Comments on the comments by Dennis on "Time to tap Russia and China on North Korean denuclearisation"by Akanksha Sharma, 16/08/2015
The remark by Dennis that "... and China will never put any serious pressure on North Korea to give up their nukes for fear that N Korea will collapse", to the most may be partially correct and possibly very misleading. Yes, China probably does not wish to see the North Korea collapse, but it is not in China's interest to see North Korea really becomes a nuclear power, given its ramifications for geopolitical balance and the excuses the US and Japan use to station missile defence systems in East Asian countries. However, one should not overstate the influence of China on North Korea, given the wayward and unpredictable behaviour of the latter. China has been embarrassed by North Korea many times in recent years.
The predication that North Korea is in its end stage is likely to be a pure speculation and may not turn out to be true. Certainly it is premature to rely hopes on such a speculation. If that was true, then why is there an urgent need to persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear power? We could all just simply wait for its collapse and then rid off its nuclear bombs.
The US should probably not station any troops in the Korean peninsular at all as opposed to not station in the North as you argued.
PS: Dennis made a reply to my comments and as a result, I made the following reply (22:23 pm, 18/08/2015):
I am sure both the South Korean and the Japanese leaders know much better than you in terms of what is best for their respective countries. They should know far better what is in their own countries' interests. It would be arrogant to assume they don't know. I am not sure either country wishes to have become a nuclear power either with or without the persuasion from the US.
Further I am not sure that China didn't apply pressure to North Korea to stop nuclear testing. The public records indicate China did, contrary to your claim that it didn't. Simply ask a question, given Beijing could become a target of North Korea's nuclear missiles, is that in China's interest to not pressure for the North to stop testing?
There is a simple sanity test here.
Showing posts with label Korea peninsular. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Korea peninsular. Show all posts
2011-04-11
When will US withdraw its troops from Korea peninsular?
Comments on Robert Edwin Kelly “Comparing North Korea to East Germany”, 9/04/2011, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/04/09/comparing-north-korea-to-east-germany/
Should the two Koreas be unified and given China's the relationships with the Koreas, why will there be any need for the US to have its troops stayed in Korea at all?
Let's acknowledge it, China has not stayed its troops in North Korea since the truce in the peninsular and the US has had its troops there.
The former USSR collapsed and the cold war has ended now for over 20 years. The US still has its troops in the peninsular
So how long will US troops stay in there and what its purpose will be and who will they be against?
Whether the Koreas are unified or not, or when they will do so, there is always the question: when will the US withdraw its troops from the peninsular to both symbolically and really actually contribute to a more stable and peaceful Northeast Asia and East Asia?
It is ridiculous for the US to use its military bases in East Asia to conduct spy missions over other countries. Would the US accept others to do the same spy missions using planes or ships around it?
If this is what the US means for China to follow the rules, is that a just requirement?
You have the military power to project forces to anywhere in the world.
You have military bases bordering others.
You have nuclear arsenals to destroy the world many times over and you have the means to deliver those weapons in very short time to anywhere.
You have much superior technologies in nearly every combat areas.
You have invaded so many countries, for one reason or another, including Iraq that was pre-emptively conducted and is still going on.
You constantly spy on others.
You also bombed China's embassy.
You harassed China's ship in international waters.
So still, you want others to follow this rule forever?
Should the two Koreas be unified and given China's the relationships with the Koreas, why will there be any need for the US to have its troops stayed in Korea at all?
Let's acknowledge it, China has not stayed its troops in North Korea since the truce in the peninsular and the US has had its troops there.
The former USSR collapsed and the cold war has ended now for over 20 years. The US still has its troops in the peninsular
So how long will US troops stay in there and what its purpose will be and who will they be against?
Whether the Koreas are unified or not, or when they will do so, there is always the question: when will the US withdraw its troops from the peninsular to both symbolically and really actually contribute to a more stable and peaceful Northeast Asia and East Asia?
