Comments on Stephen Costello "US North Korea policy should acknowledge past success", 14-15 January 2016
The following are comments on the article and on some comments by others.
In hind sight, efforts of the five parties involved in the attempt to prevent and limit the North Korea’s nuclear programs achieved very little. China may need to bear a greater share of responsibility, given the reliance of North Korea on China in terms of trade and other support. However, blaming China for the current North Korea nuclear situation overstates the limited influence of China on North Korea. Further, China has probably faced with huge uncertainties in terms of how to best deal with North Korea and potential consequences of a failed state should North Korea collapse. Nevertheless, China should review its policy towards North Korea and its effects. Maybe a tough love approach is needed.
From the conventional geopolitical point of view, I would agree to the point that Chinese leaders do “have a vested interest in using the DPRK as a cushion between them and the South/USA.” Any independent minded person would say, why not?
Don’t the US have, at least from time to time, attempt to contain China? What the current US president said on at least couple of occasions, that he does not like for China to write the rules and the US’ exclusion of China in the TPP negotiations, re the TPP in the context of economics and trade?
Even in that context, China did not and does not like to see the development of the North Korea’s nuclear program that is not in China’s interests.
Any link for China’s policy to the North Korea’s nuclear program is misguided and wrong. It is to blame China but that is wrong and unlikely to be helpful.
China have probably been hoping that the North Korea leader may heed its hope not to go forward with its nuclear program, given its support to North Korea. But the later obviously has not been following China’s wish.
I would argue China’s policy amid uncertainties regarding North Korea has not achieved its objectives. It should have long ago reviewed its policy effectiveness and changed course. In real world, its never too late to adopt a better policy.
Showing posts with label Northeast Asia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Northeast Asia. Show all posts
2015-08-16
Singing swansong for North Korea now is too premature speculation
Comments on the comments by Dennis on "Time to tap Russia and China on North Korean denuclearisation"by Akanksha Sharma, 16/08/2015
The remark by Dennis that "... and China will never put any serious pressure on North Korea to give up their nukes for fear that N Korea will collapse", to the most may be partially correct and possibly very misleading. Yes, China probably does not wish to see the North Korea collapse, but it is not in China's interest to see North Korea really becomes a nuclear power, given its ramifications for geopolitical balance and the excuses the US and Japan use to station missile defence systems in East Asian countries. However, one should not overstate the influence of China on North Korea, given the wayward and unpredictable behaviour of the latter. China has been embarrassed by North Korea many times in recent years.
The predication that North Korea is in its end stage is likely to be a pure speculation and may not turn out to be true. Certainly it is premature to rely hopes on such a speculation. If that was true, then why is there an urgent need to persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear power? We could all just simply wait for its collapse and then rid off its nuclear bombs.
The US should probably not station any troops in the Korean peninsular at all as opposed to not station in the North as you argued.
PS: Dennis made a reply to my comments and as a result, I made the following reply (22:23 pm, 18/08/2015):
I am sure both the South Korean and the Japanese leaders know much better than you in terms of what is best for their respective countries. They should know far better what is in their own countries' interests. It would be arrogant to assume they don't know. I am not sure either country wishes to have become a nuclear power either with or without the persuasion from the US.
Further I am not sure that China didn't apply pressure to North Korea to stop nuclear testing. The public records indicate China did, contrary to your claim that it didn't. Simply ask a question, given Beijing could become a target of North Korea's nuclear missiles, is that in China's interest to not pressure for the North to stop testing?
There is a simple sanity test here.
The remark by Dennis that "... and China will never put any serious pressure on North Korea to give up their nukes for fear that N Korea will collapse", to the most may be partially correct and possibly very misleading. Yes, China probably does not wish to see the North Korea collapse, but it is not in China's interest to see North Korea really becomes a nuclear power, given its ramifications for geopolitical balance and the excuses the US and Japan use to station missile defence systems in East Asian countries. However, one should not overstate the influence of China on North Korea, given the wayward and unpredictable behaviour of the latter. China has been embarrassed by North Korea many times in recent years.
The predication that North Korea is in its end stage is likely to be a pure speculation and may not turn out to be true. Certainly it is premature to rely hopes on such a speculation. If that was true, then why is there an urgent need to persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear power? We could all just simply wait for its collapse and then rid off its nuclear bombs.
The US should probably not station any troops in the Korean peninsular at all as opposed to not station in the North as you argued.
