Comments on Nathan Attrill "China’s leadership model goes back to the future", 22/04/2016
Just as voters in any countries may choose different parties if they have the freedom to choose, the Chinese people may change their views about their political leaders, both past and present.
For example, when people see continually increasing inequality even in the context of huge economic growth, as well as rampant corruption over the past 20 years or so, many and possibly the majority may have fond memories of the Mao era when there was little corruption and people were virtually equal in income even though everyone was poor, equally poor.
The Chinese also would like to have more freedom, that is for sure. Equally, they are likely to prefer a strong, and just, government.
People outside China need to understand the whole of Chinese people, their way of lives and their way of thinking. There is no point to lecturing them in our own way.
Commenting on the comments
by RICHARD22ND APRIL, 2016, 7:33 AM
The two upheavals you said were facts and there is no question about it. The first one, the so called Great Leap Forward, however, was not the fault only of Mao even though he should have the greatest responsibility to it. It was the collective work of the then whole leadership including Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoqi, with Mao as the top leader. Most people in the leadership were carried away by the huge success of its first 5-years plan and thought, wrongly though, they could accelerate the development in China.
There was an interesting contrast between China and Japan while the latter had two decades of double income plans for every decade at that similar time. One adopted the correct method, while the other went astray. It took a few years to recover from that disaster, before the second, equally if not more disastrous, Cultural Revolution.
I agree with GODFREE ROBERTS that China had seen great changes due the Mao era, even though they were disrupted severely by the two mentioned disasters.
Showing posts with label Chinese government. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Chinese government. Show all posts
2016-04-28
"Dark period" is a over exaggeration
Comments on Editors, East Asia Forum "The limits to Chinese political power"
While many may have concerns regarding China’s direction in many fronts but particularly in its political direction, the use of the words “dark period” by Minzner to describe the current development and situation in the Chinese political system and governance is a bit unfortunate.
Yes President Xi has centralised certain controls, but that may be a over correction to the previous ineffective central leadership. I am not particularly knowledgeable of the central governance in China under President Hu, but there is saying that, in Chinese, “政令不出中南海“ (in English, it roughly means government commands does not go outside the Zhongnanhai, the Chinese Communist government’s Headquarters location) that may bear some truth of that ineffectiveness.
Whether it is collective leadership, or otherwise, that kind of ineffectiveness, if true, can be problematic for any country.
My best hope would be that the current development represents what in Chinese “矫枉过正”， that is, an overcorrection.
While many may have concerns regarding China’s direction in many fronts but particularly in its political direction, the use of the words “dark period” by Minzner to describe the current development and situation in the Chinese political system and governance is a bit unfortunate.
Yes President Xi has centralised certain controls, but that may be a over correction to the previous ineffective central leadership. I am not particularly knowledgeable of the central governance in China under President Hu, but there is saying that, in Chinese, “政令不出中南海“ (in English, it roughly means government commands does not go outside the Zhongnanhai, the Chinese Communist government’s Headquarters location) that may bear some truth of that ineffectiveness.
Whether it is collective leadership, or otherwise, that kind of ineffectiveness, if true, can be problematic for any country.
My best hope would be that the current development represents what in Chinese “矫枉过正”， that is, an overcorrection.
2015-07-15
Are Chinese authorities scared of the economy and stock market?
Comments on Peter Drysdale "No need for China’s leaders to lose nerve over market", 15/07/2015
Some may also argue that the rapid slowing in the growth of the Chinese economy would have been a major piece of evidence of poor handling of or leadership in the economy on the authorities behalf, even though the phrase of the so called "new normal" was probably the authorities attempt to prepare the public for the slowing.
The problem is that the slowing may have been or still be too much for comfort for the authorities.
Of course, should the over slowing of the Chinese economy and the panic in dealing with the stock market may, in turn, have implications for the pace of reforms. Some in the authorities may be really nervous now, so their confidence in reforms may be affected. In a Chinese saying "惊弓之鸟“ - the birds scared of bows.
Having said that, the piece today titled "China’s challenges drive experiment-driven reforms" from Andrew Sheng and Xiao Geng, provides some timely encouragement to Chinese economy observers, particularly overseas ones. And that is reassuring, indeed.