It is ridiculous for the US to use its military bases in East Asia to conduct spy missions over other countries. Would the US accept others to do the same spy missions using planes or ships around it?
If this is what the US means for China to follow the rules, is that a just requirement?
You have the military power to project forces to anywhere in the world.
You have military bases bordering others.
You have nuclear arsenals to destroy the world many times over and you have the means to deliver those weapons in very short time to anywhere.
You have much superior technologies in nearly every combat areas.
You have invaded so many countries, for one reason or another, including Iraq that was pre-emptively conducted and is still going on.
You constantly spy on others.
You also bombed China's embassy.
You harassed China's ship in international waters.
So still, you want others to follow this rule forever?
2011-01-11
Sometimes facts and claims hard to distinguish
Comments on Yuriko Koike “Cold War with China is not inevitable”, 11/01/2011, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/opinion/cold-war-with-china-is-not-inevitable/story-e6frg6zo-1225984624335
While the article's conclusion or intention is good and should be applauded, some of the materials presented in the article are confusing.
For example, Yuriko Koike states the following “It is this grim history that makes China's present disregard for Deng Xiaoping's maxim that China "disguise its ambition and hide its claws" so worrying for Asian leaders from New Delhi to Seoul and from Tokyo to Jakarta. From its refusal to condemn North Korea's unprovoked sinking of the South Korean warship, Cheonan, and shelling of South Korean islands, to its claims of sovereignty over various Japanese, Vietnamese, Malaysian and Philippine archipelagos and newly conjured claims on India's province of Arunachal Pradesh, China has revealed a neo-imperial swagger.”
Those claims had been there, just as the countries on the other side on the disputed territories have also maintained their claims. They are disputed territories and have some history with them. To be fair, there are some territories that are under China’s control but also claimed by some other countries including some of the above mentioned ones.
Yuriko Koike’s presentation makes the claims as if new claims. Further, his characterisation those claims as revealing a neo-imperial swagger is completely wrong, just as any saying that the other sides are neo-imperial by maintaining their claiming of some of China’s held territories would be wrong.
Further, to include China’s “refusal to condemn North Korea's unprovoked sinking of the South Korean warship, Cheonan, and shelling of South Korean islands” as part of the basis of the argument is at least one sided and potentially biased. While most western countries accept the argument that North Korea's sank of the South Korean warship, Cheonan, China and some other countries have not accepted that as a fact. If one is not sure, then how can you condemn North Korea as the culprit?
Equally, the “shelling of South Korean islands” by North Korea is a fact given that it did not deny it, but which side was the first culprit is still unclear. The two sides have blamed the other side to have provoked the chain incidents.
Clearly South Korea has conducted many military drills very close to the borders with the North. For a truly independent observer, it is indeed difficult to simply accept the South’s claim, or the North’s for that matter for the same basic reason.
PS: I don't believe that Yuriko Koike is deliberately misleading in his post, it may have been a result of simply accepting one-sided arguments or claims.
While the article's conclusion or intention is good and should be applauded, some of the materials presented in the article are confusing.
For example, Yuriko Koike states the following “It is this grim history that makes China's present disregard for Deng Xiaoping's maxim that China "disguise its ambition and hide its claws" so worrying for Asian leaders from New Delhi to Seoul and from Tokyo to Jakarta. From its refusal to condemn North Korea's unprovoked sinking of the South Korean warship, Cheonan, and shelling of South Korean islands, to its claims of sovereignty over various Japanese, Vietnamese, Malaysian and Philippine archipelagos and newly conjured claims on India's province of Arunachal Pradesh, China has revealed a neo-imperial swagger.”
Those claims had been there, just as the countries on the other side on the disputed territories have also maintained their claims. They are disputed territories and have some history with them. To be fair, there are some territories that are under China’s control but also claimed by some other countries including some of the above mentioned ones.
Yuriko Koike’s presentation makes the claims as if new claims. Further, his characterisation those claims as revealing a neo-imperial swagger is completely wrong, just as any saying that the other sides are neo-imperial by maintaining their claiming of some of China’s held territories would be wrong.