PS: Dennis made a reply to my comments and as a result, I made the following reply (22:23 pm, 18/08/2015):
I am sure both the South Korean and the Japanese leaders know much better than you in terms of what is best for their respective countries. They should know far better what is in their own countries' interests. It would be arrogant to assume they don't know. I am not sure either country wishes to have become a nuclear power either with or without the persuasion from the US.
Further I am not sure that China didn't apply pressure to North Korea to stop nuclear testing. The public records indicate China did, contrary to your claim that it didn't. Simply ask a question, given Beijing could become a target of North Korea's nuclear missiles, is that in China's interest to not pressure for the North to stop testing?
There is a simple sanity test here.
2010-12-16
Hemmings' poor analysis of the Korean penisular
Comments on John Hemmings “A rational suggestion regarding North Korea”, 16/12/2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/12/15/a-rational-suggestion-regarding-north-korea/
This is by far the most moralistic approach based on ideal by a bystander on the one hand, and extremely irresponsible bordering humanitarian disaster on the other.
However, there is no guarantee that what John Hemmings proposes is workable or even as good as the one he despises as not working.
It is a biased analysis and a dangerous advocate for an extremely risky experiment that has little prospect to succeed but is destined to fail.
This is when people get desperate and attempt to try anything irrespective what it is!
This is by far the most moralistic approach based on ideal by a bystander on the one hand, and extremely irresponsible bordering humanitarian disaster on the other.
However, there is no guarantee that what John Hemmings proposes is workable or even as good as the one he despises as not working.
It is a biased analysis and a dangerous advocate for an extremely risky experiment that has little prospect to succeed but is destined to fail.
This is when people get desperate and attempt to try anything irrespective what it is!
2010-11-18
North-East Asian economic integration
Comments on Andrew Elek “North-East Asian economic integration: APEC or FTA games?” 17/11/2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/11/17/north-east-asian-economic-integration-apec-or-fta-games/
While many of Andrew's arguments are undoubtedly valid in an ideal world, he only mentioned but ignored the implications of NAFTA on other regional preferential agreements.
Further, it is difficult to understand why the three governments could not see the advantages and disadvantages of a North-East Asian FTA that Andrew has in mind.
It is a question of who failed to understand what.
While many of Andrew's arguments are undoubtedly valid in an ideal world, he only mentioned but ignored the implications of NAFTA on other regional preferential agreements.
Further, it is difficult to understand why the three governments could not see the advantages and disadvantages of a North-East Asian FTA that Andrew has in mind.
It is a question of who failed to understand what.
2010-07-30
East Asia likely to be another pillar
Comments on Amy King “China and the lessons of the past”, 29/07/2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/07/29/china-and-the-lessons-of-the-past/
While obviously it is Japan that determines and will continue to determine its foreign policy, how China behaves will also be an important factor that may have a bearing on Japan's choice.
It is in every country's interest that the Northeast Asian countries, namely China, Japan and Korea become the cornerstone of a successful East Asian community, given the sizes of their economies.
If China can't get the Northeast Asian countries close to a successful regional community, how can it become an effective and responsible global leader in the future? It has to consider what the best long term strategy should be for its position as a world leader to be consistent with its growing economy.
The idea of zero sum game by any of the key players will be unhelpful to the interests of the Northeast Asian countries.
Closer relations and further economic integration of the region is likely to become another pillar to complement the North America and Europe Union as the three most important pillars in global affairs in the 21st century.
PS: I have suggested in the past that a federation model for the reunification China and Taiwan under which each would choose its own political system. Hong Kong and Macau could be given special status under that federation. The federation's role is to strengthen the common interests of all members as a federation by coordinating matters related to national defence, external security and foreign affairs, but leave its members to run virtually almost all its internal affairs.
The model for East Asia regional organisation could be between those of the United Nations and the European Union. The European model seems to have an undesirable feature in terms of another layer of bureaucracy.
While obviously it is Japan that determines and will continue to determine its foreign policy, how China behaves will also be an important factor that may have a bearing on Japan's choice.
It is in every country's interest that the Northeast Asian countries, namely China, Japan and Korea become the cornerstone of a successful East Asian community, given the sizes of their economies.
If China can't get the Northeast Asian countries close to a successful regional community, how can it become an effective and responsible global leader in the future? It has to consider what the best long term strategy should be for its position as a world leader to be consistent with its growing economy.
The idea of zero sum game by any of the key players will be unhelpful to the interests of the Northeast Asian countries.
Closer relations and further economic integration of the region is likely to become another pillar to complement the North America and Europe Union as the three most important pillars in global affairs in the 21st century.