Some may also argue that the rapid slowing in the growth of the Chinese economy would have been a major piece of evidence of poor handling of or leadership in the economy on the authorities behalf, even though the phrase of the so called "new normal" was probably the authorities attempt to prepare the public for the slowing.
The problem is that the slowing may have been or still be too much for comfort for the authorities.
Of course, should the over slowing of the Chinese economy and the panic in dealing with the stock market may, in turn, have implications for the pace of reforms. Some in the authorities may be really nervous now, so their confidence in reforms may be affected. In a Chinese saying "惊弓之鸟“ - the birds scared of bows.
Having said that, the piece today titled "China’s challenges drive experiment-driven reforms" from Andrew Sheng and Xiao Geng, provides some timely encouragement to Chinese economy observers, particularly overseas ones. And that is reassuring, indeed.
2015-07-06
Some issues of China's economy
Comments on Peter Drysdale "Has China’s transition to ‘new normal’ growth stalled?" 7/07/2015
There is, arguably a measurement issue of total factor productivity in terms of inputs, particularly capital (investment). Some investment, for example, does not become capital immediately at the time of investment. Then there is a capital utilisation issue. Given Chinese government's structural adjustment/transition, some capital has been made idle or obsolete that should probably no longer be included as capital.
While clearly China has probably seen a limit on its labour supply, I remember that Professor Meng Xin mentioned at last year's China Update that there was still large amount of un-utilised labour in China, that cast some doubt on the argument of China has already at or past the Lewis point. If Professor Meng was correct, then one needs to look at the labour market in China differently and there is an issue for government policy to release idle or un-utilised labour into more productive use.
The more rapid increases in wage may be as much as the so called short supply in labour force as the Chinese government policy to force wage to rise more rapidly to ensure social stability.
Another point regarding the structural adjustment, there may, arguably, be a dynamic optimisation issue and whether the Chinese government's policies such forced closure of many plants of higher energy use or low efficiency ones, have been optimal or not is a question. For example, an alternative would be to more rapidly accelerate the service sector more as opposed to force a reduction in manufacturing activities.
But in China, the government is all powerful and much more powerful than most western countries' in terms of its relationship with the other agents in the economy.
Another point is the interpretation of the meaning of the "new normal" by the Chinese leadership. The simplest may be that it means a growth from high to "medium high" or "medium to high". Whether other adjustments are part of the "now normal" or not is a question, because one may interpret those adjustments as reforms under the "new normal" meant by the Chinese leadership.
Perhaps another way to put the dynamic optimisation in a more abstract form in terms of proportions is as the following:
when there is a structural imbalance: one adjustment is to reduce the excesses components to have the structure more balanced. Alternatively, another adjustment would be achieved through expanding the components that are in shortage, so the structure is moving towards to more balanced.
There is, arguably a measurement issue of total factor productivity in terms of inputs, particularly capital (investment). Some investment, for example, does not become capital immediately at the time of investment. Then there is a capital utilisation issue. Given Chinese government's structural adjustment/transition, some capital has been made idle or obsolete that should probably no longer be included as capital.
While clearly China has probably seen a limit on its labour supply, I remember that Professor Meng Xin mentioned at last year's China Update that there was still large amount of un-utilised labour in China, that cast some doubt on the argument of China has already at or past the Lewis point. If Professor Meng was correct, then one needs to look at the labour market in China differently and there is an issue for government policy to release idle or un-utilised labour into more productive use.
The more rapid increases in wage may be as much as the so called short supply in labour force as the Chinese government policy to force wage to rise more rapidly to ensure social stability.
Another point regarding the structural adjustment, there may, arguably, be a dynamic optimisation issue and whether the Chinese government's policies such forced closure of many plants of higher energy use or low efficiency ones, have been optimal or not is a question. For example, an alternative would be to more rapidly accelerate the service sector more as opposed to force a reduction in manufacturing activities.
But in China, the government is all powerful and much more powerful than most western countries' in terms of its relationship with the other agents in the economy.