Further, to include China’s “refusal to condemn North Korea's unprovoked sinking of the South Korean warship, Cheonan, and shelling of South Korean islands” as part of the basis of the argument is at least one sided and potentially biased. While most western countries accept the argument that North Korea's sank of the South Korean warship, Cheonan, China and some other countries have not accepted that as a fact. If one is not sure, then how can you condemn North Korea as the culprit?
Equally, the “shelling of South Korean islands” by North Korea is a fact given that it did not deny it, but which side was the first culprit is still unclear. The two sides have blamed the other side to have provoked the chain incidents.
Clearly South Korea has conducted many military drills very close to the borders with the North. For a truly independent observer, it is indeed difficult to simply accept the South’s claim, or the North’s for that matter for the same basic reason.
PS: I don't believe that Yuriko Koike is deliberately misleading in his post, it may have been a result of simply accepting one-sided arguments or claims.
2010-12-21
A nonsensical logic from Huisten
Comments on Ron Huisten “China and the DPRK: With friends like these….”, 20/12/2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/12/20/china-and-the-dprk-with-friends-like-these/#more-15928
Ron Huisten's blame of China for the current situations of the Korean peninsula simply ignores the fact that China has had no troops stayed in the peninsular since the truce of the war while the US has a strong presence in South Korea.
He also ignores the fact South Korea is much stronger than the North economically and in terms of larger population.
What about tactic nuclear arsenals sometimes on the peninsular by the stronger side?
So how balanced or convincing is Ron Huisten's analysis, or more correctly speculation?
Let's look at one example from his post: At least the revelation from the Wikileaks was based on more certain factors than Ron Huisten's pure speculation on what China might have done, re, "It is even possible that Beijing did go down this path ("to revitalise the security assurances that prevailed in the Cold War days would be rejected by Pyongyang and involve a massive loss of face for Beijing") and was rejected, and that we simply do not know about it."
How could an analyst engage in such pure speculation with no fact whatsoever?
Further, Ron Huisten states “The evidence available to us indicates that China made no attempt to test the option of security assurances as a means of diverting Pyongyang’s nuclear program.”
Let’s leave aside this assertion for the time being. However, what security assurance is he talking about, given that the US and the coalition of the willing has invaded Iraq out of false security information of the so called WMD?
In such an environment, few can be sure China’s security given that the US bombed it embassy in Serbia and killed its diplomatic personnel, the US spying planes flew at the Chinese border and its intimidation of Chinese cargoes at open seas and its encircling of China, how could China be able to convince the North Korea that its security can be guaranteed?
If the following statement by Ron Huisten is true, then it directly contradicts the point Ron Huisten argued in his post, namely, “Beijing may have calculated, at least for a time, that the risks of being dragged into a war by its unpredictable neighbour were too great.”
“This acquiescence eroded to breaking point over the course of 2010 with the US eventually signalling its assessment that China has ‘enabled’ Pyongyang in bringing the peninsula closer to renewed conflict than it has been for decades.”
It is an interesting but also appalling piece, I am afraid to say.
PS: Why doesn't Ron Huisten advocate for the US to offer security guarantee, such as withdrawal of, or reducing its troops in exchange for North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons program? Wouldn't that security guarantee be much more effective than what he said about a Chinese offering?
PS: I note that my comments were not shown in the EastAisaforum site, as of late 21/12/2010.
It is interesting but regrettable that my comments are not shown.
In my view, the post is very much biased in its analysis and selective use of facts and using speculations or assertion.
Not allowing comments to point that out is not a good sign.
It has the effect of promoting and perpetuating that particular view!
Is that what the forum moderators want or wish to do?
Ron Huisten's blame of China for the current situations of the Korean peninsula simply ignores the fact that China has had no troops stayed in the peninsular since the truce of the war while the US has a strong presence in South Korea.