PS: I have suggested in the past that a federation model for the reunification China and Taiwan under which each would choose its own political system. Hong Kong and Macau could be given special status under that federation. The federation's role is to strengthen the common interests of all members as a federation by coordinating matters related to national defence, external security and foreign affairs, but leave its members to run virtually almost all its internal affairs.
The model for East Asia regional organisation could be between those of the United Nations and the European Union. The European model seems to have an undesirable feature in terms of another layer of bureaucracy.
2010-05-15
Broad context of the NK issues
Comments on Andrei Lankov “Why does China continue to support North Korea?” 14/05/2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/05/14/why-does-china-continue-to-support-north-korea/
While I may or may not share the argument, analysis and conclusions of both the author and the comments, I think the focus on China on issues related to North Korea and not to mention others is likely to be highly problematic and biased.
It is not only China but also other parties that are involved in this issue and contribute to the development of the issues and responses from North Korea, whether those responses are reasonable and rational or not.
I remember one earlier post identified that some of the failures in the six party meetings on North Korea issues including denuclearisation had been caused or at least contributed by some other party members.
Conceivably, everyone would acknowledge that North Korea would consider its own interests and those are inevitably differs from some the other parties including China's.
While the focus has been on North Korea, the full resolution of the issues from the Korea peninsular is likely to require every party to make concessions, not just North Korea, or China, or any other single member.
Only examining and analysing the issues in that broader context is it possible to be rational, sensible and practical. Anything otherwise is unlikely to be particularly productive and fruitful.
One should not be kidding oneself and others.
While I may or may not share the argument, analysis and conclusions of both the author and the comments, I think the focus on China on issues related to North Korea and not to mention others is likely to be highly problematic and biased.
It is not only China but also other parties that are involved in this issue and contribute to the development of the issues and responses from North Korea, whether those responses are reasonable and rational or not.
I remember one earlier post identified that some of the failures in the six party meetings on North Korea issues including denuclearisation had been caused or at least contributed by some other party members.
Conceivably, everyone would acknowledge that North Korea would consider its own interests and those are inevitably differs from some the other parties including China's.
While the focus has been on North Korea, the full resolution of the issues from the Korea peninsular is likely to require every party to make concessions, not just North Korea, or China, or any other single member.
Only examining and analysing the issues in that broader context is it possible to be rational, sensible and practical. Anything otherwise is unlikely to be particularly productive and fruitful.
One should not be kidding oneself and others.
2010-04-26
Northeast Asia, East Asia and Asia
Comments on Donald Emmerson “ASEAN and American engagement in East Asia”, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/04/25/asean-and-american-engagement-in-east-asia/
An important element in the East Asia region is north East Asia including China, Japan and Korea, though it has been dragged by some historical issues.
Once the three nations sort out their issues, they are likely to have much stronger influences in East Asia and Asia.
How long it will take for the three to become a more effective regional body depends on how quickly their leaders and governments will be mature enough to look into and focus on the future of their common interests as opposed to looking back at historical and being unforgiving for the past.
I think both economic and political development over the past two years are likely to promote them being embarking on a new path for much closer cooperation among themselves and then being an effective leader in Asia for Asian affairs.
North East Asia is likely to become the core of a closer and fast Asia integration and that day may come sooner than expected.
Asian integration is likely to be different from both America and Europe. It is likely to be more equal than the America model but with no monetary union as the Euro zone for a long time, given the current Greece fiscal problems.
An important element in the East Asia region is north East Asia including China, Japan and Korea, though it has been dragged by some historical issues.
Once the three nations sort out their issues, they are likely to have much stronger influences in East Asia and Asia.
How long it will take for the three to become a more effective regional body depends on how quickly their leaders and governments will be mature enough to look into and focus on the future of their common interests as opposed to looking back at historical and being unforgiving for the past.
I think both economic and political development over the past two years are likely to promote them being embarking on a new path for much closer cooperation among themselves and then being an effective leader in Asia for Asian affairs.
North East Asia is likely to become the core of a closer and fast Asia integration and that day may come sooner than expected.
Asian integration is likely to be different from both America and Europe. It is likely to be more equal than the America model but with no monetary union as the Euro zone for a long time, given the current Greece fiscal problems.
2009-07-26
Interesting Japan and its regionalism push
Comments on Takashi Terada “The rise of China: the impetus behind Japanese regionalism”, 26/07/2009, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/07/26/the-rise-of-china-the-impetus-behind-japanese-regionalism/
This is an interesting article to describe Japan's motives behind its regionalism push.
It provides some supports to the argument that Japan has been unwilling to see other developing nations to improve their living standards and catch up with Japan and be equal with it.
