in Tojo’s wartime cabinet, spent three years in Sugamo Prison as a suspected Class-A war criminal, and became prime minister in the late 1950s. Upon being elected to the Japanese Diet in 1993, Abe joined an Liberal Democratic Party ‘study group’ that published a book in 1995 calling the World War II a war for self-defence and denying that Japan committed war crimes like the Nanking Massacre and the forced recruitment of ‘comfort women’ (sex slaves). In February 1997, Abe formed another group of Diet members with similar views and became its executive director. Half of his cabinet ministers are members. He is forcing through changes in school textbooks to better reflect his revisionist view of history.
Despite all this, the accusation from some in Asia that Abe wants to — or could — lead Japan back to militarism akin to the 1930s is completely outlandish. Japan’s actions back then were an artefact of that era in world history and Japan’s own status as a traditional, rural, pre-democratic society. Today, Japan is a modern democratic society in alliance with the United States. There is no going back."
I have the following comment on them:
The last paragraph appears to imply that a modern democratic society, as Japan is at the moment, can not go back to or become militarism. In another word, that assumes, in its bare logic, that the majority of any society can not become militarism. I would argue that that assumption is wrong and that some societies can become militarism with the support of a majority. That is the danger of the history revisionists who deny its country's past wrong doing and war crimes committed to other nations. For example, I would argue that Hitler probably had majority support of Germany people at some time. back to the 1930s and 1940s We all know what that support developed into.
Secondly, while I don't know for sure what Abe wants to do with his "romanticised view of the 1930s and 1940s" of Japan, one thing for sure is that the relative international strengths have changed and that Japan, though having very strong capacities in many sectors, does not have its absolute power in Asia as it had during the 1930s and 1940s, irrespective its alliance with the US or not, or wether its has majority domestic support or not. For one thing for sure, China, as well as other East Asian countries, is/are much more powerful and Japan is and will no longer be allowed to do what it did in the 1930s and 1940s.
Thirdly, as long as the Japanese government has the view of Abe's regarding Japan's 1930s and 1940s, it will have difficulty relationships with its East Asian counterparts. And that damages and will damage its own national interests if it does not stop that view.
The days of 1930s and 1940s of Japan have long gone forever and any attempts to bring that back by any Japanese politicians will be completely futile and downright stupid. Should Japan become militarism again, it would risk its own total destruction with the modern military capacities of other East Asian countries.
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