He also ignores the fact South Korea is much stronger than the North economically and in terms of larger population.
What about tactic nuclear arsenals sometimes on the peninsular by the stronger side?
So how balanced or convincing is Ron Huisten's analysis, or more correctly speculation?
Let's look at one example from his post: At least the revelation from the Wikileaks was based on more certain factors than Ron Huisten's pure speculation on what China might have done, re, "It is even possible that Beijing did go down this path ("to revitalise the security assurances that prevailed in the Cold War days would be rejected by Pyongyang and involve a massive loss of face for Beijing") and was rejected, and that we simply do not know about it."
How could an analyst engage in such pure speculation with no fact whatsoever?
Further, Ron Huisten states “The evidence available to us indicates that China made no attempt to test the option of security assurances as a means of diverting Pyongyang’s nuclear program.”
Let’s leave aside this assertion for the time being. However, what security assurance is he talking about, given that the US and the coalition of the willing has invaded Iraq out of false security information of the so called WMD?
In such an environment, few can be sure China’s security given that the US bombed it embassy in Serbia and killed its diplomatic personnel, the US spying planes flew at the Chinese border and its intimidation of Chinese cargoes at open seas and its encircling of China, how could China be able to convince the North Korea that its security can be guaranteed?
If the following statement by Ron Huisten is true, then it directly contradicts the point Ron Huisten argued in his post, namely, “Beijing may have calculated, at least for a time, that the risks of being dragged into a war by its unpredictable neighbour were too great.”
“This acquiescence eroded to breaking point over the course of 2010 with the US eventually signalling its assessment that China has ‘enabled’ Pyongyang in bringing the peninsula closer to renewed conflict than it has been for decades.”
It is an interesting but also appalling piece, I am afraid to say.
PS: Why doesn't Ron Huisten advocate for the US to offer security guarantee, such as withdrawal of, or reducing its troops in exchange for North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons program? Wouldn't that security guarantee be much more effective than what he said about a Chinese offering?
PS: I note that my comments were not shown in the EastAisaforum site, as of late 21/12/2010.
It is interesting but regrettable that my comments are not shown.
In my view, the post is very much biased in its analysis and selective use of facts and using speculations or assertion.
Not allowing comments to point that out is not a good sign.
It has the effect of promoting and perpetuating that particular view!
Is that what the forum moderators want or wish to do?
2010-12-16
Hemmings' poor analysis of the Korean penisular
Comments on John Hemmings “A rational suggestion regarding North Korea”, 16/12/2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/12/15/a-rational-suggestion-regarding-north-korea/
This is by far the most moralistic approach based on ideal by a bystander on the one hand, and extremely irresponsible bordering humanitarian disaster on the other.
However, there is no guarantee that what John Hemmings proposes is workable or even as good as the one he despises as not working.
It is a biased analysis and a dangerous advocate for an extremely risky experiment that has little prospect to succeed but is destined to fail.
This is when people get desperate and attempt to try anything irrespective what it is!
This is by far the most moralistic approach based on ideal by a bystander on the one hand, and extremely irresponsible bordering humanitarian disaster on the other.
However, there is no guarantee that what John Hemmings proposes is workable or even as good as the one he despises as not working.
It is a biased analysis and a dangerous advocate for an extremely risky experiment that has little prospect to succeed but is destined to fail.
This is when people get desperate and attempt to try anything irrespective what it is!
2010-11-25
Sheridan confused logic
Comments on Greg Sheridan “Attack dog again crosses red line”, 25/11/2010, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/opinion/attack-dog-again-crosses-red-line/story-e6frg6zo-1225960447172
Greg Sheridan often has some interesting but strange views on foreign affairs. For example, his second point (of realities) states "Two, China bears a great deal of responsibility for what is happening."
He elaborated later on the reasons as: "Second conclusion: China's responsibility. Rudd has focused on the need for Beijing to exercise maximum influence and restraint on North Korea. It would be unreasonable to hold Beijing responsible for every act of murder and insanity that Pyongyang undertakes. But it was instructive that Beijing prevented the UN from officially concluding that North Korea sank the Cheonan."