I remember someone blamed that China was ungrateful to Japan's aid in comments to an article earlier on. If Japan was like this, how and why could China be grateful to it?
It is complex regionalism, international economics and politics. This article can serve as a potential reference.
We need true and sincere international cooperation, not the kind of one undermining another or others.
As a by-product, this article also potentially increases the difficulties of Rudd’s push to establish an Asia Pacific Community, because it could be perceived as another tool to contain China.
All nations need to be rational and mature.
This is an interesting article to describe Japan's motives behind its regionalism push.
It provides some supports to the argument that Japan has been unwilling to see other developing nations to improve their living standards and catch up with Japan and be equal with it.
I remember someone blamed that China was ungrateful to Japan's aid in comments to an article earlier on. If Japan was like this, how and why could China be grateful to it?
It is complex regionalism, international economics and politics. This article can serve as a potential reference.
We need true and sincere international cooperation, not the kind of one undermining another or others.
As a by-product, this article also potentially increases the difficulties of Rudd’s push to establish an Asia Pacific Community, because it could be perceived as another tool to contain China.
All nations need to be rational and mature.
2009-07-16
Whatever they are from, no nuclear weapons should be in Japan
Comments on Tobias Harris “Who’s afraid of the conservatives in Japan?” 15/07/2009, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/07/15/whos-afraid-of-the-conservatives-in-japan/
While North Korea's nuclear program poses a threat to every country in the East Asia region, why does it improve Japan's security by having US nuclear weapons in Japan, given that Japan has been under the US nuclear umbrella?
It should be noted that the 1960 secret agreement was made during the cold war era, obviously. It reminds people of the Cuba missiles crisis in 1962, not too long after 1960. If it were not a secret agreement, the Cuba missiles crisis may have had been different.
How did the US take the missiles in Cuba then? Why didn't it allow them to stay there? What are the implications of having US nuclear weapons in Japan for other countries in the region? How China and Russia will react, given that the way the US reacted to the Cuba missiles? Will it be a stabilising or destabilising to the regional security?
While it is important to prevent nuclear proliferation, to have US nuclear weapons in Japan would hardly contribute to that cause.
It would be a much more serious regional security issue than just that of a reaction to the North Korea’s nuclear program and would have much wider implications. If that happens, it would have the potential to shift the focus away from North Korea to a whole new issue.
While North Korea's nuclear program poses a threat to every country in the East Asia region, why does it improve Japan's security by having US nuclear weapons in Japan, given that Japan has been under the US nuclear umbrella?
It should be noted that the 1960 secret agreement was made during the cold war era, obviously. It reminds people of the Cuba missiles crisis in 1962, not too long after 1960. If it were not a secret agreement, the Cuba missiles crisis may have had been different.
How did the US take the missiles in Cuba then? Why didn't it allow them to stay there? What are the implications of having US nuclear weapons in Japan for other countries in the region? How China and Russia will react, given that the way the US reacted to the Cuba missiles? Will it be a stabilising or destabilising to the regional security?
While it is important to prevent nuclear proliferation, to have US nuclear weapons in Japan would hardly contribute to that cause.
It would be a much more serious regional security issue than just that of a reaction to the North Korea’s nuclear program and would have much wider implications. If that happens, it would have the potential to shift the focus away from North Korea to a whole new issue.
Achieving permanent peace in the Korea peninsular
Comments on Hitoshi Tanaka “The North Korea nuclear crisis: Five guiding principles”, 14/07/2009, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/07/14/the-north-korea-nuclear-crisis-five-guiding-principles/
The essence of Tanaka’s five guiding principles seems good. They need to be applied very carefully, though. For example, while Tanaka says that “the joint statement released during the recent summit in Washington between President Obama and South Korean President Lee Myung-bak is a fine example of what is necessary” for the first principle, that is, North Korea must never be recognized as a nuclear state. However, some people say that the North sees the part on Korea unification with hostility, because it implies the vanish of the North with the style of German unification.
Secondly, it is important to have a clear consensus among all parties on how to achieve “the establishment of a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula,” under the fourth principle of “a comprehensive, negotiated settlement is the only practical way forward”. What would be such a peace regime? How would peace in the peninsular be safeguarded? Would US troops still remain in the South?
Thirdly, would the fifth principle, “the Six-Party process must continue with informal negotiations before the talks resume”, be workable and potential bilateral talks not undermine the six party approach and be used by the North to play the other members against each other? The party members need to make sure the two processes are consistent with each other.