Another point is the interpretation of the meaning of the "new normal" by the Chinese leadership. The simplest may be that it means a growth from high to "medium high" or "medium to high". Whether other adjustments are part of the "now normal" or not is a question, because one may interpret those adjustments as reforms under the "new normal" meant by the Chinese leadership.
Perhaps another way to put the dynamic optimisation in a more abstract form in terms of proportions is as the following:
when there is a structural imbalance: one adjustment is to reduce the excesses components to have the structure more balanced. Alternatively, another adjustment would be achieved through expanding the components that are in shortage, so the structure is moving towards to more balanced.
2013-10-25
Further reforms needed in China
Comments on Susan Shirk "Can China’s leaders harness support for change?", 25/10/2013, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/10/23/can-chinas-leaders-harness-support-for-change/
My feel is that it should be fairly easy to have the support of the vast majority of the Chinese people for further and sensible economic reforms, perhaps easier than it was 3 decades ago, when it was so difficult for people to struggle between the planning system and a market system, so that Deng invented the phrase “cross rivers through touching stones” and used that gradual approach to carry out reforms.
Nowadays, the market system has been almost fully embraced by the nation (apart from perhaps some of the monopoly state owned firms) and many people are currently the victim of monopolies as well as some economic policies including macroeconomic policies that give preferential treatment of the state monopolies at the expense of the vast majority of the people, such as low deposit rate and high lending rate with state owned firms treated favourably, the restrictive household registration system, the monopolistic pricing by state owned firms, etc.
Given there are high ranking officials in or associate with some state owned firms under investigations or prosecutions for corruptions or bribery or some misbehaviours, the resistance from vested interests in state owned big firms may not be as strong as many people thought.
There should also be real decentralisation in fiscal powers from the central to local governments, and at the same time to move the ocal government away from excessively relying on revenue from land sales and the use of grey banking for their finance.
However, any further reforms must have a focus of economy wide benefits and national interests that may mean starting with lifting
any restrictions for domestic players as the first step.
My feel is that it should be fairly easy to have the support of the vast majority of the Chinese people for further and sensible economic reforms, perhaps easier than it was 3 decades ago, when it was so difficult for people to struggle between the planning system and a market system, so that Deng invented the phrase “cross rivers through touching stones” and used that gradual approach to carry out reforms.
Nowadays, the market system has been almost fully embraced by the nation (apart from perhaps some of the monopoly state owned firms) and many people are currently the victim of monopolies as well as some economic policies including macroeconomic policies that give preferential treatment of the state monopolies at the expense of the vast majority of the people, such as low deposit rate and high lending rate with state owned firms treated favourably, the restrictive household registration system, the monopolistic pricing by state owned firms, etc.
Given there are high ranking officials in or associate with some state owned firms under investigations or prosecutions for corruptions or bribery or some misbehaviours, the resistance from vested interests in state owned big firms may not be as strong as many people thought.
There should also be real decentralisation in fiscal powers from the central to local governments, and at the same time to move the ocal government away from excessively relying on revenue from land sales and the use of grey banking for their finance.
However, any further reforms must have a focus of economy wide benefits and national interests that may mean starting with lifting
any restrictions for domestic players as the first step.
2011-10-28
A hard call by Roubini, maybe
Comments on Andrew Burrell and David Uren “'Hard landing' coming in China, warns Nouriel Roubini”, 26/10/2011, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/economics/hard-landing-coming-in-china-warns-nouriel-roubini/story-e6frg926-1226176718241
China is in a much better position to weather another downturn in many of the world's advanced economies.
There are a number of reasons for such optimism about the Chinese economy. Firstly, its central government debt is much more manageable compared to many of the advanced economies.
Secondly, the Chinese government has a higher degree of control of its economy, largely as a legacy of its incomplete transition from its past planned economy.
Thirdly, it's domestic demand is large and there is considerable room to invest in infrastructure and housing due to its urbanisation process.
Fourthly, while another downturn in the advanced economies would reduce their aggregate external demand for each of them, it does not necessarily mean China's exports to them as a whole will be reduced to the same degree. To the contrary, China's exports may replace some of the trade between those economies including some of their domestic outputs.