From this Sheridan was using the Cheonan as the basis, although he started with Rudd's call "for Beijing to exercise maximum influence and restraint on North Korea".
But I am afraid that Sheridan is having a confused logic here. Does Sheridan mean that had China adopted a different stance for the Cheonan incident North Korea would have not shelled the recent round?
It is interesting to see that the foreign affairs editor of The Australian has so little knowledge on regional international affairs and employ false and confused logic.
His biased and misleading views on foreign affairs appear to reflect an outdated mentality of the cold war era.
Cold war has long gone, but some legacies still linger on with some people. One reason may be that some people find it hard to learn new skills for the changed time, so they have to use what they have had.
Greg Sheridan often has some interesting but strange views on foreign affairs. For example, his second point (of realities) states "Two, China bears a great deal of responsibility for what is happening."
He elaborated later on the reasons as: "Second conclusion: China's responsibility. Rudd has focused on the need for Beijing to exercise maximum influence and restraint on North Korea. It would be unreasonable to hold Beijing responsible for every act of murder and insanity that Pyongyang undertakes. But it was instructive that Beijing prevented the UN from officially concluding that North Korea sank the Cheonan."
From this Sheridan was using the Cheonan as the basis, although he started with Rudd's call "for Beijing to exercise maximum influence and restraint on North Korea".
But I am afraid that Sheridan is having a confused logic here. Does Sheridan mean that had China adopted a different stance for the Cheonan incident North Korea would have not shelled the recent round?
It is interesting to see that the foreign affairs editor of The Australian has so little knowledge on regional international affairs and employ false and confused logic.
His biased and misleading views on foreign affairs appear to reflect an outdated mentality of the cold war era.
Cold war has long gone, but some legacies still linger on with some people. One reason may be that some people find it hard to learn new skills for the changed time, so they have to use what they have had.
2010-07-27
Rising tensions surrounding the Korea peninsular
Comments on Rowan Callick “Cheonan sinking brings larger spat to surface”, 27/07/2010, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/opinion/cheonan-sinking-brings-larger-spat-to-surface/story-e6frg7e6-1225897171800
While many may think it was North Korea that sank the Korean warship based on what the so called international investigation, it is by no means certain that was conclusively the case.
Was the international investigation completely neutral and unbiased? Were there any North Koreans, Chinese or Russians included in that international investigation team, or at least as observers in the investigation?
Why did the Korean government said shortly after the sinking that was quite different from the investigation report's result?
What were the likely motives for the North to do that, should the investigation result be correct?
While we may have no reasons not to believe the investigation result, the Chinese may have every reason to be suspect of it.
There are no short of history that the truth of a significant event was never clear at the time.
While many may think it was North Korea that sank the Korean warship based on what the so called international investigation, it is by no means certain that was conclusively the case.
Was the international investigation completely neutral and unbiased? Were there any North Koreans, Chinese or Russians included in that international investigation team, or at least as observers in the investigation?
Why did the Korean government said shortly after the sinking that was quite different from the investigation report's result?
What were the likely motives for the North to do that, should the investigation result be correct?
While we may have no reasons not to believe the investigation result, the Chinese may have every reason to be suspect of it.
There are no short of history that the truth of a significant event was never clear at the time.
2010-07-26
How can real progress be made on denuclearisation in the Korea peninsular?
Comments on Geoffrey K. See “An East Asian development fund for North Korea?” 25/07/2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/07/25/an-east-asian-development-fund-for-north-korea/
The issue of North Korea has been in a vicious cycle: it is weak and becomes weaker and weaker and worries about its own security and survival; as a result, it has been developing nuclear weapons; its nuclearisation led to sanctions; any dialogues have not assured North Korea's fear of its security.
It is unlikely that a North Korea development fund would be able to allay its security fears in the current international circumstance.