The essence of Tanaka’s five guiding principles seems good. They need to be applied very carefully, though. For example, while Tanaka says that “the joint statement released during the recent summit in Washington between President Obama and South Korean President Lee Myung-bak is a fine example of what is necessary” for the first principle, that is, North Korea must never be recognized as a nuclear state. However, some people say that the North sees the part on Korea unification with hostility, because it implies the vanish of the North with the style of German unification.
Secondly, it is important to have a clear consensus among all parties on how to achieve “the establishment of a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula,” under the fourth principle of “a comprehensive, negotiated settlement is the only practical way forward”. What would be such a peace regime? How would peace in the peninsular be safeguarded? Would US troops still remain in the South?
Thirdly, would the fifth principle, “the Six-Party process must continue with informal negotiations before the talks resume”, be workable and potential bilateral talks not undermine the six party approach and be used by the North to play the other members against each other? The party members need to make sure the two processes are consistent with each other.
Understand North Korea?
Comments on Andrei Lankov “Pyongyang strikes back”, 15/07/2009, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/07/15/pyongyang-strikes-back/
While the arguments in this article are seemingly logic, I wonder whether there could be other explanations or reasons behind the North Korea's changing behaviour in the recent past.
It appears that there are still some unanswered questions.
I had thought it was the fault of the North's political leaderships that caused all this, but then I encountered the comments by Richard Broinowski that shed some different light, suggesting that some other parties also contributed to that (see http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/07/05/obamas-north-korea-policy-and-the-june-15-south-north-joint-declaration/#comments).
The fear of the potential destabilisation of a rich South on the North sounds attractive. But didn’t the leadership think about that during the relatively relaxed period in the first place?
Further, how the North leaderships think strategically about the future of the North? Do they really think they can hide the different realities between the two Koreas forever?
While the arguments in this article are seemingly logic, I wonder whether there could be other explanations or reasons behind the North Korea's changing behaviour in the recent past.
It appears that there are still some unanswered questions.
I had thought it was the fault of the North's political leaderships that caused all this, but then I encountered the comments by Richard Broinowski that shed some different light, suggesting that some other parties also contributed to that (see http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/07/05/obamas-north-korea-policy-and-the-june-15-south-north-joint-declaration/#comments).
The fear of the potential destabilisation of a rich South on the North sounds attractive. But didn’t the leadership think about that during the relatively relaxed period in the first place?
Further, how the North leaderships think strategically about the future of the North? Do they really think they can hide the different realities between the two Koreas forever?
2009-07-14
Interesting Japanese behaviours
Comments on Shiro Armstrong “Australia, and managing Japan’s insecurity”, 13/07/2009, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/07/13/australia-and-managing-japans-insecurity/
There are wide implications of Japan's insecurity of itself and the jealous of the rise of its neighbours. It is not just jealous, but more importantly its resistance, some may say that is probably only the least of that matter, to others development.
That is not helpful to the common good of the region. Unless Japan can realise the inevitable reality that its superior past will not last forever and it has to treat others with equal rights and respect, the others will not treat it with respect.
It is mostly a Japan issue and is up to the Japanese to resolve it. It is, however, closely watched by neighbours.
There is a saying in Chinese (maybe in Buddhism) that goes like this: you will reap good returns if you are good, and bad returns if you are bad; its not the case there will not be the due returns to you, it is that the time is not ripe yet. What returns does Japan wants to get from its behaviours?
There are wide implications of Japan's insecurity of itself and the jealous of the rise of its neighbours. It is not just jealous, but more importantly its resistance, some may say that is probably only the least of that matter, to others development.
That is not helpful to the common good of the region. Unless Japan can realise the inevitable reality that its superior past will not last forever and it has to treat others with equal rights and respect, the others will not treat it with respect.
It is mostly a Japan issue and is up to the Japanese to resolve it. It is, however, closely watched by neighbours.
There is a saying in Chinese (maybe in Buddhism) that goes like this: you will reap good returns if you are good, and bad returns if you are bad; its not the case there will not be the due returns to you, it is that the time is not ripe yet. What returns does Japan wants to get from its behaviours?
2009-07-12
North Korea and US policies for the Northeast Asia region
Comments on Scott Snyder “What’s driving Pyongyang?” 11/07/2009, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/07/11/whats-driving-pyongyang/
I agree that a positive vision for the future of the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia that would clarify US expectations and intentions toward the region is extremely important not only to the North Korea nuclear and missiles issues in the short to media term, but also for the long term regional security and stability.