So if one really understands the Chinese economy and its dynamics including its experience from the last GFC, one will certainly be optimistic about its growth over the next decade or so.
However, a good growth may not necessarily mean more growth in demand for raw materials over the next decade at the same speed as in the past decade or so.
The "material intensity" of the Chinese economy is likely to fall gradually at first and then more rapidly in a few years' time.
That is determined simply by its stage of economic development.
China is in a much better position to weather another downturn in many of the world's advanced economies.
There are a number of reasons for such optimism about the Chinese economy. Firstly, its central government debt is much more manageable compared to many of the advanced economies.
Secondly, the Chinese government has a higher degree of control of its economy, largely as a legacy of its incomplete transition from its past planned economy.
Thirdly, it's domestic demand is large and there is considerable room to invest in infrastructure and housing due to its urbanisation process.
Fourthly, while another downturn in the advanced economies would reduce their aggregate external demand for each of them, it does not necessarily mean China's exports to them as a whole will be reduced to the same degree. To the contrary, China's exports may replace some of the trade between those economies including some of their domestic outputs.
So if one really understands the Chinese economy and its dynamics including its experience from the last GFC, one will certainly be optimistic about its growth over the next decade or so.
However, a good growth may not necessarily mean more growth in demand for raw materials over the next decade at the same speed as in the past decade or so.
The "material intensity" of the Chinese economy is likely to fall gradually at first and then more rapidly in a few years' time.
That is determined simply by its stage of economic development.
2011-03-22
The Princeling camp?
Comments on David Kelly “Chinese political transition: split in the Princeling camp?”, 21/03/2011, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/03/21/chinese-political-transition-split-in-the-princeling-camp/
One has to wonder whether there has ever been a unified Princeling camp in China, ever since the Cultural Revolution, or the end of it.
Further, as in Australia here, the word 'reform' has been used in China literally for change at the best by many people and should be supported without any reservation, irrespective whether it is for the better or the worse. An example in Australia was the 'building the education revolution' projects that have been reportedly wasted billions of Australian taxpayer’s money in the wake of the GFC.
If reforms, such as privatisation of state owned firms, in China resulted in state assets corruptly becoming some privileged persons’ private assets, should they be good for the Chinese as a whole? Many Chinese have complained that past privatisation has produced many billionaires who were connected directly or indirectly to people in power.
A lesson learnt from Australian politics is not to believe spins, especially political ones.
One has to wonder whether there has ever been a unified Princeling camp in China, ever since the Cultural Revolution, or the end of it.
Further, as in Australia here, the word 'reform' has been used in China literally for change at the best by many people and should be supported without any reservation, irrespective whether it is for the better or the worse. An example in Australia was the 'building the education revolution' projects that have been reportedly wasted billions of Australian taxpayer’s money in the wake of the GFC.
If reforms, such as privatisation of state owned firms, in China resulted in state assets corruptly becoming some privileged persons’ private assets, should they be good for the Chinese as a whole? Many Chinese have complained that past privatisation has produced many billionaires who were connected directly or indirectly to people in power.
A lesson learnt from Australian politics is not to believe spins, especially political ones.
2011-03-16
How likely is a ‘Jasmine revolution’ in China?
Comments on Feng Chongyi “‘Jasmine revolution’ in China over the horizon”, 16/03/2011, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/03/15/%e2%80%98jasmine-revolution%e2%80%99-in-china-over-the-horizon/
It appears that Professor Feng may have over-stated the problems existing in China, though that does not mean the problems aren't serious and that they don't need careful solutions.
For the majority of people in China, the choice is between an ideal democratic system that may not necessarily be practical in China but may disrupt its economic development and limited democracy under one party rule but that can have stability and rapid economic development.
Most of them are realistic and pragmatic enough to choose.
Yes, there are more than 1.3 billion people in China and there are always very different views.
But is that enough for a revolution?
I personally doubt it, especially given China's history before the communist party and since the reforms began.
It appears that Professor Feng may have over-stated the problems existing in China, though that does not mean the problems aren't serious and that they don't need careful solutions.