There is currently no mechanism for North Korea to believe its security can be guaranteed.
Until it really feels that, it is unlikely to trust such a development fund. It may feel threatened by that.
Is there any way to assure North Korea’s security and leads to its giving up nuclear weapons and programs?
Maybe the parties involved in the six parties should make a collective guarantee of the security of both Koreas and the US then withdrawal its forces from the Korea peninsular as a gesture.
The international community including global and regional powers have tried various methods and so far they have shown unsuccessful. A collective security guarantee may be the only pragmatic way to successfully resolve the tension in the Korea peninsular.
A denuclearised and stable Korea peninsular is in every party’s interest.
Once North Korea feels no external threats to its security, it may see the benefits of trade and engagement with the outside world. That may lead to its integration with the international community.
The issue of North Korea has been in a vicious cycle: it is weak and becomes weaker and weaker and worries about its own security and survival; as a result, it has been developing nuclear weapons; its nuclearisation led to sanctions; any dialogues have not assured North Korea's fear of its security.
It is unlikely that a North Korea development fund would be able to allay its security fears in the current international circumstance.
There is currently no mechanism for North Korea to believe its security can be guaranteed.
Until it really feels that, it is unlikely to trust such a development fund. It may feel threatened by that.
Is there any way to assure North Korea’s security and leads to its giving up nuclear weapons and programs?
Maybe the parties involved in the six parties should make a collective guarantee of the security of both Koreas and the US then withdrawal its forces from the Korea peninsular as a gesture.
The international community including global and regional powers have tried various methods and so far they have shown unsuccessful. A collective security guarantee may be the only pragmatic way to successfully resolve the tension in the Korea peninsular.
A denuclearised and stable Korea peninsular is in every party’s interest.
Once North Korea feels no external threats to its security, it may see the benefits of trade and engagement with the outside world. That may lead to its integration with the international community.
2009-07-16
Achieving permanent peace in the Korea peninsular
Comments on Hitoshi Tanaka “The North Korea nuclear crisis: Five guiding principles”, 14/07/2009, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/07/14/the-north-korea-nuclear-crisis-five-guiding-principles/
The essence of Tanaka’s five guiding principles seems good. They need to be applied very carefully, though. For example, while Tanaka says that “the joint statement released during the recent summit in Washington between President Obama and South Korean President Lee Myung-bak is a fine example of what is necessary” for the first principle, that is, North Korea must never be recognized as a nuclear state. However, some people say that the North sees the part on Korea unification with hostility, because it implies the vanish of the North with the style of German unification.
Secondly, it is important to have a clear consensus among all parties on how to achieve “the establishment of a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula,” under the fourth principle of “a comprehensive, negotiated settlement is the only practical way forward”. What would be such a peace regime? How would peace in the peninsular be safeguarded? Would US troops still remain in the South?
Thirdly, would the fifth principle, “the Six-Party process must continue with informal negotiations before the talks resume”, be workable and potential bilateral talks not undermine the six party approach and be used by the North to play the other members against each other? The party members need to make sure the two processes are consistent with each other.
The essence of Tanaka’s five guiding principles seems good. They need to be applied very carefully, though. For example, while Tanaka says that “the joint statement released during the recent summit in Washington between President Obama and South Korean President Lee Myung-bak is a fine example of what is necessary” for the first principle, that is, North Korea must never be recognized as a nuclear state. However, some people say that the North sees the part on Korea unification with hostility, because it implies the vanish of the North with the style of German unification.
Secondly, it is important to have a clear consensus among all parties on how to achieve “the establishment of a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula,” under the fourth principle of “a comprehensive, negotiated settlement is the only practical way forward”. What would be such a peace regime? How would peace in the peninsular be safeguarded? Would US troops still remain in the South?
Thirdly, would the fifth principle, “the Six-Party process must continue with informal negotiations before the talks resume”, be workable and potential bilateral talks not undermine the six party approach and be used by the North to play the other members against each other? The party members need to make sure the two processes are consistent with each other.