Ultimately, any products of cold war era should be and need to be dismantled. They include US troops in South Korea, for example.
The US president commented on Russia Prime Minister’s possible outdated thinking in terms of cold war era. The US needs to set the example in doing so and also needs to rid of cold war era thinking and doing. Otherwise, the president would not look credible when asking others to move away from cold war thinking.
The world has changed. So both former cold war foes need to change. This is especially the case for the US, given that the former USSR has long collapsed.
It seems a permanent solution to the Korea peninsular security and stability may need a collective security guarantee of the two Koreas security, and leave the door open for an eventual unification of the Koreas on their own terms, with no external pressures.
If a collective security guarantee is worked out, then there will not be any need for the US troops to stay in South Korea, because otherwise it would send wrong messages to the region and will not be in the interests of the region.
North Korea is smaller than the South in both the economy and population. If security is guaranteed, the North should reduce its military forces. That will eliminate the needs for the stay of US troops in the peninsular. One would ask what the purpose of their stay would be for.
I agree that a positive vision for the future of the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia that would clarify US expectations and intentions toward the region is extremely important not only to the North Korea nuclear and missiles issues in the short to media term, but also for the long term regional security and stability.
Ultimately, any products of cold war era should be and need to be dismantled. They include US troops in South Korea, for example.
The US president commented on Russia Prime Minister’s possible outdated thinking in terms of cold war era. The US needs to set the example in doing so and also needs to rid of cold war era thinking and doing. Otherwise, the president would not look credible when asking others to move away from cold war thinking.
The world has changed. So both former cold war foes need to change. This is especially the case for the US, given that the former USSR has long collapsed.
It seems a permanent solution to the Korea peninsular security and stability may need a collective security guarantee of the two Koreas security, and leave the door open for an eventual unification of the Koreas on their own terms, with no external pressures.
If a collective security guarantee is worked out, then there will not be any need for the US troops to stay in South Korea, because otherwise it would send wrong messages to the region and will not be in the interests of the region.
North Korea is smaller than the South in both the economy and population. If security is guaranteed, the North should reduce its military forces. That will eliminate the needs for the stay of US troops in the peninsular. One would ask what the purpose of their stay would be for.
2009-07-08
All members of the six party need to be reasonable and work together
Comments on Richard Broinowski”s comments on “Obama’s North Korea policy and the June 15 South-North Joint Declaration”, 8/07/2009, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/07/05/obamas-north-korea-policy-and-the-june-15-south-north-joint-declaration/#comments
If Richard Broinowski says is true and I don't have any reasons not to assume so, then it is disturbing to see three of the six party members (presumably in addition to whatever the North has done) to have contributed to the failures of the international efforts.
While the US, Japan and the South have tended to say that China has been too soft to the North, they perhaps need to reflect on their own strategies and their effects. The six party members all need to work together realistically and effectively, with well defined and clear objectives. No members should "violate" reached agreements.
It seems there are lessons for all members.
If Richard Broinowski says is true and I don't have any reasons not to assume so, then it is disturbing to see three of the six party members (presumably in addition to whatever the North has done) to have contributed to the failures of the international efforts.
While the US, Japan and the South have tended to say that China has been too soft to the North, they perhaps need to reflect on their own strategies and their effects. The six party members all need to work together realistically and effectively, with well defined and clear objectives. No members should "violate" reached agreements.
It seems there are lessons for all members.
2009-07-01
Hong Kong: best place for future Asian institutions
Comments on Barry Eichengreen “Can Asia Free Itself from the IMF?” 30/06/2009, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/06/30/can-asia-free-itself-from-the-imf/
In terms of location for such an Asian financial institution, Hong Kong may be a good candidate.
Although Hong Kong is part of China, it and Macau all have a special status of special administrative regions in China. It requires “Hong Kong” Visa to visit and even mainland Chinese people are not free to visit without an appropriate travel document.
It was a British colony for a long time. It is a more neutral place than any other places in East Asia.
Hong Kong has also been a regional financial centre. So there are both physical and human infrastructures there. It is also located in the middle of East Asia geographically.
Why not make Hong Kong a permanent place for Asian institutions? Why not China and other countries negotiate to make Hong Kong such a neutral place for all Asians to benefit, with China retaining its sovereignty, but otherwise letting Hong Kong be a place as it is now for the future to come?
With huge land, it could be possible for China to make more land available for such a special region.
I think all stakeholders should consider Hong Kong as a perfect candidate.
In terms of location for such an Asian financial institution, Hong Kong may be a good candidate.
