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Showing posts with label East Asia Community. Show all posts
Showing posts with label East Asia Community. Show all posts

2010-05-19

Important context for East Asian Community and Japan-China relations

Comments on Yoshihide Soeya “An East Asian Community and Japan-China relations”, 17/05/2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/05/17/an-east-asian-community-and-japan-china-relations/comment-page-1/#comment-118099

It is encouraging to note the author also acknowledged that "of course, there are still modern elements in Japanese society and politics, which particularly tend to surface in an emotional vicious cycle over historical and territorial issues between Japan and China."

However, an important context that the author didn't say is the military alliance between Japan and the United States that is the most significant modern element (to borrow a word from the author) in Japanese society and politics.

Yes, it is true that Japan does not have the same military spending as a share of the GDP as China does. No one denies that fact.

Isn't that modern element part of the equation and the key to that situation?

How much military spending in the US? How many times is that of China's?

Has Japan ever seriously criticised the US for its military spending or its modern elements of diplomacy and international politics?

Has Japan ever seriously thought about to terminate the military alliance and remove the US military bases from its territory? That is to say, has Japan ever really stay away with those modern elements from Japanese society and politics?

One is left to wonder what relevance the author's arguments are if the most important issues or elements are omitted from the discussion.

A more direct question is why a piece of academic analysis has left those important elements out in the first place?

Was it due to negligence or deliberation?

2010-05-10

Consistency is needed!

Comments on K Kesavapany “ASEAN+8 – A recipe for a new regional architecture”, 8/05/2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/05/08/asean8-a-recipe-for-a-new-regional-architecture/

K Kesavapany states correctly that "as the international centre of economic gravity moves towards East Asia, the challenge for the region is to develop a new architecture commensurate with its growing role in world affairs."

K Kesavapany argues that although "East Asia countries are well-represented in the Group of 20, the G20 is not, and cannot by its nature be envisaged as, an East Asian organisation. The Asian voices are matched, if not overwhelmed, by those of the United States; Canada, Brazil, Mexico and Argentina from the Americas; the European Union; the individual European countries of Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy; the great Eurasian power called Russia; Turkey, another Eurasian country; Saudi Arabia, the leader of the oil-producing world; and South Africa.

The G20 is a global organisation that seeks to reflect the existing balance of economic power. It is certainly necessary, but it is difficult to see how it could reflect the aspirations and responsibilities of an ascendant East Asia."

Those are obviously correct and excellent analyses that I would agree.

K Kesavapany then seems to have made a sudden yet smooth enough 180 degree turn, turning the back to the East Asia Summit concept and embracing to the ASEAN+8 concept.

Many people may be confused by the different ideas or proposals in East Asia, ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6, Asia Pacific Community, now ASEAN+8.

Let's remind people what ASEAN+8 and EAS mean:

ASEAN+8 = ASEAN, Australia, China, Japan, India, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea the United States.

SAS = members from East Asian countries.

I am not sure that people are now totally confused by the logic and rationale K Kesavapany uses.

If continuing K Kesavapany's earlier arguments, one would certainly expect that the EAS, as opposed to ASEAN+8 would be chosen by K Kesavapany to represent the voice of East Asia, but that is not so.

One would probably feel some inherent inconsistency in the development of K Kesavapany's arguments and conclusion.

It would be helpful if that inconsistency could be avoided.

2010-04-09

Meaning of being open and inclusive

Comments on Tommy Koh “Building fraternity amongst East Asian states”, 8/04/2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/04/08/building-fraternity-amongst-east-asian-states/

Tommy Koh's idea of focusing on the future and letting go of the past is excellent.

The idea of open and inclusiveness is interesting and needs better definition.

Being open and inclusive does not equate to that the East Asian Community can be the United Nations.

One needs to be practical and work with a well defined concept, rather than being confused or attempting too much in the name of open and inclusiveness.

That is not the right approach.

2010-04-05

Develop an institutional framework for an East Asian community

Comments on Satoshi Amako “China as a ‘Great Power’ and East Asian integration”, 4/04/2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/04/04/china-as-a-great-power-and-east-asian-integration/

This article appears to be fairly constructive, although some of its views may clearly be outdated and incorrect, such as the characterisation of the “Chinese conception of world order”.

I would focus on what is likely to be more important to a successful East Asian community that will benefit all East Asian countries including China.

I regard it extremely important to develop a representative, democratic, dynamic and flexible regional governing mechanism that recognises both national sovereignty and contributions, that is fair representation, responsibility and accountability.

To that end, nations should have open dialogues and discussions.

I think the current political system of representative and senate mechanism has some attraction.

The representative half is good for representation of contributions and population, hence responsibility and accountability. The senate half recognises the sovereignty irrespective a nation's size. A combination of these two should be flexible enough to accommodate the needs of every member.

The concern of a Chinese hegemony in an East Asian community can be addressed in that framework. The rights and interest of small and smaller nations can be safeguarded.

Having said that, I would argue that can only act as a default or fall back position. Nations should seek to develop an even better and more superior system for an effective and beneficial regional community.

2010-03-22

Academia ideal and political reality

Comments on Joel Rathus “Japan’s early moves on the East Asian Community”, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/03/21/japans-early-moves-on-the-east-asian-community/

I assume that the first meeting has not finished, but the second one has and got its consensus already.