Understand North Korea?
Comments on Andrei Lankov “Pyongyang strikes back”, 15/07/2009, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/07/15/pyongyang-strikes-back/
While the arguments in this article are seemingly logic, I wonder whether there could be other explanations or reasons behind the North Korea's changing behaviour in the recent past.
It appears that there are still some unanswered questions.
I had thought it was the fault of the North's political leaderships that caused all this, but then I encountered the comments by Richard Broinowski that shed some different light, suggesting that some other parties also contributed to that (see http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/07/05/obamas-north-korea-policy-and-the-june-15-south-north-joint-declaration/#comments).
The fear of the potential destabilisation of a rich South on the North sounds attractive. But didn’t the leadership think about that during the relatively relaxed period in the first place?
Further, how the North leaderships think strategically about the future of the North? Do they really think they can hide the different realities between the two Koreas forever?
While the arguments in this article are seemingly logic, I wonder whether there could be other explanations or reasons behind the North Korea's changing behaviour in the recent past.
It appears that there are still some unanswered questions.
I had thought it was the fault of the North's political leaderships that caused all this, but then I encountered the comments by Richard Broinowski that shed some different light, suggesting that some other parties also contributed to that (see http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/07/05/obamas-north-korea-policy-and-the-june-15-south-north-joint-declaration/#comments).
The fear of the potential destabilisation of a rich South on the North sounds attractive. But didn’t the leadership think about that during the relatively relaxed period in the first place?
Further, how the North leaderships think strategically about the future of the North? Do they really think they can hide the different realities between the two Koreas forever?
2009-07-12
North Korea and US policies for the Northeast Asia region
Comments on Scott Snyder “What’s driving Pyongyang?” 11/07/2009, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/07/11/whats-driving-pyongyang/
I agree that a positive vision for the future of the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia that would clarify US expectations and intentions toward the region is extremely important not only to the North Korea nuclear and missiles issues in the short to media term, but also for the long term regional security and stability.
Ultimately, any products of cold war era should be and need to be dismantled. They include US troops in South Korea, for example.
The US president commented on Russia Prime Minister’s possible outdated thinking in terms of cold war era. The US needs to set the example in doing so and also needs to rid of cold war era thinking and doing. Otherwise, the president would not look credible when asking others to move away from cold war thinking.
The world has changed. So both former cold war foes need to change. This is especially the case for the US, given that the former USSR has long collapsed.
It seems a permanent solution to the Korea peninsular security and stability may need a collective security guarantee of the two Koreas security, and leave the door open for an eventual unification of the Koreas on their own terms, with no external pressures.
If a collective security guarantee is worked out, then there will not be any need for the US troops to stay in South Korea, because otherwise it would send wrong messages to the region and will not be in the interests of the region.
North Korea is smaller than the South in both the economy and population. If security is guaranteed, the North should reduce its military forces. That will eliminate the needs for the stay of US troops in the peninsular. One would ask what the purpose of their stay would be for.
I agree that a positive vision for the future of the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia that would clarify US expectations and intentions toward the region is extremely important not only to the North Korea nuclear and missiles issues in the short to media term, but also for the long term regional security and stability.
Ultimately, any products of cold war era should be and need to be dismantled. They include US troops in South Korea, for example.
The US president commented on Russia Prime Minister’s possible outdated thinking in terms of cold war era. The US needs to set the example in doing so and also needs to rid of cold war era thinking and doing. Otherwise, the president would not look credible when asking others to move away from cold war thinking.
The world has changed. So both former cold war foes need to change. This is especially the case for the US, given that the former USSR has long collapsed.
It seems a permanent solution to the Korea peninsular security and stability may need a collective security guarantee of the two Koreas security, and leave the door open for an eventual unification of the Koreas on their own terms, with no external pressures.