Although Hong Kong is part of China, it and Macau all have a special status of special administrative regions in China. It requires “Hong Kong” Visa to visit and even mainland Chinese people are not free to visit without an appropriate travel document.
It was a British colony for a long time. It is a more neutral place than any other places in East Asia.
Hong Kong has also been a regional financial centre. So there are both physical and human infrastructures there. It is also located in the middle of East Asia geographically.
Why not make Hong Kong a permanent place for Asian institutions? Why not China and other countries negotiate to make Hong Kong such a neutral place for all Asians to benefit, with China retaining its sovereignty, but otherwise letting Hong Kong be a place as it is now for the future to come?
With huge land, it could be possible for China to make more land available for such a special region.
I think all stakeholders should consider Hong Kong as a perfect candidate.
2009-06-24
Parties act together to achieve common goals
Comments on Peter Van Ness “Stick to the Six Party Talks on North Korea”, 23/06/2009, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/06/23/stick-to-the-six-party-talks-on-north-korea/
Peter Van Ness's article is excellent. The six party approach, supported by the UNSC, is the only practical way to deal with the challenges posed by the North Korea reckless regime.
The five party members must act together as a united front with a common aim: the denuclearisation of the Korea peninsular, peace, security and stability of the Northeast Asia region.
There are no other more effective and practical ways than the six party approach. It is in every member's interest to work to achieve the common objectives.
Peter Van Ness's article is excellent. The six party approach, supported by the UNSC, is the only practical way to deal with the challenges posed by the North Korea reckless regime.
The five party members must act together as a united front with a common aim: the denuclearisation of the Korea peninsular, peace, security and stability of the Northeast Asia region.
There are no other more effective and practical ways than the six party approach. It is in every member's interest to work to achieve the common objectives.
2009-06-18
New thinking and new strategies to denuclearisation the Korea peninsular
Comments on Ken Jimbo “Rejecting high-risk coexistence with North Korea”, 17/06/2009, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/06/17/rejecting-high-risk-coexistence-with-north-korea/comment-page-1/
This is an excellent article and Ken Jimbo has really injected new strategic thinking into considering practical options to deal with the North Korea regime and the denuclearisation in the Korea peninsular.
However, the six-party framework is important and Russia should be included as an important partner in the process, although some matters could be decided among if others if they only concern them.
There is an urgent need for a new approach to the six party talks to achieve denuclearisation in the Korea peninsular. We need practical and pragmatic strategies that really work.
The most important isue is to assure China that the other party members are with it in dealing with any challenges. If China’s is really resolute and the five are a united front, the denuclearisation issue should not be too difficult.
This is an excellent article and Ken Jimbo has really injected new strategic thinking into considering practical options to deal with the North Korea regime and the denuclearisation in the Korea peninsular.
However, the six-party framework is important and Russia should be included as an important partner in the process, although some matters could be decided among if others if they only concern them.
There is an urgent need for a new approach to the six party talks to achieve denuclearisation in the Korea peninsular. We need practical and pragmatic strategies that really work.
The most important isue is to assure China that the other party members are with it in dealing with any challenges. If China’s is really resolute and the five are a united front, the denuclearisation issue should not be too difficult.
2009-06-16
What can Japan expect from rebalancing?
Comments on Tobias Harris “Is Japan balancing?” 16/06/2009, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/06/16/is-japan-balancing/
This is another point that why there is a need to have an Asian community that collectively looks after themselves and the region as a whole. No matter what Japan does, it is likely only to represent a futile and wasteful attempt to balance or to fill the waning influences of the US in North East Asia. That will cause wasteful military race in the region and beyond.
It has been more than 60 years after the end of the Second World War and nearly 20 years after the collapse of the former USSR, the other only superpower aside the US during the cold war era. What is Japan rebalancing for? Will it effective to its so called objectives?
We need to move on from the cold war geopolitical thinking and strategies. We need a completely new approach. An Asia community or union style with collective and non-discriminative security arrangement for all members will save unnecessarily too much military spending for each of its members.
East Asia or Asia more broadly, should build on the recent momentum of its ascendance in world economic affairs to look for a more-long lasting and more-enduring regional development, stability and security. Through managing well its own regional affairs, Asia can contribute to a better world.
This is another point that why there is a need to have an Asian community that collectively looks after themselves and the region as a whole. No matter what Japan does, it is likely only to represent a futile and wasteful attempt to balance or to fill the waning influences of the US in North East Asia. That will cause wasteful military race in the region and beyond.
It has been more than 60 years after the end of the Second World War and nearly 20 years after the collapse of the former USSR, the other only superpower aside the US during the cold war era. What is Japan rebalancing for? Will it effective to its so called objectives?
