White may suffer from illusions on NFU

Comments on Hugh White "A second strike on nuclear ‘no first use’", 6/09/2016

It seems that Professor White may have developed his argument based on possibly incorrect premises.

One is the concept of illusion by US allies. Are those countries really that low intelligence?

The second is the logic that some of the US allies will develop nuclear weapons should the US do a no first use (NFU).

I would question the soundness of both.

A nuclear weapon free world is a much higher goal for all human beings than the possible use of such weapons by a hegemonic sole superpower!

Commenting on 'What might a new Asian order look like?'

Comments on Robert A. Manning and Jim Przystup "What might a new Asian order look like?" 12/04/2016

This article is really lacking of imagination, to say the least, because its real aim was probably to maintain the continued dominance of the US which they seem to have a strong interest.

The rise of the US following Britain may serve as a path if the US and the authors will try to do what the British did when it faced challenges from the US.

Could Britain in any way to stop the rise of the US and the change in the world order, given the economic power of the latter and its strengths in military or the ability to transform part of its economic power into military power if and when it was needed?

Could there have been an alternative and better trajectory than what was then? Could Britain have possibly been able to contain the USA forever?

Further, did all the former masters of former colonies adopted the best and fair strategies when their former colonies began to ask for independence? Were they really all caring the interests of those colonies instead of leaving some tricky and divisive legacies behind?

Would that have always been justified to maintain the status quo at those times?

One may like the certainty of the present time, but future will definitely be different from the present, although sometimes it is harder to predict what it will be exactly.

The following is the second part of my comments on the article:

The authors seem to think Asian people cannot come up with an Asian order that benefit all Asians. If that is true, they run the serious risk of being significantly estimating the intelligence and creativity of Asians.

What might a new Asian order look like?

Firstly, a simplest answer would be if the Americans are wise enough to not interfere with Asian affairs, that would be a big part of a new Asian order. Asians can live well by themselves without their interference. The US can do a rebalance back to its own country in America!

Secondly, a new Asian order would be that where all Asian countries are proud members of their regional organisation and being respected not by each other themselves but by other interregional plays, big and small.

Thirdly, a new Asian order would be where the Chinese, the Indians, the Japanese, the Koreans, the Russians, and ASEAN people and all other Asian people are masters of Asia and work together toward the rise of Asia, beyond the rise of of any single or small group of countries in Asia.

Fourthly, the Americans, the Europeans are no longer able to arrogantly regard themselves as the first and second world and treat Asians as the third world people. They will not be able to monopoly that status for themselves.

The above are elements of a new Asian order and of an Asian dream.

It would be a proud Asian dream similar to but more than what King's dream was, because Asians have shown some of that already.

Yes, there are some Asians who like to beg their uncle Sam because it is now still the superpower but they don't have true Asian characters.

Hedging, alliance and dynamic developments

Comments on Darren J. Lim, ANU and Zack Cooper "Are East Asian states really hedging between the US and China?" 1/02/2016

The main argument or conclusion in this is likely to depend on the relative dynamic development of China and the US in terms of political, economic and military strengths. The argument may be currently valid, but can be problematic if the growth of China’s military strengths follows the same path of its economic development of the last three decades, particularly the last two decades.

Just as few had imagined or foreseen the rise of China economically three decades ago, it is difficult to predict what China’s military strengths will be in two to three decades into the future.

Another is whether China will maintain its current and long held policy of non alignment. Arguably, China could have options in that respect.

Should China, either alone or with reliable partners, have stronger or at least the same military strengths, the argument in this post could be significantly discounted.

Some rational choice now could be changed when the circumstances and assumptions change.

Further, the US, though strongly committed to its alliance partners now, at least apparently, will also need to calculate the costs of a direct war against a rising power.

During the cold war, the threat of mutual destruction made the US and the former Soviet avoid direct war. Arguably, the US may have had superiority in conventional weapons. The Soviet invaded Afghanistan, though eventually it had to withdrawal or it was defeated there.

The point is that few countries will go to war without considering the costs it would incur, particularly it is to fight for a partner country.