It would be equally interesting to see what comes from the first meeting and what kind of consensus it may reach.

It may be expected that it would be easier to start with what those key members in common, that is, a common denominator, given the lack of progress for so long, irrespective consensus or lack of consensus, among academia or officials.

Academia may have very nice ideas, but sometimes those ideas lacks practical support, or in another word, impractical.

There seems a need for a balance between ideal and practical.

Don't be distracted by others

Comments on Kyung-Tae Lee “Where is the East Asian Community going?” 21/03/2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/03/21/where-is-the-east-asian-community-going/

While some of the proposals may on their own have some merits, some of them may have acted as distractions and have the effect to hinder the progress of establishing an East Asia community.

East Asian countries need to unite and have in mind a common regional interest that assists its members' interests.

They need to look forward, as opposed to look backward.

Some issues should be left as bygone as bygone, and people should be focused on the common interest that will be better for every member from Pareto efficiency point of view, if I can borrow a jargon.

It may be easier to start with a common denominator to establish the core, and then keep the community open to legitimate members, as long as they share the chart for the community.

Asain affairs are for Asians to decide

Comments on Peter Drysdale “Japan and the East Asian Community – Weekly editorial”, 22/03/2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/03/22/japan-and-the-east-asian-community-weekly-editorial/

With all respect, Asia and East Asia do not need to be US centric.

They can live by their own as a region.

They have enough weight and strength to be equal with EU or the US.

They need to think and act as a region, not a handicap.

It is interesting but not always helpful to naturally link to the US when people discuss about Asia, or East Asia.

People should not always live in the past. They need to look into the future.

Further, it is especially unhelpful for outsiders to tell Asia or East Asia what they should do for their own affairs.

Whether the US wishes to be everywhere and stay in Asia or East Asia's affairs should not be a key issue for Asians to consider their future.

2009-10-14

Who will benefit from regional leadership rivalries?

Comments on Aurelia George-Mulgan “Hatoyama’s East Asia Community and regional leadership rivalries”, 13/10/2009, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/10/13/hatoyamas-east-asia-community/

A couple of comments.
First, it is interesting that why an East Asian community should include non-East Asian nations to begin with. If it is open regionalism, why should it be called East Asian as opposed to Asian community?
Second, from a strategic point of view, it would be interesting to see which, Japan or China, will benefit from delaying an East Asian Community. This is especially pertinent in the context of the so called G2 potentially. In that context, there is no middle powers represented.

2009-10-13

I am optimistic about an East Asia Community

Comments on Joel Rathus “East Asia Community: Little chance of a breakthrough at the Trilateral Summit”, 11/10/2009, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/10/11/east-asia-community-little-chance-of-a-breakthrough-at-the-trilateral-summit/comment-page-1/#comment-66931

From the article one gets a sense that although the processes are slow, it is progressing and it will not be surprising that East Asia Community comes to shape in the not too distant future, although the author appears to be pessimistic and dismissive.

Let's look at the three reasons Rathus used for the pessimism.

"Firstly, at the global level, movement towards an EAC must be understood as game played between the great powers, China and the US. Japan and Korea are better understood as middle powers, allied with the US but with an option to exit in favour of a China-led regional order under the EAC. With the US demonstrating a greater desire to take Asia seriously and on its own terms (signing of the TAC), it seems unlikely that Japan and Korea will do any more than explore with China the ‘exit’ option."

It is noted that China is half of the G2 and is more willing to endorse the EAC. So the picture is really different from what Rathus sees.

"Secondly, at the regional level, the Trilateral Summit looks inward, rather than outward, focusing on coordination and cooperation amongst themselves rather than joint-leadership of a wider East Asia, and, even here, successes have been shallow. Agreements reached at the Summit thus far have been in the fields of environmental protection, health and cultural exchange – i.e. of a ‘low-hanging fruit’ variety. Whereas agreement on substantive matters such as deeper economic integration has so far been elusive, with the three-party Free Trade Agreement proposed, studied (then studied again) but resulting in no further action."

It is a natural process for the big three among the potential EAC members to be in sync themselves before they can launch a bigger community, isn't it? That is not necessarily "inward looking". So the implications are also different from what Rathus got.

"Thirdly, domestic forces within at least two of the three parties still conspire against a ‘European moment in East Asia’."

Let's talk about Japan first. Rathus sees A FTA with China may present a problem at the moment. But the question is that is a Japan-China FTA a precondition for an EAC? It is likely to be not. Second, an EAC is broader than the three themselves, and EAC integration does not necessarily mean an immediate FTA. So there is no implication of FTA for the EAC, at least at the moment if that is what Rathus is concerned with. What Rathus sees as obstacles is in fact no obstacle at all.

Now let's turn to Korea, the other member that Rathus mention. Rathus says: "In fact, despite its own rhetoric, Korea’s position is very similar to Japan – regional community is a limited interest at best." We have shown that it is not a problem for Japan, so naturally it will not be a problem for Korea either.

To conclude, the same facts, there are quite different implications that can be drawn. I have derived quite different implications based on Rathus' argued reasons.I won't cast a judgement whose are correct, for now.