We need to move on from the cold war geopolitical thinking and strategies. We need a completely new approach. An Asia community or union style with collective and non-discriminative security arrangement for all members will save unnecessarily too much military spending for each of its members.
East Asia or Asia more broadly, should build on the recent momentum of its ascendance in world economic affairs to look for a more-long lasting and more-enduring regional development, stability and security. Through managing well its own regional affairs, Asia can contribute to a better world.
Asia is the third pillar in world economy and needs its own representatives
second Comments on Gary Hawke “The Asia Pacific Community: objectives, not institutions”, 15/06/2009, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/06/15/the-asia-pacific-community-objectives-not-institutions/
I can just add some economic information to the debate. I just have a look at the CIA country information about its estimated purchasing power parity (PPP) data of a number of countries and got the following information (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/).
The PPPs for 2008 were $17.2 trillion for the North America (US, Canada and Mexico), $14.82 trillion for the heavy weights in EU (Germany, UK, Italy, France) and $14.43 trillion for North East Asia (Japan, China, Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan).
With other dynamic developing economies coming along in Asia, especially noticeable India, and the rapid growth of the Chinese economy, Asia is really becoming the third pillar, together with the US and EU, in the world economy.
What this means is that it would be better if it is possible to have some sort of Asian regional organisations to coordinate their common efforts and represent their interest in the world affairs. After all, Asia has about two thirds of world population, with two countries each having more than a billion population.
A peaceful, stable and more prosperous Asia will contribute to a better world.
No matter it is population, geographical size, or economic weights, Asia is an important continent. it needs its own voices and representatives in the world affairs.
I can just add some economic information to the debate. I just have a look at the CIA country information about its estimated purchasing power parity (PPP) data of a number of countries and got the following information (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/).
The PPPs for 2008 were $17.2 trillion for the North America (US, Canada and Mexico), $14.82 trillion for the heavy weights in EU (Germany, UK, Italy, France) and $14.43 trillion for North East Asia (Japan, China, Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan).
With other dynamic developing economies coming along in Asia, especially noticeable India, and the rapid growth of the Chinese economy, Asia is really becoming the third pillar, together with the US and EU, in the world economy.
What this means is that it would be better if it is possible to have some sort of Asian regional organisations to coordinate their common efforts and represent their interest in the world affairs. After all, Asia has about two thirds of world population, with two countries each having more than a billion population.
A peaceful, stable and more prosperous Asia will contribute to a better world.
No matter it is population, geographical size, or economic weights, Asia is an important continent. it needs its own voices and representatives in the world affairs.
2009-06-08
Hard and effective sanctions against DPRK are the only way left
Comments on Ron Huisken “Is Pyongyang reacting to or shaping events?” 6/06/2009, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/06/06/is-pyongyang-reacting-to-or-shaping-events/
It is disappointing that the UNSC has been so slow in coming up with a new sanction resolution. The slowness and indecisiveness of UNSC may create an impression that the international community is unable to effectively deal with DPRK and its missile and nuclear tests. That is unfortunate, no matter who have been holding up the UNSC process.
China should realise that it has lost its kind and subtle influence over DPRK and continue its past strategies will not work. DPRK appears to have got an upper hand over whatever China’s strategies in the six party talks have been. It can only be forced to the negotiation table through hard and effective sanctions. So China needs to fundamentally reconsider its approaches. Fearing the implications of the collapse of DPRK can only encourage it to act more reckless and ignore anyone’s advice.
There should no longer be any illusions over the current DPRK leadership. The solidarity of the international community is the only way to deal with DPRK reckless gambles to take the advantages created by any inconsistency within the international community.
It is disappointing that the UNSC has been so slow in coming up with a new sanction resolution. The slowness and indecisiveness of UNSC may create an impression that the international community is unable to effectively deal with DPRK and its missile and nuclear tests. That is unfortunate, no matter who have been holding up the UNSC process.
China should realise that it has lost its kind and subtle influence over DPRK and continue its past strategies will not work. DPRK appears to have got an upper hand over whatever China’s strategies in the six party talks have been. It can only be forced to the negotiation table through hard and effective sanctions. So China needs to fundamentally reconsider its approaches. Fearing the implications of the collapse of DPRK can only encourage it to act more reckless and ignore anyone’s advice.
There should no longer be any illusions over the current DPRK leadership. The solidarity of the international community is the only way to deal with DPRK reckless gambles to take the advantages created by any inconsistency within the international community.
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