If a collective security guarantee is worked out, then there will not be any need for the US troops to stay in South Korea, because otherwise it would send wrong messages to the region and will not be in the interests of the region.
North Korea is smaller than the South in both the economy and population. If security is guaranteed, the North should reduce its military forces. That will eliminate the needs for the stay of US troops in the peninsular. One would ask what the purpose of their stay would be for.
2009-07-08
All members of the six party need to be reasonable and work together
Comments on Richard Broinowski”s comments on “Obama’s North Korea policy and the June 15 South-North Joint Declaration”, 8/07/2009, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/07/05/obamas-north-korea-policy-and-the-june-15-south-north-joint-declaration/#comments
If Richard Broinowski says is true and I don't have any reasons not to assume so, then it is disturbing to see three of the six party members (presumably in addition to whatever the North has done) to have contributed to the failures of the international efforts.
While the US, Japan and the South have tended to say that China has been too soft to the North, they perhaps need to reflect on their own strategies and their effects. The six party members all need to work together realistically and effectively, with well defined and clear objectives. No members should "violate" reached agreements.
It seems there are lessons for all members.
If Richard Broinowski says is true and I don't have any reasons not to assume so, then it is disturbing to see three of the six party members (presumably in addition to whatever the North has done) to have contributed to the failures of the international efforts.
While the US, Japan and the South have tended to say that China has been too soft to the North, they perhaps need to reflect on their own strategies and their effects. The six party members all need to work together realistically and effectively, with well defined and clear objectives. No members should "violate" reached agreements.
It seems there are lessons for all members.
2009-07-06
Respect the six party forum
Comments on Chung-in Moon “Obama’s North Korea policy and the June 15 South-North Joint Declaration”, 5/07/2009, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/07/05/obamas-north-korea-policy-and-the-june-15-south-north-joint-declaration/
If the current situation if that "the deep concern is that any military escalation might not end in a conventional military conflict as North Korea nears the possession of operational nuclear weapons", then imagine what would hold for the future if North Korea's nuclear programs are more advanced and it becomes a full nuclear power? What could international community do then if North Korea continues to act in the way as it has done recently?
The summit diplomacy by US, the two Koreas only is unlikely to work in the long term, but only generates short term confusions. While there have been short comings of the six party talks, that forum may be the only effective way to further progress the denuclearisation issue in the Korea peninsular, because Japan, China and Russia will also be affected by what will happen to North Korea and in the Korea peninsular.
It seems a little too early and premature to specify how the two Koreas should be unified at this moment. As the article states already, North Korea views the US stated support of unification on those conditions as a hostile move to foster regime transformation in the North and to facilitate ‘Korean reunification through absorption’ a la mode Germany. It is unlikely to accept that in the short term.
The issue of unification should be deferred until the denuclearisation issue has been resolved successfully. The unification issue should be left for the two Koreas to decide, but for the foreseeable future, the interests of the two sides need to be respected.
If the current situation if that "the deep concern is that any military escalation might not end in a conventional military conflict as North Korea nears the possession of operational nuclear weapons", then imagine what would hold for the future if North Korea's nuclear programs are more advanced and it becomes a full nuclear power? What could international community do then if North Korea continues to act in the way as it has done recently?
The summit diplomacy by US, the two Koreas only is unlikely to work in the long term, but only generates short term confusions. While there have been short comings of the six party talks, that forum may be the only effective way to further progress the denuclearisation issue in the Korea peninsular, because Japan, China and Russia will also be affected by what will happen to North Korea and in the Korea peninsular.
It seems a little too early and premature to specify how the two Koreas should be unified at this moment. As the article states already, North Korea views the US stated support of unification on those conditions as a hostile move to foster regime transformation in the North and to facilitate ‘Korean reunification through absorption’ a la mode Germany. It is unlikely to accept that in the short term.
The issue of unification should be deferred until the denuclearisation issue has been resolved successfully. The unification issue should be left for the two Koreas to decide, but for the foreseeable future, the interests of the two sides need to be respected.
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