For the majority of people in China, the choice is between an ideal democratic system that may not necessarily be practical in China but may disrupt its economic development and limited democracy under one party rule but that can have stability and rapid economic development.
Most of them are realistic and pragmatic enough to choose.
Yes, there are more than 1.3 billion people in China and there are always very different views.
But is that enough for a revolution?
I personally doubt it, especially given China's history before the communist party and since the reforms began.
2010-02-15
Different meanings of monopoly in China
Comments on Sun Tianfu “Consumer angst over reform of China’s age-old salt monopoly”, 13/02/2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/02/13/consumer-angst-over-reform-of-chinas-age-old-salt-monopoly/
Noted that this is a translation, I would like to point out that some context may be missing.
The monopoly the author talks about is meant to be State monopoly, but not the normal monopoly in economics where there is only one firm to supply a product or in an industry.
As the article mentions that there is a salt industry association and there were at least 28 major companies in the industry.
In this case, it is still unclear how the State monopoly works, given that there also appears to be private companies, as the article mentions.
Noted that this is a translation, I would like to point out that some context may be missing.
The monopoly the author talks about is meant to be State monopoly, but not the normal monopoly in economics where there is only one firm to supply a product or in an industry.
As the article mentions that there is a salt industry association and there were at least 28 major companies in the industry.
In this case, it is still unclear how the State monopoly works, given that there also appears to be private companies, as the article mentions.
2009-11-17
Let economic reforms and evolution do the job in China
Comments on Dan Ryan “Hu Jintao, tear down that Mao”, 17/11/2009, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/hu-jintao-tear-down-that-mao/story-e6frg6ux-1225798347631
In most cases, evolution is better than revolution. That also applies to East Europe.
Besides the China way and the East Europe way, there should be other ways that are likely better.
But it may be true that the evolution in China is slow.
However, one should not forget that China suffered a long period both domestic chaos and wars, and invasions by others before the Chinese Communists came to power in 1949. It is by no means sure that tearing down Mao too quickly would or will be good for China.
An orderly transition, starting from the economy and then gradually to other areas, may not be a bad thing for China after all. Given its size, it is not bad for the region either.
What China has been pursuing is pragmatic not ideological in that sense. One should not lose the context.
In most cases, evolution is better than revolution. That also applies to East Europe.
Besides the China way and the East Europe way, there should be other ways that are likely better.
But it may be true that the evolution in China is slow.
However, one should not forget that China suffered a long period both domestic chaos and wars, and invasions by others before the Chinese Communists came to power in 1949. It is by no means sure that tearing down Mao too quickly would or will be good for China.
An orderly transition, starting from the economy and then gradually to other areas, may not be a bad thing for China after all. Given its size, it is not bad for the region either.
What China has been pursuing is pragmatic not ideological in that sense. One should not lose the context.
2009-09-19
Chinese government should uphold the law and eliminate discrimination
Comments on Peter Yuan Cai “Between Scylla and Charybdis: the CCP’s minority policy dilemma”, 18/09/2009, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/09/18/between-scylla-and-charybdis-the-ccps-minority-policy-dilemma/
While it is difficult enough for the Chinese government to maintain appropriate balance between pleasing both domestic and international audiences, at stake is whether there is justice in China.
Many of China’s policies are discriminative, such as the family planning, religions, and household registration system, etc. The discriminations generally fall on Han people and people living in rural areas.
Chinese government can make its life easier by eliminating discriminations in its system.
Chinese government should improve its skills in dealing with both domestic and international people. There is nothing wrong in upholding justice and against violence, irrespective who are against the law and what ethnic groups they are from.
While it is difficult enough for the Chinese government to maintain appropriate balance between pleasing both domestic and international audiences, at stake is whether there is justice in China.
Many of China’s policies are discriminative, such as the family planning, religions, and household registration system, etc. The discriminations generally fall on Han people and people living in rural areas.
Chinese government can make its life easier by eliminating discriminations in its system.
Chinese government should improve its skills in dealing with both domestic and international people. There is nothing wrong in upholding justice and against violence, irrespective who are against the law and what ethnic groups they are from.
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