Changed relationship between QE and inflation

Comments on Masanaga Kumakura "Japan is sinking in a sea of money", 28/01/2016

The recent QEs in the US, European Central Bank and Japan appear to have cast doubt on the conventional economic theory, i.e. the monetisation of government debt is a recipe for fiscal profligacy and hyperinflation. Whether it is because the special circumstances or other reasons, the QE in the US played a useful role in averting more nasty economic depression. Economists should revisit that conventional economic theory, perhaps.

China unlike to catch up with the US on per capita income in three decades

Comments on Peter Robertson and Longfeng Ye "China’s greatest challenge will be escaping the middle income trap', 30/01/2016

The terms of the richest and most powerful country in the following paragraph is confusing. China will not be the richest country in many decades to the future. One should not be confused by the size of a nation and the average income or per capita income. Most powerful or not, it is also debatable. “China’s slower growth figures have caused jitters in world financial markets. Nevertheless its growth remains at miracle levels. At this pace, China would appear to remain on track to become the richest and most powerful country in the world, bar none.”

Further, the following paragraph is questionable, the implied calculation seems to be incorrect: “In a scenario where Chinese “miracle” growth continues around 5-6% for three decades and gradually slows to the average world growth rate, the average Chinese citizen would be as wealthy as the average American.”Per capita income in China is around one fifth of that in the US. Growth rate of around 5-6% is at the best only 2-3 percentage points higher than the US. Three decades of that greater growth rate does not give a factor of 5!

China in its current stage of development shares more similarities with Japan and Korea in their relative developmental stage than with Brazil or Turkey, in culture and economic characteristics, such as saving rates, education state role in growth. Purely from that perspective, China is more likely to avoid the middle income trap, barring disastrous government policies.

PS: Professor Robertson replied to my earlier comments with the following: "Hi Lincoln
I think you have overestimated the US growth rate and underestimated China’s current per capita GDP in $PPP.
The growth rate gap is more likely to be around 4 percentage points as the US per capita income growth unlikely to exceed 2 percentage points per year.
Also China’s per capita income (in $PPP) today is closer to 26-27% of the USA’s.
Obviously one can question the assumptions but I hope that answers your question."

My tcourtsy to Professor Robertson "Thanks Professor Robertson for your reply and clarification that clears some confusion that I had."

PSS: Notwithstanding Professor Robertson's clarification, I still doubt China could practically catch up with the US on per capita income in three decades. While it is possible for a small economy like Singapore or Hong Kong, it is unlikely for a large economy. Japan's per capita income ($37,500 in 2014, re CIA World Factbook) is still quite a bit below the US's ($54,400 in 2014), not to mention South Korea's (interestingly also $35,400 in 2014).

Both Japan and Korea, with reasonably large economic size, are two of the best examples of catching up in the post war era and up to now as well.

One may argue that Japan has had a period of lost decades, but that is exactly part of the parcel of economic development and catch up processes, and reflects the difficulties for a large country to catch up in a short period.

China's 'one belt' - a soft approach to international affairs?

Comments on Michael Clarke "China takes its Eurasian moment", 18/07/2015

From the discussion of the current Eurasian state by the author, it is clear that China's approach will be much more beneficial to those countries involved, with its insisting on the centrality of ‘sovereign equality’ and ‘non-interference’ in ‘domestic affairs’ as the basis for interstate relations on the one hand, and real economic integration backed by its financial support on the other. As a result, they are much more likely to warm up with Beijing's initiative in comparison to others' much more conditional approaches.

There is one point, that is, that the 'one belt' initiative is not necessarily in serious competition with Russia's Eurasian Union idea. It is not too dissimilar to the current states of either bilateral or regional free trade agreements where a country may be the member of two or more free trade agreements.

Furthermore, it is unclear whether Beijing's key focus is on geopolitical or geoeconomical aspects. It seems that it is more on geoeconomical, given its stated the centrality of ‘sovereign equality’ and ‘non-interference’ in ‘domestic affairs’ as the basis for interstate relations, as opposed to the other majors' aims.

Maybe this reflect Beijing's approach to soft power, as opposed to hard power. Is it a new strategic approach by Beijing? Quite possibly.